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THE CAPITAL COMMONS: DIGITAL MONEY AND CITIZENS’ FINANCE IN A 
PRODUCTIVE COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC - ABSTRACT 
 
Robert C. Hockett 
All societies must address two questions where the organization of productive activity is concerned. The 
first is whether production will be mainly publicly managed, privately managed, or 'mixed.' The second is 
whether the financing of production will be mainly publicly managed, privately managed, or mixed. 
 
In the American commercial republic, we seem more or less to have answered the 'who does production' 
question to our own satisfaction. From the founding era to the present, we have elected to leave production 
primarily, though not of course solely, 'in private hands.' Where the financing of production is concerned, 
on the other hand, we have been more ambivalent. 
 
For the past 160 years, our financial system has operated as a public-private franchise arrangement. At the 
core of our franchise lie the sovereign public (the 'public' of our 'republic') and its money-modulator – the 
issuer and manager of its monetized full faith and credit, its 'money' – on the one hand, and the private 
sector financial institutions and markets we publicly license to allocate most of the resultant Wicksellian 
'bank money' or 'credit-money' on the other hand. At the periphery of the franchise lie those institutions and 
markets that 'shadow bank' through relations with the banking core. 
 
In recent years, developments in several distinct spaces have prompted what amounts to a broad 
reassessment of our hybrid financial arrangements. One such development is weariness with our system's 
penchant for over-generating public credit that fuels bubbles and busts rather than production, a product of 
leaving our public capital - by far the greater part of investment capital - to private management. This is 
what the author has long called poor credit modulation. 
 
Another ground of critique is our hybrid system's poor record on what the author has long called credit 
allocation, from which modulation turns out to be inseparable. Our morbid fear of explicitly, rather than 
implicitly, ‘picking winners and losers’ is the culprit here. Finally, other sources of disenchantment are our 
system's long-term worsening of inequality, the scandal of commercial and financial exclusion our system 
permits, and the promise offered by new financial technologies where ending both that and leaky monetary 
policy are concerned. The current Covid pandemic and recent murder of George Floyd of course 
underscore these sources of disillusion. 
 
This article embraces these critiques, which the author himself has leveled continuously over the past 
fifteen years, argues that privately ordered production requires publicly ordered finance, and shows how to 
order finance publicly on a Fed balance sheet forthrightly recognized as a Citizens’ Ledger. New public 
investments will make up the asset side of the upgraded Fed balance sheet, while a corresponding system of 
digital public banking through ‘FedWallets’ will upgrade the liability side of the same. Newly restored 
regional Fed functionalities ('Spreading the Fed'), an FSOC-inspired National Reconstruction and 
Development Council (NRDC) and its financing arm (a restored RFC), and a price-stabilizing 'People's 
Portfolio' round out the new system of Citizens' Finance. 
 
In the course of its arguments, the article traces all salient consequences that flow from its overhaul of our 
system of financing production, from banking through ‘shadow banking’ to the capital markets. It also 
makes some surprising discoveries along the way. Among these is that full separation of Fed and Treasury 
and hence monetary and fiscal policy, itself an artifact of franchise finance and hence the false hope of 
separating credit modulation from credit allocation, is no longer tenable. Another is that global central bank 
digital currency (CBDC) development is now corroborating much of what the article argues.. 
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INTRODUCTION: COMMERCE, FINANCE, AND PRODUCTIVE REPUBLICS  
Americans have long prided themselves on their innovative 
entrepreneurial culture and the associated creative dynamism of their 
productive economy. They have likewise long celebrated the fact that their 
polity was founded as, and in many ways remains, a democratic republic—a 
res publica (“public thing”) inclusively constituted and managed by 
materially independent and freely associating citizens, households, and 
firms (personae privata).1 This ideal of the “commonwealth” or “good 
society,” traceable to 17th century English and 18th century Scottish 
Enlightenment updatings of Renaissance Italian and Roman Republican 
antecedents, often travels together with two related conceptions—those of a 
“commercial republic” and the “exchange economy” that serves as any such 
republic’s material foundation.2   
                                                
     1 Cf. ROBERT HOCKETT, A REPUBLIC OF OWNERS (forthcoming Yale University Press, 
2020). 
     2 Id. See also Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic Through Hamiltonian Means: 
Values, Constraints, and Finance in an American ‘Ownership Society’, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
45 (2006) [hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic]; Robert Hockett, Materializing Citizenship: 
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Key to the formation and healthy maintenance of any such society 
and associated economy are their mode or modes of finance—the means by 
which current resources find deployment in the production of future 
resources, or “wealth.”3 Virtually by definition in any such society and 
associated economy, these modes themselves will involve at least some 
degree of private sector project-planning and associated “private ordering.”4 
Finance being a matter of channeling today’s resources to the production of 
tomorrow’s resources, and such “channeling” in any exchange economy 
being at least partly a matter of contractual transfer, financial modalities 
will make at least some use of commercial modalities.5 They will employ 
modes of payment through which productive units can purchase access to 
productive “inputs” that they do not already have—that is, finance their 
productive operations—in producing the “outputs” that constitute their 
material wealth6 
This reliance of financial modalities on commercial modalities in 
any exchange economy on the one hand, and the aforementioned “mixed” 
public/private character of any republic, including a commercial republic, 
on the other hand, confront the citizens of any such republic with a critical 
foundational choice. That is the choice of what roles the “public” and 
“private” sectors will play in supplying the indispensible value-transfer 
(“payment”), value-storage (“saving”), and other commercial and financial 
infrastructures used by productive units on the one hand, and what 
associated roles public and private should play in governing productive 
financial flows via those structures on the other hand.7 Should production 
itself be a private sector affair while financing production is made a public 
sector affair, for example? Should the reverse be the case? Or should both 
finance and production be mainly public or mainly private affairs? 
                                                                                                                       
Finance in a Producers’ Republic, 63 EMORY L. J. 55 (2014) [hereinafter Materializing 
Citizenship]; and Robert Hockett, Pre-Liberal Autonomy & Post-Liberal Finance, 77 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 105, 126 (2014) [hereinafter Pre-Liberal Autonomy]. 
     3 See sources cited id. See also Robert Hockett, Rousseauvian Money (Cornell Law 
Sch., Research Paper No. 18-48), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278408 [hereinafter Rousseauvian 
Money]. 
     4 See sources cited id. 
     5 Id. See also Robert Hockett, The Democratic Digital Dollar: A Digital Savings and 
Payments Platform for Fully Inclusive State, Local, and National Money and Banking 
Systems, 10 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 (2020) (“Because a money is simply what counts for 
purposes of accounting, accumulating, and transferring value within a given value-storage 
and -payments system,1 supplying a universally accessible architecture of the kind here 
designed is equivalent to supplying a universal (1) currency, (2) trade and payments, and 
(3) retail banking platform to all who participate.”).  
     6 Id. 
     7 Id. 
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In the American commercial republic, we have more or less 
definitively answered, to our own satisfaction at least, the “who does 
production” question—at least from the founding era to the present day: we 
have elected to leave production primarily, though not of course solely, “in 
private hands.” We don’t have extensive networks of “public sector 
industry” and “state-owned enterprises,” for example, even though we do 
have some “government corporations” and “government-sponsored 
enterprises” (GSEs).8  
Where the financing of production is concerned, by contrast, we 
have been decidedly more ambivalent throughout our history. On the one 
hand, we have in the past founded and operated two national development 
banks—the First and Second Banks of the United States, which helped 
oversee and finance national economic development in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries.9 And we have founded and operated at least two more 
modern national institutions dedicated to productive mobilization and what 
might be called national redevelopment—viz. the War Finance Corporation 
(WFC) and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which presided 
over national war mobilization and productive revitalization during the first 
half of the 20th century.10  
On the other hand, we have also allowed a nominally private sector 
“financial services industry” both to flourish and to grow into an ever-larger 
part of our GDP-measured macro-economy, especially over the past 50 
years.11 And we tell ourselves to this very day that this industry is the 
primary driver—indeed both the coordinator and the “fuel”-supplier—of 
our national production processes themselves.12 
The fact of the matter, then, is that while the American commercial 
republic’s productive processes both are and have always to this point been 
by and large privately ordered, our financial system is and has always been 
hybrid in character. It has been a mix of combined public and private sector 
credit allocation on the one hand, and variably successful public credit 
modulation on the other hand—success and failure in turn fluctuating with 
changing degrees of public sector appreciation that credit allocation on the 
one hand, and modulation on the other, cannot ultimately be kept separate.13  
                                                
     8 See infra, Parts II and III. 
     9 Id. 
     10 Id. 
     11 Id. 
     12 Id. 
     13 See infra, Part I. The modulation versus allocation distinction, and the ultimate 
practical inseparability of the two, is introduced in Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for 
Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter Fixer-Upper]. It also figures 
prominently in the work cited infra, note 17. 
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It is this problem—that of fluctuating success and failure in the 
mixed public/private financing of private sector production—which I aim to 
address, even to solve, through this article. I aim to do that by showing how 
best to end financial hybridity itself, separating our financial system into 
distinct public and private sector components along lines that make good 
institutional sense as a matter of both democratic republican justice and 
commercial republican productivity. But specifying in detail what this 
entails requires more specificity both about the nature of our distinctly 
American species of financial hybridity on the one hand, and about what 
susceptibilities to disease are encoded in the DNA, so to speak, of that 
species on the other hand. Explicating what parts or portion of our financial 
system should be made forthrightly part of “the commons” in our 
“commonwealth,” in other words, requires that we carefully explicate what 
parts of it already are…                        
For the past 160 years, the American financial system has operated 
not only as a generically hybrid arrangement, but more specifically as a 
public-private franchise arrangement.14 At the core of our franchise lie the 
sovereign public (the “public” of our “republic”) and its money-
modulator—the issuer and manager of its monetized full faith and credit, its 
“money”—on the one hand, and the private sector financial institutions and 
markets that are publicly licensed to allocate most of the resultant “credit-
money” on the other hand.15  
For the half-century following the mid-1860s, our public money-
modulator was the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a 
regulator whose name is suggestive but whose role grew progressively more 
obscure to the public once its original mandate was transferred, in principal 
part, to the Federal Reserve (Fed) circa 1913.16 Since the latter date, and 
                                                
     14 See Robert Hockett, Finance without Financiers in DEMOCRATIZING FINANCE 5-6 
(Erik Olin Wright ed., forthcoming Verso Press, 2020 [2015]) [hereinafter Finance without 
Financiers] (discussing how the privately owned banks in conjunction with a publicly 
administered sovereign currency create a public-private partnership); Robert C. Hockett & 
Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2017) 
[hereinafter Finance Franchise] (explaining that at its core, the financial system can be 
seen as public-private partnership); see also infra Part I (explaining further the 
public/private partnership in our hybrid financial system). 
     15 Finance without Financiers, id., at 9-11 (explainig how banks, having monetized the 
full faith and credit, make up the core of the financial system); Finance Franchise, id., at 
1164 (same). For more on money, credit-money, modulation, and allocation see supra, note 
13, and infra Parts I-III. 
     16 See Robert C. Hockett, Money’s Past Is Fintech’s Future: Wildcat Crypto, the Digital 
Dollar, and Citizen Central Banking, 2 STANFORD J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2019) 
[hereinafter Money’s Past] (“The Federal Reserve Act (‘FRA’) of 1913 established the Fed 
that we all know today, and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national 
money supply from the Comptroller to this new entity.”). 
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especially since the banking reforms of the 1930s, the Fed has served as our 
republic’s primary money-modulator, while private sector financial 
institutions have continued to act as our primary, though not as our sole, 
money-allocators.17  
Over the last decade, developments in several distinct “spaces” have 
prompted what is in effect, even if not yet in name, a broad reassessment of 
our hybrid financial arrangements.18 One such development has been the 
worldwide financial debacle of just over a decade ago, as followed by its 
debt-deflationary sequel—a still-lingering malady that proximately 
originated in American financial dysfunction and ultimately culminated in 
global economic devastation.19 These events and their extended aftermath 
have led some to propose elimination or curtailment of the mandate of the 
public member of our public-private finance franchise—“end[ing] the Fed,” 
                                                
     17 See, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, FINANCING THE NEW GREEN DEAL: A PLAN OF ACTION 
AND RENEWAL (forthcoming Palgrave Economics 2020) (discussing the modulatory and 
allocative tasks); Fixer-Upper, supra note 13 at 142 (introducing the idea of financial 
“regulation as modulation”); Robert Hockett, An FSOC for Continuous Public Investment: 
The National Reconstruction and Development Council, 10 MICH. J. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. __ (2020) (forthcoming); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. 
Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 
43 J. CORP. L. 437, 441 (2018) [hereinafter National Investment Authority] (reminding 
readers of the difference between the credit modulation task and the credit allocation task); 
Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to 
Systemic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 229 
(2014) [hereinafter Macroprudential Turn] (declaring that the reason the central bank is 
suited to regulate finance macroprudentially is because the central authority already is a 
money-modulator and that money); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors 
in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 
144 (2015) [hereinafter Public Actors] (stating the Fed’s role as a modulator, and extending 
it, by analogy, to the labor market); Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: A Constructive 
Retrieval for Global Finance, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 404 (2013) [hereinafter 
Bretton Woods 1.0] (observing that the central bank has essential credit-modulator duties 
that if it is prevented from exercising can have negative consequences); Saule T. Omarova, 
New Tech Versus New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. REG. 735, 
735, 742 (2019) [hereinafter New Tech Versus New Deal] (explaining the private right of 
credit allocation and the public responsibility of credit modulation); Finance Franchise, 
supra note 1, at 1213 (summarizing the task the central bank has in modulating the credit 
supply, and the task private institutions have in allocating the credit). 
     18 See, e.g., Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17 (outlining the different 
issues across several spaces that have impacted the American financial system). 
     19 See, e.g., Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 4, at 452 (“Scarce wonder, then, that the IMF 
reported, in 2009, the first worldwide economic contraction since the 1940s. Was the Fed 
asleep at the switch?”); Fixer-Upper, supra note 4, at 1218 (citing the real estate crash of 
2008 as an event that caused both an American and global financial downturn). 
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as one cry has it20—or binding its hands by removing the public credit 
element from public credit-money through reinstating some variant of the 
antiquated practice of “pegging” currencies to exogenously given stocks of 
glittering metals.21 The same developments have prompted others to 
propose elimination or curtailment of the mandate of the private members 
of our public-private finance franchise arrangement—that is, to eliminate or 
dramatically reduce our banking institutions’ credit-disseminating role 
through “100% money” (also known as “narrow banking”), or, somewhat 
more modestly, what I will call “40% money” proposals.22   
A second, related development prompting a rethink of our American 
brand of public-private hybrid finance has been a growing awareness, on 
the part of many observers, that substantial sectors of the American 
citizenry not only are disproportionately harmed by finance-associated 
productive dysfunction, but also are denied access both to essential savings 
and payment infrastructures and, therefore, to the very financial system that 
too often generates financial and, with it, productive breakdown in the first 
place.23 This recognition, the modern manifestations of which first began to 
                                                
     20 See, e.g., RON PAUL, END THE FED 141 (2009) (“The Federal Reserve should be 
abolished because it is immoral, unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad economics, 
and undermines liberty.”). 
     21 Compare DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION: THE CORRUPTION OF 
CAPITALISM IN AMERICA 706-12 (2013) (setting out thirteen different way in which the Fed 
and its policies could be reformed), and JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS: THE MAKING 
OF THE NEXT GLOBAL CRISIS 255-58 (2012) (explaining various ways that the Fed’s 
policies can be improved to have a better currency) with Robert C. Hockett, Don’t Catch 
His Eye, SALON (Apr. 4, 2013, 9:08 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2013/04/04/don%E2%80%99t_catch_his_eye_david_stockman%E
2%80%99s_alien_abduction_partner/ [https://perma.cc/VX8N-KANQ] (concluding that 
the solution is not to restrict the fed, but rather to exercise good judgement ourselves). 
     22 For more on these proposals, see infra Part V. 
     23 See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 162 (2015) (proposing a more 
strengthened Community Reinvestment Act); Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, 
Savings, Assets, and Banking among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, 
in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 1-22, 3 (Rebecca M. Blank and Michael S. Barr eds., 2009) 
(explaining the concept of financial inclusion in including financial services for the poor); 
ELLEN BROWN, THE PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION: FROM AUSTERITY TO PROSPERITY 397 
(2013) [hereinafter PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION] (explains the public banking solutions at the 
federal level); ELLEN BROWN, WEB OF DEBT 342 (2012) [hereinafter WEB OF DEBT] (citing 
community banking as an example of public banking); BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEMS: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCESS (Michael S. Barr et al., eds. 2007) 
[hereinafter BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS] (discussing the current state of 
microfinance and ideas to increase access to financial services); ORGANIZING ACCESS TO 
CAPITAL: ADVOCACY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 10-13 
(Gregory D. Squires ed., 2003) (detailing the benefits of the Community Reinvestment Act 
as a reason for strengthening it); JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, 
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appear in the 1990s, has prompted calls for publicly facilitated micro-
lending or micro-finance, for an “Occupy Bank,” for public banking, for a 
strengthened Community Reinvestment Act, and for sundry forms of 
publicly facilitated financial inclusion or “banking [of] the poor.”24 
Although proponents do not always seem fully cognizant of it, these 
                                                                                                                       
CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES (1992) (discussing 
development banks and their role in expanding financial access); MICHAEL SHERRADEN, 
ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY 305-08 (1991) (explaining 
policy innovations that can result in greater asset building for the poor); Michael 
Sherraden, Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR: 
THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP 302 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. 
Wolff eds., 2001) (discussing how the poor are unlikely to benefit from asset-based 
policies due to lack of participation and highly regressive tax benefits); LISA SERVON, THE 
UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS SURVIVES 170 (2017) (arguing 
for more government involvement in the financial sector, and in banking, focus the banks 
on serving the public); MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, SAVINGS FOR THE POOR: THE HIDDEN 
BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC BANKING (1999) (arguing electronic banking will expand 
financial access to the poor); MUHAMMAD YUNUS, A WORLD OF THREE ZEROS: THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF ZERO POVERTY, ZERO UNEMPLOYMENT, AND ZERO CARBON EMISSIONS 248 
(2018) (explaining the creation and concept of social business funds to help the public); 
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121, 128 (2004) (explaining the 
importance of strengthening the community reinvestment act). For sympathetic but sober 
critiques, see Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 2 at 126 (outlining the importance of 
public community reinvestment alternatives, among them microlending); Materializing 
Citizenship, supra note 2 at 68 (“Small-scale community reinvestment, development 
banking, and microlending, as well as reenlisting the Postal Service as a savings outlet for 
the financially humble, are all very good ideas—particularly the latter, in my view”). On 
the Occupy Money Cooperative, of which the author is a founding Board Member, see The 
Occupy Money Card, POPULAR RESISTANCE.ORG (July 22, 2013), 
https://popularresistance.org/the-occupy-card/ [https://perma.cc/XUR3-WHKS] (calling for 
using the occupy card to pay, and each transaction being a form of protest with every 
purchase against the financial institutions); see also Quentin Fottrell, Is Occupy Debit Card 
Bad for the 99%?, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 8, 2013, 9:29 AM), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-occupy-debit-card-bad-for-the-99-2013-10-02 
[https://perma.cc/HXL4-A8ZZ] (examining the consequences of the occupy card 
movement and its effects on financial markets). 
24 See, e.g., Margot Adler, Occupy Groups Reimagine the Bank, NPR (Mar. 27, 2002), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/03/27/149443425/alternative-banking-groups-aid-occupy-
movement [https://perma.cc/CW5J-NFVF] (explaining the Occupy Bank Working Group’s 
hopes of a democratic or national bank to better serve the underbanked community); Eillie 
Anzilotti, The One Strategy That Could Finance the Whole Green New Deal, FAST 
COMPANY (June 26, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90364616/public-banking-can-
finance-the-green-new-deal [https://perma.cc/GVN5-VZNV] (discussing the rise of the 
public banking idea, the operation of public banks, and how they can aid in the Green New 
Deal); Marguerite S. Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the 
Poor, THE WORLD BANK (2001), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/226941468049448875/sustainable-finance-for-
the-poor [https://perma.cc/YF8Z-YU9Z] (discussing the need for and benefits of 
microfinance). 
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proposals link up quite intimately with the first class of proposals via an 
underappreciated yet quite consequential common denominator—the role 
that widening wealth and income inequality plays in underwriting both 
commercial-cum-financial exclusion and financial-cum-macroeconomic 
fragility.25   
Finally, a third development prompting a rethink of our hybrid 
American form of public-private finance has been the spread of new 
technologies of trade and payment—in effect, new commercial 
infrastructures.26 These have led some to prognosticate, in some cases 
breathlessly, that sovereign currencies are destined to be pushed aside and 
replaced by privately issued crypto-currencies, digital assets, and other 
forms or outgrowths of “fintech.”27 Advocates of this crypto-utopian (I will 
call it “cryptopian”) persuasion sometimes sound rather like “metalists” of 
the sort mentioned above, inasmuch as they tout crypto-currencies’ 
contrived scarcity as a characteristic that renders them something like 21st 
century “digital gold.”28 Other, in my view more careful, observers also see 
                                                
     25 See Robert Hockett, Income Inequality and Financial Fragility, 77 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. EN BANC 119, 120 (2018) (explaining that the significant wealth and income 
inequality is linked to market fragility); Robert Hockett & Daniel Dillon, Income Inequality 
and Market Fragility: Some Empirics in the Political Economy of Finance, Part I & II, 63 
CHALLENGE __ (2019) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2204710. 
     26 See infra Part IV (showing a comprehensive overview, as attentive to perils as to 
opportunities). For a comprehensive overview, as attentive to perils as to opportunities, see 
New Tech Versus New Deal, supra note 17, at 737 (giving examples of fintech and 
cryptocurrencies affecting the public-private finance model); see also Finance without 
Financiers, supra note 14, at 25 (discussing new technologies in the modern shadow 
banking markets); Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1202 (explaining that fintech 
portrays itself as a revolutionary alternative to the existing financial system). 
27 These claims are now far too numerous to cite comprehensively, and grow 
increasingly difficult to read without laughter, though I engage with them infra Parts II–III. 
For a few recent examples typical of the genre, see, e.g., Frank Holmes, Bitcoin Could 
Replace Cash in 10 Years, BUS. INSIDER (May 1, 2018, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-might-replace-cash-10-years-2018-5 (discussing 
the maturation and growth of digital currency and claiming cryptocurrency is a contender 
to replace cash in the future); Paul Schrodt, Cryptocurrency Will Replace National 
Currencies by 2030, According to This Futurist, MONEY (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://time.com/money/5178814/the-future-of-cryptocurrency/ [https://perma.cc/UF4N-
FEA5] (explaining that cryptocurrencies are positioned to replace fiat currencies in the next 
10 years); Aman Swami, Cryptocurrency Will Replace Fiat Currency in the Future Says 
Famous Venture Capitalist, DOLLAR DESTRUCTION (May 19, 2018), 
https://dollardestruction.com/5441/ [https://perma.cc/T5EP-C9F8] (discussing Tim 
Draper’s view that cryptocurrency will replace fiat currencies completely). 
28 See, e.g., NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS 
AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY X (2015) (stating that in designing 
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promise in blockchain, other distributed ledger, and cognate computing and 
coding technologies of the kind that now underwrite crypto-assets, but see 
promise of a much different sort.29 They see the prospect of a safer, faster, 
and more secure value-storage and -transfer system—a payments system 
that, depending on who deploys and administers it, can make for more just 
and efficient central banking and finance too.30  
I aim with this article to end financial hybridity and address the 
aforementioned “what part of our commonwealth’s financial system should 
be part of the commons” question by developing the case for the latter 
view—the view that sees qualified promise in public deployment of digital 
technology in the realms of both commerce and finance.31 Just as 
importantly, and in the same cause, I also aim to make a new case for the 
“pro-public” camps in respect of the other two recent developments just 
noted—critique of the private financier’s role in our nation’s hybrid 
financial system, and advocacy of a more unambiguously public form of 
banking and finance in our productive republic.32 I aim to do all of this with 
                                                                                                                       
bitcoin, the “Cypherpunks” decided it should be scarce, a characteristic of successful 
coinage). 
29 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that the distributed ledger 
provided by cryptography will result in the federal reserve issuing its own form of a digital 
dollar that will be safer and more efficient). 
30 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the benefits of cryptography in a providing safer and 
more efficient payment systems, rather than to be used as brand new cryptocurrencies); see 
also Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that the distributed ledger provided by 
cryptography will result in the federal reserve issuing its own form of a digital dollar that 
will be safer and more efficient); Robert Hockett, Betting on Betacoin, FORBES (Dec. 17, 
2017, 5:59 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2017/12/17/betting-on-beta-
coin/#1661e5124670 [https://perma.cc/D456-LA4P] [hereinafter Betting on Betacoin] 
(showing that the distributed ledger and cryptography can be used to improved our current 
payment system, and not creating cryptocurrencies).  
31 My earlier, more tentative endorsements include, e.g., Finance without Financiers, 
supra note 1, at 28-29 (discussing the Fed’s relationship to repo technologies); Finance 
Franchise, supra note 1, at 1120-21 (recognizing that the U.S. may soon be involved with 
transforming digital currencies into tradable raw materials); Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 
1-2 (discussing growing public interest in cryptocurrencies); Betting on Betacoin, supra 
note 17 (discussing how, like Sony’s investments in video technology in the 1970s, the 
public may seek to invest in cryptocurrencies).  
32 In Finance without Financiers, Finance Franchise, and Public Actors, the prospect 
remained open that the public-private franchise arrangement could remain viable if the 
franchisor and its designated agents— in particular the Congress, the White House, the Fed 
and the Treasury—could remain mindful of the franchisor’s critical role in the division of 
labor. Finance without Financiers, supra note 1, at 14-19; Finance Franchise, supra note 
1, at 1146-49; Public Actors, supra note 4, at 137. I still believe this, but am now more 
pessimistic about the likelihood of continuous cognizance, across differing political eras, of 
that that role. As I argue below in Part V, I think the proposal that I make here will 
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a single far-reaching proposal that will find useful schematic expression on 
both the asset and the liability sides of present-day Fed and Treasury 
balance sheets—effectively our public ledger. And I hope to make my case 
on grounds of both political justice and productive efficiency on the one 
hand, and our commercial and financial history on the other—a history that 
manifests a distinct teleological trajectory.33  
The proposal, which I call “Citizen Finance,” is in a way simple and 
long overdue, even while bearing many attractively transformative 
ramifications that appear to have escaped notice till now. It is that our 
republic’s monetary and fiscal authorities—our Fed and Treasury—cease 
conducting their money-modulating and implicit capital-allocating 
operations primarily indirectly, via the media of private sector bank reserve 
accounts, associated private sector bank and capital market lending, and Fed 
open market operations in generic Treasury securities on private sector 
financial markets, and instead do so directly—by (a) channeling monetized 
public full faith and credit primarily through public investment institutions 
rather than private sector depository institutions and “shadow banks” as 
they do now, on the asset side of the balance sheet, and (b) a new national 
payments platform and associated system of what I call digital Citizen and 
Resident Wallets, on the liability side of the balance sheet.34  
                                                                                                                       
effectively “institutionalize” that cognizance in a manner that renders it more robust and 
enduring. 
33 See infra Parts IV and V (referencing citizen finance-related proposals). 
34 There is some overlap between my proposal and (a) my more limited “Inclusive 
Value Ledger” legislation now proposed in the State of New York; (b) those of a number of 
central banks worldwide, discussed infra, Part VI; and (c) a number of friends and 
colleagues with whom I have discussed these and related matters for some five or six years 
now. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, The New York Inclusive Value Ledger: A Peer-to-Peer 
Savings and Payments Platform for an All-Embracing and Dynamic State Economy (white 
paper, 2019), available at https://ronkimnewyork.com/downloads/The-New-York-
Inclusive-Value-Ledger-Sept-2019.pdf (last visited March 7, 2020); JONATHAN 
MCMILLAN, THE END OF BANKING 159-61 (2014) (describing how ending private banking 
would lead to redefining the public sector’s role in the financial system, particularly with 
respect to digital money); Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, & Lev Menand, A Public Option 
for Bank Accounts (Or Central Banking for All), (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper 18-33, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192162 (discussing the 
benefits, implications, costs, and objections of creating FedAccounts); David Andolfatto, 
Fedcoin: On the Desirability of a Government Cryptocurrency, MACROMANIA (Feb. 3, 
2015),  http://andolfatto.blogspot.com/2015/02/fedcoin-on-desirability-of-government.html  
[https://perma.cc/4P2W-W6P2] (addressing Koning’s proposal and proposing a “Fedwire 
for All,” which would allow for any digital cash users to access closed centralized ledgers); 
Central Banks Should Consider Offering Accounts to Everyone, ECONOMIST (May 26, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/central-banks-
should-consider-offering-accounts-to-everyone (arguing that accounts with central banks 
should be widely-available); Nicholas Gruen, Central Banking for All: A Modest Proposal 
for Radical Change, NESTA, 6-8 (Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.nesta.org.uk/report/central-
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The public investment institutions, several species of which I have 
authored or co-authored on elsewhere,35 will channel finance capital 
primarily to productive and socially desirable infrastructural and primary 
market, not to speculative secondary and tertiary market, investments.36 
They will thereby take the Fed and the Treasury out of the business of 
financing or otherwise abetting mere betting in securities and derivative 
markets, and move them instead into the publicly critical work, essential in 
any commercial republic or exchange economy where productive units 
engage in private ordering, of financing inclusively productive activity and 
public goods provision on the asset side of the public balance sheet.  
The corresponding Citizen and Resident Wallets on the liability side 
of the balance sheet will for their part be dividend-yielding or interest-
bearing, much as are present-day private sector bank Fed reserve accounts 
and individual demand deposits held at depository institutions or money 
market funds. But now the returns will effectively convey stakes in the 
nation’s productive accumulation—its sustainable “economic growth”—to 
the citizenry and business enterprises operating in salutary sectors of the 
“real” economy, rather than rents paid to publicly privileged, privately 
owned speculative financial institutions.  
Returns on Citizen and Resident Wallets will be raiseable when it 
proves necessary, during bubbles or unsustainable booms, collectively to 
                                                                                                                       
banking-for-all-a-modest-case-for-radical-reform/ [https://perma.cc/Q6BH-5MUD] 
(supporting retail branches for central banking services and connecting government-
sponsored banking accounts to more bank payment systems); J.P. Koning, Fedcoin, 
MONEYNESS (Oct. 19, 2014), http://jpkoning.blogspot.com/2014/10/fedcoin.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q82Y-EX32] (advocating for the creation of “Fedcoin” and allowing 
users to remain anonymous by using accounting benefits available through the Fed); Dirk 
Niepelt, Reserves for Everyone—Towards a New Monetary Regime?, VOX: CEPR POLICY 
PORTAL (Jan. 21, 2015), https://voxeu.org/article/keep-cash-let-public-hold-central-bank-
reserves [https://perma.cc/W233-4RL5] (arguing that the public should have access to 
central bank accounts but that cash should not be phased out); Robert Sams, Which 
Fedcoin?, CRYPTONOMICS (Feb. 5, 2015), https://cryptonomics.org/2015/02/05/which-
fedcoin/ [https://perma.cc/QSY2-W52L] (analyzing Koning’s and Andolfatto’s arguments 
while also questioning why accounts with the Federal Reserve do not exist). More on these 
proposals infra, Part VII. 
35 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4 (listing the author’s scholarship on public 
investment institutions). 
36 By “primary” market I mean the market for funds used to finance non-financial 
production. By “secondary” market I mean the market for re-sale of claims generated by 
primary market financing. And by “tertiary” market I mean the market for derivative 
claims referencing—that is, “bets” placed upon secondary market price movements 
among—claims traded on secondary markets.  
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scale back aggregate credit-money generation and associated spending.37 
They will likewise be lowerable, even to negative rates or their functional 
(“helicopter money”) equivalent, when it proves necessary to boost credit 
generation or debt-free spending during busts or recessions.38 Citizen and 
Resident Wallets in this sense will lend themselves—pun only partly 
intended—to digital “QE for the People” and Fed “helicopter drops” 
directly to citizens and their productive enterprises, rather than to 
commercial banks and other favored financial institutions, during times of 
acute financial or economic distress calling for extraordinary expansion 
measures like those pioneered by the Fed between 2009 and 2016.39 This 
will in turn make for far more direct—and, I shall argue, more inclusive and 
distributively just—monetary and even fiscal policy than do present 
arrangements. It will also make for much greater and more equitable 
productive, commercial, and financial participation on the part of our 
citizenry, as well as a fit use for new fintech technologies as these now 
develop and proliferate.40  
In effect, then, what I propose is to reclaim those public utility 
functions that our hybrid finance franchise arrangement now outsources to 
private sector franchisee institutions, and to return them “in house” to our 
sovereign republican franchisor institutions.41 There will still be, of course, 
privately accumulated wealth, privately offered financial services for 
wealth-accumulators, and private sector investments of many a familiar 
kind. But there will no longer be indefinitely extended, monetized public 
full faith and credit flowing (or hemorrhaging) toward artfully inflated 
secondary and tertiary financial and derivatives markets as our present 
arrangement enables and, all too often, all but assures.42 Instead public full 
                                                
37 See Koning, supra note 21; Andolfatto, supra note 21; Sams, supra note 21; Ricks, 
Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 22-23 (discussing how central banks could choose 
to raise rates when necessary). 
38 These are in my view critically important features of the plan, for reasons sounding 
in the modulatory and allocative tasks mentioned in supra note 21. See id. 
39 See Timothy A. Canova, The Role of Central Banks in Global Austerity, 22 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 665, 689-93 (2015) (advancing the view that the Fed's approach to 
quantitative easing, which favored Wall Street financial institutions over Main Street 
businesses, was inadequate at bolstering broad sections of the economy after the 2008 
financial crisis). 
40 More on these features, too, infra Parts IV and V (addressing "citizen finance" and 
how it will both benefit new fintech and promote financial inclusion). 
41 The importance of these matters is discussed thoroughly infra Parts I–V. They are 
also my primary concerns in, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 1; Finance 
Franchise, supra note 14; FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17; Hockett, 
FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17; 
and Development Finance State, supra note 17. 
42 Infra Parts IV and V (highlighting the benefits of “citizen finance”). 
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faith and credit will flow only toward primary markets and such secondary 
or tertiary markets—like those for home mortgage, higher education, small 
business, family farm, and public utility loans—as legitimately require, for 
reasons sounding in justice or systemic market failure, sovereign 
assistance.43  
Private investors will likely increase their primary market 
investment activity, as distinguished from secondary and tertiary market 
speculative activity, as well under my proposed new arrangement. That will 
be thanks to the impetus—and the collectively underwritten stability—that 
sustained public investment in those primary and other markets affords: an 
impetus and stability whose absence at present denies, in classic “market 
failure” fashion, productive investment opportunities to yield-requiring 
“patient capital.”44 Meanwhile, secondary and tertiary markets, which with 
public credit-money are now larger by orders of magnitude than any bona 
fide liquidity or hedging need ever could justify, will become mainly 
private affairs—and much smaller on that account.45 Indeed, they will 
become what they have long falsely claimed that they are—sites of “one-to-
one” credit-intermediation rather than “one-to-many” credit-multiplication 
and “none-to-many” credit-generation.46  
                                                
43 Id. On some of those public secondary and tertiary market-making activities, see, 
e.g., Robert Hockett, Open Labor Market Operations, 62 CHALLENGE 113, 121 (2019) 
[hereinafter Open Labor] (discussing Fannie Mae’s involvement in secondary market in 
mortgage instruments); Robert Hockett, Republican Home-Owning, FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS 15-16 (2018), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/files/pdfs/hfs/assets/2018/tipping-
points/hockett_tipping_points_paper_2018_12.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/SV42-E7RW] 
[hereinafter Republican Home-Owning] (discussing Fannie Mae’s involvement in 
secondary market in mortgage instruments); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, 
‘Private’ Means to ‘Public’ Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEO. INQ. IN L. 53, 
61-62 (2014) [hereinafter Governments as Market Actors] (discussing Fannie Mae’s and 
Sallie Mae’s secondary market-making activities); Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 2 at 
135-37 (addressing Fannie Mae’s involvement in secondary market-making).  
44 More on this impetus infra Part IV. See also Hockett, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW 
DEAL, supra note 4; Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National 
Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 453 in which its importance is front and center. 
       45 More on this, too, infra Part IV. See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra 
note 4; Finance without Financiers, supra note 1, at 41 (discussing how, in secondary 
markets, “endogenously generated credit-money can recursively drive prices to dangerous, 
crash-prone heights”); Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1170-71 (describing how 
government-backed securities are constantly a portion of global assets); FINANCING THE 
GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 4, at PIN (PAREN); Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, 
supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 470-71 (indicating private 
parties would continue to be involved in secondary markets); Public Actors, supra note 17, 
at 134 (highlighting how government leadership in secondary markets could provide an 
advantage for profit-seeking private actors). 
46 These terms stem from the work cited supra, note 1, and are reprised infra, Part I.  
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And while fintech is not strictly necessary to make all of this 
possible—indeed we could, and probably should, have put in place 
something like Citizen Finance during the New Deal if not indeed earlier, 
when Fedwire was introduced back in 191847—it certainly makes things 
both easier and more urgent today than they would have looked yesterday. 
That is particularly so now, as central banks worldwide look to upgrade 
their national payments infrastructures even while private sector financial 
conglomerates look to commandeer crypto and fintech development to their 
own, hardly pro bono purposes.48 
My full proposal and justifying argument proceed as follows. Part I 
briefly rehearses the constitutive elements and transactional relations—the 
agents and structure and “flows”—of that hybrid franchise arrangement 
which now characterizes our financial system, an arrangement I have 
mapped out more painstakingly in earlier work.49 It describes how the flow 
of credit-money throughout our financial system is essentially a flow of 
monetized public full faith and credit from central bank, through private 
sector banks, financial markets, and “shadow banks,” to primarily 
speculative borrowers.50 It also reminds readers of why this form of credit-
generation and –dissemination is far more unproductive and indeed even 
destructive than mere “intermediation” would be.  
Part II then briefly recounts the political, economic, and monetary 
circumstances that prompted and partly justified public/private financial 
hybridity when our combined money and payments, banking, and financial 
systems were first instituted, ad hoc and in stages, over a century ago.51 Part 
III then lays out the ways in which matters have changed since back then—
ways that now render the full franchise arrangement no longer necessary or, 
it now seems, even tenable.  
Part IV commences the process of mapping my public “finance-
reclamation” proposal—again, “Citizens Finance”—in detail, addressing at 
each stage what failures in the present arrangement the proposed 
                                                
47 More on Fedwire and its significance infra, Parts IV and V. 
48 As more fully discussed infra Parts IV.B and V; see also, supra nn. 3, 4, and 17 
(discussing developments in technology and fintech, and both U.S. and global financial 
architecture affecting economic development). 
49 See, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 14 (explaining how financial flows 
stem from public accommodation and monetization of privately originated loans); Finance 
Franchise, supra note 14. 
50 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 12-13 (explaining how financial flows 
stem from public accommodation and monetization of privately originated loans); Finance 
Franchise, supra note 1, at 1156-57 (explaining this flow as the “operative logic” of 
finance and the franchise agreement). 
51 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 1149 (outlining how the hybrid 
public-private franchise debunks a standard paradigm and the new interpretation redefines 
the dynamics of the financial system). 
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arrangement will rectify.52 In so doing it traces the ramifications of my 
proposed changes throughout the financial system, as well as its 
implications for familiar but no longer sensible distinctions we draw 
between public fiscal and monetary operations. Part V discusses logistics 
and highlights the sense in which Citizens’ Finance can be seen as an end-
state toward which our nation’s commercial, monetary, and financial 
evolution has been trending or groping for at least a century and a half, if 
not since our Founding.53  
In effect, I show, we are now reaching a stage of development at 
which consolidated “public ledger finance,” which is inherently more stably 
productive and equitable but for centuries was less feasible than “token 
finance” once societies grew too large and far-flung to keep plenary citizen 
“account books,” is once again possible. That is the real promise of 
fintech—the promise of consolidating money, payments, and finance into 
something that is public, productive, and sustainable again.       
Part VI makes clear how new digital technologies make both 
implementation and operation of Citizens Finance both much easier and 
more necessary than would otherwise have been the case, even while they 
are not, strictly speaking, necessary to do what I believe now needs doing.54 
In this connection it also discusses specific technical options for the 
Democratic Digital Dollar component of Citizen Finance, including the 
options now being explored by forward-looking central banks worldwide.55 
Part VII addresses anticipated objections and alternatives to Citizens’ 
Finance, demonstrating along the way the superiority of what I here 
advocate to competing suggestions that I suspect likely critics will favor.56 
Then I conclude and look forward.  
  
I. HYBRID FINANCE: A BRIEF RECAPITULATION 
Our financial system is essentially a public-private franchise 
arrangement.57 The good that the franchise distributes is not hotel rooms, 
foodstuffs, or auto-parts that conform to reliably uniform standards across 
an integrated national economy. It is instead a national payment, credit, and 
                                                
52 See Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17. 
53 Money’s Past, supra note 3 (detailing the financial evolution towards a digital 
dollar). 
 has been.”). 
 (discussing the benefits and feasibility of a Fed-issued digital dollar). 
56 Id. at 11 (“Direct central banking, in short, is thus apt to be far more effective, 
saving friendly and consumer-friendly even than indirect central banking has been.”). 
57 This Part summarizes the detailed account of the U.S. financial system as a whole 
found in Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, and Finance Franchise, supra note 
14.  
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value-storage medium—the monetized full faith and credit of the United 
States.58 Our system distributes, in other words, a uniform national currency 
and its credit equivalent—dollar-denominated debt—most of it in the form 
of what is alternatively called “credit money,” “bank money,” “deposit 
money” or “broad money.”59  
Our sovereign republic issues this good, and like any franchisor 
promulgates and enforces certain “quality control” measures to ensure that 
specific exemplars of the good conform to a uniform standard.60 Licensed 
private sector banking and other financial institutions in turn act as 
franchisees, distributing the good—again, monetized public full faith and 
credit—for the public sector franchisor and earning what I call “privatized 
seignorage” for their trouble by being permitted to charge interest for 
lending, and fees for managing, republic-issued credit-money.61 
It is easiest to trace the truth of this claim in connection with 
commercial banks, which extend dollar-denominated credit in the form of 
newly opened or credited deposits for borrowers.62 These bank-issued 
deposits are immediately spendable (“drawable upon”) as money—that is, 
as full payment equivalents of Federal Reserve notes, better known as dollar 
bills—in virtue both of the role that our system confers upon banks in our 
Fed-administered national payments infrastructure, and of the role Fed 
accommodation plays in conferring money status on payments made out of 
licensed bank deposit accounts via that payments infrastructure.63 But 
effectively the same thing now happens in other subsectors of the financial 
sector—notably capital markets, money and commercial paper markets, 
repo markets, derivatives markets, and other shadow banking markets—as 
                                                
58 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (defining the franchise 
arrangement); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1156 (defining the franchise 
arrangement). 
59 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 11 (describing how credit-money 
can be issued); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1156 (explaining how credit-money 
fits into the franchise agreement as the capital for public franchisors). 
60 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 26 (“[Repo transactions] have not 
yet become subject to the ‘quality control’ standards that the franchisor imposes upon those 
forthright franchisees.”). 
61 See id., at 11 (describing the process in how private franchisees might earn a 
profit—the “privatized seignorage”—by dispensing a good provided by the sovereign 
franchisor). 
62 Id., at 8 (using commercial banks as a counterexample to the intermediation 
interpretation). Finance Franchise, supra note 14 (reiterating that our financial system is a 
franchise agreement and does not follow the intermediation orthodoxy).   
63 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 12 (“Accommodation and 
monetization are the processes through which the sovereign enables credit to be 
indefinitely generated in immediately spendable form, by committing ex ante to convert 
certain private liabilities into public liabilities that serve as money.”); Finance Franchise, 
supra note 1, at 1156-57 (defining what accommodation means). 
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well as, thanks to the multilateral credit and payments linkages we now 
permit among all of these markets, private sector banks, and our republic’s 
central bank, the Fed.64 The upshot is a financial system that is far less 
about “intermediating” scarce private capital, as banking and financial 
orthodoxy still surprisingly proclaim, than it is about generating and 
multiplying often over-abundant, because mis-allocated, public capital, 
a.k.a. credit-money.   
 As just suggested, an unfortunate misconception, both assumed by 
non-experts and reinforced by some lawyers, financiers, economists, and 
public servants who ought to know better, is that banks simply lend what 
others have antecedently deposited, and that other financial subsectors 
likewise just intermediate between such private sector accumulators of 
putatively scarce capital and end-users of capital.65 In the case of the 
banking sector, the assumed picture is nicely captured by phrases like 
“loanable funds,” on at least one understanding of that phrase, and slogans 
like “deposits make loans.”66 In fact, however, it is far more accurate to 
speak of “loan-generated funds” and say “loans make deposits,” since most 
of what we see in the way of deposits is simply the bank balance-sheet’s 
liability-side equivalent of bank-disseminated, publicly enabled, dollar-
denominated asset-side credit.67  
The real key to loans’ spendability as deposit account “bank money” 
(again, that is a term of art) is not those loans’ fictitious derivation from 
antecedently deposited private-sector-supplied funds, as the dominant 
misconception—what I call “the intermediated scarce private capital 
myth”—has it.68 It is, rather, what I have elsewhere dubbed Fed 
                                                
64 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 40 (“In sum, then, all of the shadow 
banking channels enable the capital and money markets to amplify and replicate, in all 
salient respects, the functions of traditional banks.”); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 
Part III, IV. 
65 Finance without Financiers supra note 14, at 4, 6 (suggesting an alternative to the 
‘intermediate’ interpretation); Finance Franchise supra note 14, at 1147 (defining the 
franchise agreement by dispelling the intermediation interpretation). 
66 Finance without Financiers supra note 14, at 14 (describing loanable funds to be an 
orthodox notion that Hockett later dispels). See also Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 
1159 (defining “loanable funds” and its relation to banking sector). 
67 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 15 (explaining bank lending 
transactions—the bank will record the loan as an asset and the deposit as a liability); 
Finance Franchise, supra note 14, Introduction and Parts I–II. 
68 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 5-9 (explaining the “intermediated 
scarce private capital orthodoxy” view is false); Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1146 
(“The intermediated-scarce-private-capital orthodoxy is a myth, in turn, because it 
profoundly misrepresents the reality of modern financial systems.”). 
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“accommodation” and “monetization.”69 That is to say, Fed-recognized 
clearing and settlement, through the public payments architecture that the 
Fed oversees and administers, of payments drawn upon deposit accounts 
maintained with publicly licensed and enabled banking and other financial 
institutions.70  
The license in question, in turn—the best known and most coveted 
“flavor” of which is known among specialists as the “bank charter”—is 
essentially a franchise contract.71 Required reserves and capital buffers, like 
portfolio regulation, consumer financial protection, and other modalities of 
financial regulation, are in turn simply terms of that contract.72 They 
amount to quality control terms meant to maintain the stability of the 
franchisee banks and other financial institutions, along with the payments 
infrastructure that they largely constitute, upon which the public relies, all 
while preventing both (a) exploitation of that same “general public” and (b) 
over-issuance (inflation) of the public money in relation to the quantum of 
available goods and services that this money can command.73     
Thanks in part to their deliberately cultivated borrowing, other 
transactional, and affiliative relations with banking institutions, and in part 
to public backstopping of themselves along with the banks during times of 
financial distress, nonbank financial institutions have steadily become, as 
suggested above, de facto franchisee institutions as well.74 As shown in 
prior work, they now issue and multiply public credit-money much as do 
banks, and do so far in excess of anything they borrow from depositors, 
                                                
69 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining “what can be called 
public “accommodation” and “monetization” of initially privately extended credit.”). 
70 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 17 (explaining federal bank 
accommodation is necessary given central banks administer payments infrastructure on 
which privately drawn checks clear at par from private banks); Finance Franchise, supra 
note 14, at 1162 (explaining central bank accommodation is an unavoidable result of 
administering a payments system on which privately drawn check clear at par from private 
banks). 
71 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (“[C]ontemporary financial systems 
as we now find them are best interpreted as public-private franchise arrangements.”). 
72 See id. (explaining the terms of the “franchise” operate like a licensing agreement 
where the Fed contracts out their monetized full faith and credit). 
73 See id. at 16 (explaining financial regulation, like reserve requirements or capital 
requirements, mitigate the risk privately-owned banks create when over-lending or lending 
at rates that increase inflationary pressures). 
74 See id. at 23 (explaining “capital, and now also money, markets amplify and 
replicate the role of banking and Treasury securities markets as channels for dispensing the 
full faith and credit of the sovereign” just as banks do under their ‘franchisee’ agreements). 
See also id. (discussing the financial crisis of 07-09 that shed light on so called, “shadow 
bank[s,]” that replicate the banking industry and similarly promote public accommodation 
and monetization). 
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investors, and other non-bank counterparties.75 Nonbank financial 
institutions assist, in a word, not only in credit-intermediation but in credit-
multiplication and -generation too, again as our commercial banks do.76 
And this is made possible by public accommodation and facilitation of these 
institutions’ transactions in manners that resemble or replicate public 
accommodation of banks’ and their depositors’ transactions. In short, then, 
money being simply “that which pays” in the making of payments, and 
“what pays” in turn mainly comprising as it does payments made out of 
loan-credited transaction accounts, our money system boils down to our 
Fed-overseen and -enabled payment and financial systems.77  
The upshot of this set of arrangements is that even the capital and 
money markets, and even the repo and derivatives markets, and even the 
rest of the so-called “shadow banking” sector, are now franchisees in our 
public-private finance franchise too, albeit less carefully monitored than 
traditional depository institutions (that being part of their point).78 All of 
these institutions are now privately owned and operated distributors of that 
endogenously generated public good which is the monetized full faith and 
credit of the United States, also known as the money supply.79 And this is 
so even though these institutions continue also to intermediate.80 What I call 
credit-multiplication and -generation, in other words, now accompany and 
vastly exceed or supplant credit-intermediation throughout our financial 
system, with its share of transaction volume and the associated money 
supply growing ever larger through time to the point that it dwarfs what has 
been antecedently accumulated.81 And thanks to our system’s ties to our 
central bank—our Fed—the credit-share’s growth is the public-share’s 
growth.82 The overwhelmingly greater part of that monetized full faith and 
                                                
75 Id. (“[Nonbank financial institutions are] now a critically important complement to 
the traditional banking sector where credit-money proliferation is concerned.”) 
76 Id. (explaining the “credit-money proliferation” complements our traditional banks). 
77 See Democratic Digital Dollar, supra, note 5, at 1; also Finance without Financiers, 
supra note 14, at 30 (explaining a non-bank derivative transaction replicates bank lending 
and “necessarily augments public accommodation and monetization as described” above). 
78 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 6 (“[C]ontemporary financial systems 
as we now find them are best interpreted as public-private franchise arrangements.”) 
79 Id. (“Under the terms of the franchise, the sovereign public effectively licenses 
private financial institutions to dispense a vital and indefinitely extensible public resource – 
the sovereign public’s monetized full faith and credit.”) 
80 Id. at 5 (explaining that many financial institutions intermediate). 
81 Id. at 9 (“Finance capital in the form of credit might instead be more accurately said 
to be ‘generated’ by lending institutions than ‘intermediated’ or ‘multiplied’ by them.”). 
82 Id. at 34 (“The Fed’s converting both private borrower liabilities and private insurer 
liabilities into public liabilities amounts to its monetizing that much more public full faith 
and credit, and injecting it into the financial system.”). 
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credit which is our money is, in other words, quite literally ours—our 
republic’s.  
Why is this? How did we get here? The brief functional trajectory 
that I will now narrate addresses these questions. More importantly, it 
shows that what I propose in this paper “fulfills,” in a sense, our polity’s 
monetary, commercial, and financial history—a history from what I call 
“ledger money” to “token money” and back that manifests a distinct 
teleological pattern in its steady “dialectical” unfolding.83  
  
II. HYBRID FINANCE: WHY AND HOW WE GOT HERE 
 
Why we first instituted a de facto public-private finance franchise 
arrangement, and why we have allowed it to radiate steadily outward from 
its banking and payments system core to the farthest reaches of our shadow 
banking and broader financial system, can be gleaned by addressing three 
questions. All three are implicated by the opening remarks in Part I above, 
where I said that our system distributes a uniform national currency and its 
credit equivalent.  
The pertinent questions that this observation raises are: first, why 
“currency and its credit equivalent”; second, why uniformity; and third, 
why uniformity through franchising rather than through direct distribution? 
My replies to these questions indicate not only why we now publicly 
franchise, but also why we both can and now ought to move on to a more 
thoroughly republican form of ledger finance such as Part IV describes and 
prescribes.  
A.  Why Credit and Currency 
I begin with a brief reminder of what a financial system is for, and 
the roles credit, money, and payments play in any such system. 
 
                                                
83 I allude to the familiar “Hegelian” pattern pursuant to which, as societies develop, 
solutions that they have earlier developed to particular challenges grow obsolete as the 
forms that those challenges take themselves develop, then are updated to address the new 
forms that the challenges take. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES GEISTES (1807). 
In the present context, I will be showing in Parts I through III how monetary relations 
within any community begin as informal accounting—credit, debit, and hence 
“payment”—relations tractable on mental or paper “account books,” or ledgers; then move 
to circulating currencies that function as payment ledger substitutes when societies grow 
too large and productively complex for their credit and debit—their “payment”—relations 
to be tracked mentally or on paper account books; and then return, in a sort of “higher 
synthesis,” to ledger accounting once communications and payment technologies grow 
sufficiently sophisticated to track even complex and far-flung sets of credit and debit 
relations.         
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1. Credit: Production & Payment in Time 
 
As I suggested in introducing this article, finance is the means by 
which people or entities presently lacking in resources necessary to engage 
in productive activity secure temporary access to those resources from 
others who have them.84 It is, in other words, the means by which 
productive units productively borrow.85 One way to do this would be for the 
would-be user of resources simply to borrow them directly from their 
possessors, then return them as-is or in-kind.86 A credit transaction then 
would occur, with the lender conveying the needed resource and the 
borrower conveying a promise to return the resource as-is or in-kind at 
some later date, perhaps with a premium couched as a “rental” payment.87  
This would amount to a borrowing rendition of barter, as 
inconvenient and transaction-slowing, and therefore production-slowing, as 
barter is in any exchange economy with a complex division of labor and 
resources deployed in productive activity.88 Non-stone age economies 
accordingly employ some form of fungible money or ledger accounting in 
exchanges of resources and repayment promises just as they employ money 
or ledger accounting in exchanges of goods and services.89 It is how they 
                                                
84 See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1213 (explaining finance, specifically the 
franchise arrangement just discussed, is meant to supply the economy with sufficient credit 
to support productive enterprise). 
85 There is, accordingly, a trans-temporal element baked in to the concept of finance, 
as the word’s etymology – ‘fin,’ meaning ‘finish’ or ‘end’ – itself suggests. I refer here 
primarily to ‘productive’ finance rather than finance for consumption because productive 
activity is in an important sense ‘prior’ to consumption activity. Any economy that has 
moved beyond gathering to hunter gathering or more is an economy in which that which is 
consumed has been grown, killed, constructed or otherwise produced. Indeed, even much 
gathering is in a certain sense producing. See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 3 at 37-38 
(describing financial institutions as making productive activity possible, whereby 
productive activity “allow[s] us. . . to spend now (part of) what we won’t actually have 
until later.”). 
86 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 38-41 (explaining that “when you 
borrow money. . .you just temporarily trade your own notes for Fed notes”). 
87 Id. (discussing the function of promissory notes and ensuing obligations upon the 
borrower). 
88 Id. at 13 (“And because we organize productive activity, in a decentralized exchange 
economy such as our own, largely by swapping obligations – that is, by contracting – the 
principal medium through which such organizing is done is our money.”). 
89 I do not intend this as a historical claim, but a functional one. Nor do I mean by 
“exchange economy” a “private ownership economy.” With respect to the latter point, 
communal economies involve exchange just as private property economies do. And as to 
the first point, no historical evidence supports the common economist’s argument that 
money ‘was invented to improve upon barter,’ or even that barter occurred much at all. 
Indeed all available evidence suggests that monetary arrangements grew out of highly 
‘networked’ state, social, and religious authority-maintained credit systems. See, e.g., 
1-June-18] The Capital Commons - DRAFT  
 
23
efficiently transfer and track mutual credits and debits among transacting 
parties.  
The same medium that is used to purchase goods or services for 
production or consumption is accordingly lent—or “advanced”—for the 
purchase of goods and services; indeed the latter appears historically to 
precede the former.90 We call that medium “money,” which amounts among 
other things to a universally usable mode of payment for—or claim upon—
resources.91 Money is how, or that with which, we pay—it is that which 
“counts” for purposes of our “accounting” to one another where mutual 
exchange and attendant obligations are concerned.92  
 
2. Currency: From Ledgers to Tokens—and Back  
 
Money of course need not take any particular physical form. Where 
societies are small enough, or claim-tracking technologies sophisticated 
enough, a formally or informally kept “account book” or “mental ledger” 
suffices to “keep score”—that is, to keep track of everyone’s claims and 
                                                                                                                       
PETER EINZIG, PRIMITIVE MONEY 316 (2d ed. 1966) (illustrating several definitions of 
money, including “means of purchasing goods and services and of defraying social costs” 
and “a commodity which is habitually and without hesitation taken by anybody in 
exchange for a commodity”); DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS 21-23 
(2011) (describing the forms money has taken, including as a “medium of exchange, unit of 
account, and store of value”); A. HINGSTON QUIGGIN, A SURVEY OF PRIMITIVE MONEY 3-4 
(Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1970) (1949) (categorizing money as a “recognized medium of 
exchange, a standard of value and a symbol of wealth”); MICHAEL HUDSON & MICHAEL 
VAN DE MIEROP, DEBT AND ECONOMIC RENEWAL IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 165-69 
(2002) (summarizing seventeenth and eighteenth century financing, including the credit 
system that supported the natural resources market); Alfred Mitchell-Innes, What is 
Money?, 30 BANKING L.J. 377, 377-78 (1913) (describing that “by common consent one 
particular commodity is fixed on which is generally acceptable and which therefore, 
everyone will take in exchange for the things he produces or the services he renders and 
which each in turn can equally pass on to others in exchange for whatever he may want; 
That this commodity thus becomes a ‘medium of exchange and measure of value.’ That a 
sale is the exchange of a commodity for this intermediate commodity which is called 
‘money’. . . .”).  
90 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 38 (suggesting that “money’s being a 
kind of circulating credit/debit is part of what enables it to function as an inter-temporal 
claim—a ‘store of value’—in the first place”). 
91 Id. at 34-36 (“Insofar as money functions as a medium of exchange, it can be 
thought of as a claim upon what it’s exchanged for. It’s status as legal tender makes it a 
legal claim upon what it buys – a claim upon resources.”) 
92 Id. at 16-17 (“The next thing to note is how readily our obligations here – what is 
due, what is owed – will be ‘cashed out’ at discharge into something like money. In so 
doing, we’ll see not only money’s rootedness in normativity, obligation, accountability and 
associated accounting, but also its elaboration into the notions of credit, asset, and liability 
that populate the familiar legal and financial ‘universe’. . .”). 
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counterclaims, credits and debits, assets and liabilities.93 Coin and currency 
get into the act only when societies grow large and complex enough to 
render informal “mental” accounting and even paper “book-keeping” 
incapable of tracking all transactions, while still being technologically 
underdeveloped enough to render a single formally kept digital social 
account book or ledger not yet practicable.94  
Currency and coin are in this sense intermediate-stage payment 
technologies in monetary evolution.95 They are means of “keeping 
accounts” with each other in a common “unit of account”—a “common 
currency” or “coin of the realm”—even when we do not all know one 
another or have means of recording and tracking our many exchanges with 
one another on one common ledger or spreadsheet.96  They are in other 
words primitive ledger-substitutes, we might say.97  
This observation affords us a clue as to why coin and currency 
issuance typically become sovereign functions—in a republic, republican 
functions—as economies and the polities in which they are always 
embedded grow ever more populous, socially complex, and technologically 
advanced.98 Just as people in very small societies or proto-polities could in 
theory keep accounts with one another through debit and credit entries in a 
common mental or paper book-like ledger, so could they decentralize that 
account-keeping as they grew larger and no longer able to use the same 
physical book.99 They could do so by conveying individually issued 
                                                
93 Id. at 38 (“And just as your merely ‘mentally tracked’ promise did in our you, me, 
and Jean-Jacques story, where scale was sufficiently small, trust sufficiently high, and 
matters sufficiently simple as to allow for the keeping of mere ‘mental accounts.’”). 
94 Id. at 24-25 (“When populations grow larger and asset/liability relations grow more 
farflung and complex, however, things must be ‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’ That is so if 
for no other reason than to enable us all to ‘keep track’ and ‘verify.’”); see also QUIGGIN, 
supra note 71, at 4-5 (describing general difficulties in a bartering system and that such 
problems were later avoided by “elaborate customs of credit, deferred payments or 
payment by services.”). 
95 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 28 (describing the process by which 
currency can be introduced and formalized until it is officially made commonplace). 
96 Id. (“What we do is develop means of converting . . . small-group-recognizable 
‘horizontal,’ or ‘private,’ IOUs into full-polity-recognizable ‘vertical,’ or ‘public,’ IOUs. 
Then we have truly common ‘common currency.’”). 
97  Id. at 18-19 (illustrating informal ledgers via running chores hypothetical). 
98  Id. at 24-26 (“When populations grow larger and asset/liability relations grow more 
farflung and complex, however, things must be ‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’ That is so if 
for no other reason than to enable us all to ‘keep track’ and ‘verify.’”). 
99 Id. at 9 (“Productive and distributive activity in decentralized exchange economies 
pervasively involves joint exchanges of promises, hence joint issuance of countless 
reciprocal obligations. . .Citizens. . . authorize one another to demand that such promises be 
honored and obligations be met.”). 
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promissory notes to one another, with holders understood to have claims 
upon issuers.100  
This is essentially how wooden “tally sticks” and breakable clay, 
then metal, tablets and bars—the first circulating currencies—functioned in 
ancient societies.101 The break pattern clearly identified who owed whom by 
reference to who held each half of the broken token.102 The problem this left 
was that the same growth in population and economic complexity that 
prompted the move from mental accounting to what we might call “metal 
accounting”—that is, to commercial- and financial-instrument-issuing—
ultimately rendered private instrument-issuing, like mental accounting, 
unsatisfactorily transaction-limiting and hence production-limiting too.103 
Broad transferability and hence usability of claim tokens was limited to 
those able to “credit”—that is, to believe in the credibility of—the token-
issuer.104    
It was natural in this circumstance to begin centralizing token-
issuance, which for present purposes is best seen as a step toward 
reinstituting centralized bookkeeping to societies that have grown beyond 
both informal account-keeping and private token-issuing.105 This form of 
                                                
100 Id. at 26-27 (introducing the concept of promissory notes and the resulting inter-
person obligations). 
101 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44 (“The important thing about claim 
checks was never their material form, but the fact that they reliably represented claims. 44 
Receipts of this kind actually took many different material forms over time. In the early 
Near East, clay tokens stamped with the grain authority’s seal were the most convenient 
form.”). 
102 Mitchell-Innes, supra note 71, at 395 (describing the process by which a coin was 
broken to serve as a tally for a debtor-creditor relationship); HENRY DUNNING MACLEOD, 
THE THEORY OF CREDIT 83-84 (2d ed. 1889) (illustrating the different types of substances 
used to represent currency). 
103 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46-47 (“The credit-money – the ‘finance 
capital’ – supply must be able to grow at a rate that allows for this resource stock to grow 
through the productive activity of those who need claims upon current such resources – that 
is, again, money – in order to produce future resources”); Mitchell-Innes, The Credit 
Theory of Money, 31 BANKING LAW JOURNAL 151 (1914) (discussing how buying and 
selling are really only exchanging promises to pay); N.T. Skaggs, Debt as the Basis of 
Currency, 57 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 453, 456-59 (1998) 
(discussing the disadvantages of a metallic currency, and the evolution of money).   
104 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 47 (“It’s all about optimizing productive 
capacity. . .Too little money—too little finance capital—diminishes such capacity. . . Too 
much money— too much finance capital—diminishes the reliability of money as a claim-
transfer device, hence again productive capacity.”). 
105 Id. at 14 (“. . . [J]ust as state and economy emerge, respectively, out of the 
(contract-like) authority and (contract-like) obligation birthed by the joint ‘we,’ so is 
money simply the authoritative means of signifying and discharging the multiple (contract-
like) obligations. . . .”). 
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centralization has historically taken two forms.106 And the second of these 
forms can be viewed in principle as the near-completion of the first, even 
though in some cases it has in practice chronologically preceded the first, 
owing to late discovery of the need for currencies to become “elastic,” as I 
will explain.107  
The first mode of centralization was the establishment of institutions 
with which large numbers of people could maintain monetary—that is, 
again, credit and debit—relations, which then could act as account-keepers 
for all of them, transferring credits and debits among them on single 
account books.108 Call this “the physical ledger strategy,” a more broadly 
usable digital rendition of which I will be schematizing and advocating 
below109 
The second mode of centralization was for sovereign or quasi-
sovereign authorities themselves to issue tokens that could function as 
claims and payment media far more widely—at the limit, throughout their 
jurisdictions or realms—than could privately-issued tokens.110 Subjects or 
citizens then could lay hold of such tokens either by making tax payments 
in kind—for example, in the form of crop shares paid the local liege lord, or 
grain bushels requisitioned by a priestly authority—or by temporarily 
swapping private promissory tokens for public promissory tokens.111 Here 
centralization of issuance substitutes for centralization of account-keeping. 
Call this “the sovereign issuance” strategy, which I shall show now to be 
digitally mergable with the ledger strategy when I get to Parts IV through 
VI below.   
In most societies still in existence, the second mode of re-
centralization seems to have preceded the first, with the first added on only 
later as societies groped toward recognition that money supplies must be 
elastic and what I call “modulatable”—that is, adjustable to accommodate 
                                                
106 Id. at 37 (discussing the purpose of financial institutions, especially in regards to 
enabling productive activity). 
107 Id. at 39-40 (explaining the dual private promissory note and public promissory 
note system). 
108 See id. at 19 (explaining the concept of a ledger as a set of accounts through which 
multiple parties owing obligations to each other another transfer debt and credit). 
109 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 19 (“[W]e’ll call it a ledger.”). 
110 Id. at 26 (“[M]odern societies deem certain ‘privately’— that is ‘horizontally’— 
incurred obligations ‘publicly recognized’ and hence ‘vertically’ enforceable in special 
adjudicative institutions we call ‘courts.’”). 
111 See id. at 43 (observing receipts can function as assets to their recipients and as 
liabilities to their issuers). See also EINZIG, supra note 71, at 316 (illustrating several 
definitions of money, including “means of purchasing goods and services and of defraying 
social costs” and “a commodity which is habitually and without hesitation taken by 
anybody in exchange for a commodity”). 
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fluctuating transaction and productive credit demand.112 Authorities 
dispensed tokens as evidences of payment-obligations’—in effect, tax 
obligations’—fulfillment.113 Because the mentioned obligations were 
universal and ongoing, the tokens, as de facto tax receipts representing the 
authority’s obligation to recognize payments’ having been made, were 
universally desired.114   
These tokens of “vertical” credit/debit relation between sovereign 
and subject or republic and citizen accordingly came to function as means 
of discharging even “horizontal” credit/debit relations among subjects or 
citizens inter se.115 Originally fashioned of clay into which sovereign seals 
could be stamped before baking for purposes of authentication, in time they 
came to be fashioned of more durable yet malleable metals resistant to 
corrosion, for which purposes gold and silver were most suitable.116 Here 
lies the origin of sovereign-stamped metal coinage—not to mention of coin-
metals’ perceived preciousness.117  
Banks got into the money business—indeed, came even so much as 
to exist—in these societies much later than tribute-requisitioning and 
receipt-issuing sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns.118 They began as metal-
smiths whose business required the keeping of safes.119 Safe-ownership led 
                                                
112 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67 at 42 (explaining civilizations heavily 
dependent on agriculture stored grain during ‘fat years’ in anticipation of ‘lean years’ due 
to fluctuating crop yields). 
113 Id. at 42 (“Growers were required to make ‘grain deposits’ into a community pool, 
which requirement operated as a kind of tax or mandatory social insurance premium, both 
of which boil down to essentially the same thing . . . .”). 
114 Id. at 43 (“These are public liabilities that circulate as private assets, so everyone 
uses and accepts them.”). 
115 Id. at 43 (“Once ‘tax receipts’ become ‘vertical claim checks’ . . .  they begin 
circulating as ‘horizontal claims’ too among those who need them. . . .”). 
116 Id. at 43 (explaining claim checks represented by many different material forms 
such as clay tokens in the early Near East and overtime by precious metals). 
117Id. at 44 ([T]hese metals became ‘precious’ largely because they came to be used 
widely as material representations of money claims.”). An irony here is that these 
‘precious’ metals, rather than becoming money because they were precious, instead 
became precious because they were money. See Daniela Pylypczak-Wasylyszn, The 
Historical Value of Silver: A 2000-Year Overview, COMMODITYHQ.COM (June 24, 2015), 
https://commodityhq.com/education/a-brief-2000-year-history-of-silver-prices/ 
[https://perma.cc/734G-UPLC] (documenting declines in money-price of silver when it has 
ceased to be used as a money medium).  
118 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (“The benches— or ‘banca,’ as benches 
are still called in Italy where this practice first developed— on which metalsmiths did their 
smithing gave their name to what we now call ‘banking’.”). 
119 Id. (“People began ‘depositing’ their metal with metalsmiths who happened to have 
safes, for ‘safe-keeping.’”). 
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naturally to a sidelight, that of metal storage for a fee—bailment.120 Holding 
metal in trust for many people in time came to recommend issuance of 
“claim checks” used to keep track of whose metal-stores metal-smiths 
held.121 Some smiths—the most trusted ones—might well have simply kept 
books.122 Others, with clients less trusting, issued verifiable claim tokens.123   
In time it came to be recognized that claim tokens could substitute, 
as payment media, for the heavier metal coins or other objects that they 
represented claims upon, and then that they also could be issued in excess 
of those metal stores themselves.124 The life of fully functional “elastic 
currencies”—moneys whose supply could in theory be modulated more 
readily than metals could be mined and then minted—effectively 
commenced at this juncture.125 Metal-smiths who had banked soon became 
bankers, full stop.126 These bankers could spend their own claim checks as 
money or lend them to others at interest so long as they did not issue too far 
in excess of metal stores.127 Fractional-reserve banking was born.128 
Public authorities appear to have permitted this eventually 
burgeoning private practice owing to the advantages an elastic currency 
afforded.129 Money supplies could grow to accommodate growing 
transaction volume as economies grew, even when metal-mining couldn’t 
keep pace.130 All that was needed was to ensure that they did not grow too 
                                                
120 Id. (explaining how once claim checks began circulating as paper currency 
metalsmiths could issue checks for lending at interest). 
121 Id. (“People began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened to 
have safes, for ‘safekeeping.’ The smiths for their part issued paper claim checks – or 
‘notes’ representing claims upon the deposited metals.”). 
122 Id. (explaining the smiths’ move from metal to banking). 
123Id.  at 45 (“People began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened 
to have safes . . . [t]he smiths for their part issued claim checks . . . representing claims 
upon the deposited metals.”). 
124 Id. (“It also didn’t take long for the metalsmiths to discover . . . [o]nce their claim 
checks began circulating as paper currency, they could issue such checks to themselves in 
order to buy things.”). 
125 Id. (explaining how coins were magnified by practice of issuing derivative paper 
claims as multiples of metallic claims, causing the money supply to increase many-fold). 
126 Id. (“[P]eople began ‘depositing’ their metals with metalsmiths who happened to 
have safes . . . . The smiths issued paper claim checks . . . upon the deposited metals.”). 
127 Id. (“Once their claim checks began circulating as paper currency, they could issue 
such checks to themselves in order to buy things. They could also issue such checks for 
lending at interest. As long as the checks were not issued too far in excess of the metal in 
store, there was no danger in doing this, and there was much gain to be had.”). 
128 Id. (“[T]he practice of issuing more notes than one had metal became known as 
‘fractional reserve banking.’”). 
129 Id. (“In time this line of work unsurprisingly became much more lucrative than 
metalsmithing.”). 
130 Id. (“[T]he elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued too far in excess of the 
metal that ‘backed’ it.”). 
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fast—at rates that brought excess inflationary pressure, excess liquidity risk, 
or both.131 (Excess metal-mining, which did sometimes happen even if but 
rarely, could exert similar inflationary pressure. This seems to have 
happened, most notably, after Spain and Portugal struck silver in conquered 
South American territories.) So sovereigns allowed, but also regulated, 
private bank currency issuance based upon sovereign coin issuance.132 And 
they let bankers lend in those currencies at interest so as to facilitate trade, 
investment, productive activity, and growth.133 In effect, they shared their 
seigniorage, which their coin issuance long had afforded, with bankers in 
the form that new note issuance afforded.134   
This privatized “note seigniorage” was meant to serve as an 
incentive to bankers to lend prudently and productively—that is, in ways 
that were well calculated to prove wealth-generating.135 In effect, 
sovereigns were outsourcing the role of productively issuing and lending 
sovereign claims upon resources, money—in elastic, readily multipliable, 
hence modulatable paper form—to their citizens.136 And they were 
controlling the quality of the multiplied money by requiring licensure of its 
private disseminators and regulating their activities.137 In effect, what I call 
the finance franchise was born.138   
                                                
131 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45-46 (“One could . . . ‘over-promise’ by 
issuing too many promissory notes, which would undercut the value of promise and 
promissory note alike.”). 
132 A banker who over-issued and went insolvent in consequence was deemed 
‘bankrupt’—a term that derives from the practice of public officials ceremonially—rupta, 
from which the English word ‘rupture’ derives—the benches—banca —on which metal-
smith bankers plied their trade in late Medieval Italy, where modern European banking 
originated. (The Italians were first among Europeans because they were first to trade 
extensively with Asia and North Africa, where commercial and associated financial 
practice were then far in advance of their European counterparts.) See id. at 46 (observing 
much of bank regulation during olden days involved licensing requirements and reserve 
regulations to avert risk of elastic currency being issued too far in excess). 
133 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46 (explaining how various jurisdictions 
permitted banks to issue claim tokens for promoting growth). 
134 Id. at 45 (stating that note issuance allowed for “a currency whose supply could be 
grown both to accommodate growing transaction activity and to finance growing 
productive activity”). 
135 Id. at 45–46 (observing that “this practice of issuing more notes than they had metal 
made banker’s business . . . profitable”). 
136 Id. at 40, 45–46 (theorizing that publicly licensed private banks act as outsourced 
credit checkers for the central sovereign entity). 
137 Id. at 40 (stating that federally regulated banks “assist our Fed . . . in temporarily 
transforming private money into public money”). 
138 Id. at 41 (stating that reliance on the “public full faith and credit” of the sovereign 
allows for “the franchise” of proliferated private banking by a multitude of financial 
entities). 
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But with the currency elasticity and prudent lending incentives this 
system brought came a vulnerability as well, the seriousness of which 
varied inversely with the effectiveness of sovereign franchisor monitoring 
of franchisee institutions’ activities.139 That was the danger of losing, 
through the franchise arrangement itself, precisely that form of monetary 
uniformity and associated de facto account centralization that sovereign 
coin issuance had afforded in the first place.140   
This takes us to a closer look at the need for monetary uniformity, as 
well as at the single most idiosyncratic historical attribute of the American 
rendition of the finance franchise: its having had, until late in the game, a 
multitude of ersatz-franchisee money-issuing institutions under the control 
of no single coherently acting franchisor money-modulating institution.141 
This is important in understanding both the nature of the present American 
financial system and the necessity of that modernization of this system 
which Parts IV through VI propose below.142      
 
B.  Why Uniformity  
Franchises, as noted above, are among other things uniformity-
maintenance regimes.143 The reason for monetary uniformity is not unlike 
that for hotel room or foodstuff uniformity of the sort that franchise 
arrangements in those industries ensure.144 But it also is much more 
                                                
139 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45–46 (observing that franchisee 
lending of sovereign tender was “risky – both for the banker and for society – because the 
elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued too far in excess of the metal that 
‘backed’ it”); see also Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (stating that “the public 
franchisor . . . retains primary responsibility for preventing both under- and over-generation 
of credit”). 
140 See Rousseuvian Money, supra note 67, at 45–46 (stating that “bank-licensing 
requirements and reserve-regulation” appeared at attempts at maintaining through the 
financial franchise the uniformity once afforded by sovereign coin issuance). 
141 Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4 (observing that, in the early days of the United 
States, “the U.S. Mint minted coins [and] the Treasury issued some paper . . . [b]ut paper 
money—‘notes’—were issued primarily by private banking institutions until late in the 
19th century”). 
142 Id. at 4–6 (providing an overview of United States currency issuance from the late 
18th century through 20th century). 
143 Id. at 3 (explaining that “banks are franchisees, while we the sovereign public are 
the franchisor and our national money—the dollar, the monetized full faith and credit of the 
United States—is the franchised good”). 
144 Fast food and hotel franchises emerged and spread through the American economy 
at the same time that the interstate highway system developed across the country and newly 
affluent Americans began taking road trips and family vacations. However good or bad the 
accommodations or foodstuffs might be in the places one visited or re-provisioned at, one 
could at least rest assured they were no more undesirable than their counterparts back 
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compelling. A well-functioning and fully integrated economy, in both its 
productive and its distributive functions, requires a common unit of account 
and a common payment medium whose value as measured in that unit is 
reasonably insensitive to variations among issuers, users, transaction 
locations, and time intervals.145  
These are the twin needs that necessitate “account uniformity” of the 
kind that I noted above as economies grow in both size and complexity—
the kind that amounts to the keeping of a single ledger or the using of its 
functional equivalent, a uniform coin or currency.146 We can think of these 
as forms of what I will call spatial and temporal uniformity. The story of the 
American republic’s gradual securing of those forms of uniformity for its 
money and, through that, its commercial and financial systems, is a story of 
long struggle.147 And this is because the story of America’s gradual 
attainment of coherent national sovereignty itself is a story of long—and at 
times tragically violent—struggle.148    
    
1. Spatial Uniformity: Payments & “Universal Equivalents” 
Before federal passage of a sequence of mutually complementary 
legal tender, currency, and banking acts in the early 1860s, there was 
neither a single national payment ledger nor any national “dollar bill” worth 
the name in the United States.149 The circulating medium—the token-form 
                                                                                                                       
home. That is the sense in which franchises were ‘quality control’ compacts. Id. (“You can 
think of the uniform value and appearance of our currency as being a bit like those identical 
sandwiches and golden arches you see all around the country (and world) if you like: They 
serve to let everyone know that the item’s the same irrespective of just where you are in 
our nation —New York, California; Florida, Alaska . . . . They are always and everywhere 
the same: green notes, worth no more and no less that they purport to be worth.”). 
145 Rousseuvian Money, supra note 67, at 35, 37 (stating that money “can be thought of 
as a claim upon what it’s exchanged for” and by virtue of its stability is “ultimately meant 
to make possible more productive activity across time”). 
146 Id. at 25, 27–28 (asserting that as a financial system becomes widespread and 
complex, the sovereign must “‘formalize’ and ‘regularize’ . . . which obligations shall 
‘count’ for purposes of ‘accounting’ and public ‘accountability,’ . . . [and] where to track 
and enforce such obligations and their discharge”). 
147 See Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4–8 (explaining the history of United States 
currency issuance from the late 18th century through 20th century). 
148 Jane Kamensky, The American Revolution: A History of Violence, NY TIMES 
(May 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/19/books/review/scars-of-
independence-americas-violent-birth-holger-hoock.html (discussing America’s violent 
beginning). 
149 See id. at 6 (“The banking and currency acts of the 1860s transformed our 
interlinked banking, financial, and monetary systems. In very short order there were 
federally chartered banks in most states and territories of the Union, all of them subject to 
uniform regulatory standards.”). 
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substitute for a centralized ledger—took the form primarily of privately 
issued bank notes.150  These were effectively paper “claim checks” or 
currencies representing claims upon private sector banking institutions.151 
The claims they betokened were in theory redeemable in precious metal 
specie minted by many different sovereigns or, as time went on, various 
forms of primarily but not solely publicly-issued debt.152  Banks for their 
part were kept local by the only public authorities then legislatively 
authorized to license and regulate them: sub-sovereign U.S. state 
governments.153   
This arrangement, because it fell short both of a national ledger and 
of any uniform national currency that could serve as that ledger’s 
circulating functional equivalent, posed two challenges to efficient 
transcontinental market integration across the still young United States.154 
First, payment in one state out of accounts held in another state was fraught 
with uncertainty.155 Differing states regulated banks with differing degrees 
of strictness and effectiveness.156 New York and New England, for 
example, appear to have been doing quite well by the mid-nineteenth 
century, while Nebraska and Michigan did notoriously poorly at that 
                                                
150 Id. (explaining that before the reforms of the 1860s, “America’s paper money 
supply was primarily a plethora of privately issued ‘bank notes’”). 
151 Id. (stating that banks’ “notes were their own liabilities – hence liabilities of private 
issuers”). 
152 See id. (explaining that “differing state willingness or readiness to regulate” 
privately issued bank notes “could bring differing values to currencies issued in different 
locales”); see also CHARLES A. CONANT, A HISTORY OF MODERN BANKS OF ISSUE, WITH 
AN ACCOUNT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISES OF THE PRESENT CENTURY 310-85 (1896); 
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44 (stating that “just as the paper memorialized 
promises, so did the metal – it’s just that the paper memorialized private bank promises”). 
153 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (stating that “banks then were chartered and 
regulated . . . by states rather than by our federal government”); Rousseauvian Money, 
supra note 67, at 46 (explaining that, until the establishment of the Fed and its uniform 
currency regulations, currency was backed by local institutions that varied in authority 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction). 
154 An integration, I might add, the need of which grew all the more poignant when the 
nation slipped into civil war over precisely the question of how much sovereignty the 
federal government was authorized to exercise and how much was “reserved to the states.” 
Money's Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that with no national ledger “[t]wo banks 
might both promise redeemability of their notes into the same quantum of something more 
solid—gold, for example, or U.S. Treasury certificates—but might well be differently able 
to live up to their promises.”). 
155 Id. (explaining that redeemability of bank notes issued by state-regulated banks 
were not reliably redeemable in other jurisdictions). 
156 See id. (explaining how the reliability of different banks depended on the individual 
state’s regulation). 
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time.157 This meant in turn that the practical redeemability, and hence 
ultimate reliability, of notes issued by, or of drafts drawn upon accounts 
maintained with, banks in one state could appear “iffy” to counterparties 
domiciled in other states.158  
In effect, every state had its own licensed private purveyors of 
private money variously backed, with purveyor reliability varying according 
to backer liability and of course charter address.159 This in turn meant that 
the dollar, though in theory a national unit of account, could not in practice 
serve either as such a unit—there was no centralized national account 
amalgamating all citizen accounts—or as a bona fide national currency 
substituting for credits and debits on a national account.160 A nominal dollar 
note issued by, say, Wyatt Earp Bank in Kansas might circulate at par or 
near-par, while another nominal dollar note issued by Jesse James Bank in 
Texas might circulate at but 20% of par; that is not good for Kansas-to-
Texas cross-border transacting.161  
The second challenge posed by spatial non-uniformity was the 
intrastate counterpart of the interstate challenge just noted. It was that, in 
                                                
157 See id. (describing how Nebraska and Michigan banks were unreliable because of 
the state regulation); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46 (observing that in the early 
19th century, “New York and New England banks, for example, were often reliable. 
Nebraska or Michigan banks, by contrast, not so much”); CONANT, supra note 134, at 311–
312, 328–329 (commenting on the varying reliability of early banks’ notes);  RONALD E. 
SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855 149-90 
(1982) (providing an overview of early currency stability in the United States). 
158 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (“Two banks might both promise 
redeemability of their notes into the same quantum of something solid—gold, for example, 
or U.S. Treasury certificates—but might well be differently able to live up to their 
promises. Some might be sound, other might be less so. Some might be sound this year but 
not so much next year.”). 
159 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 3 (stating that banks’ reliability differed on states’ 
charters); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“In doing so, banks decide whose 
private promissory notes will be temporarily tradeable for public promissory notes. They 
thereby assist our Fed, and hence ‘us,’ in temporarily transforming private money into 
public money—purely horizontal claims into vertical or vertically-enhanced horizontal 
claims.”). 
160 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing that bank notes fluctuated in value. 
“Needless to say, private banknote money did not make for an optimal payments system. It 
was good that the nation had a unit of account—the dollar—but unfortunately it still lacked 
a widely usable national currency.”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 23-24 (using 
hypothetical to explain single, unified ledger necessary for creation of functioning unit). 
161 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3-4 (“The upshot of this ‘Banking Babel’ was that 
the nation’s currency supply largely consisted of hundreds or thousands of distinct bank 
notes all trading at various discounts to stated par. A dollar note issued by Bill the Kid 
Bank or Sidewinder Bank might trade at 50% of par, for example, amount to no more than 
‘four bits,’ not a dollar. A dollar note issued by Wyatt Erp Bank or Bald Eagle Bank might, 
by contrast, go for 90% of par, or even full par.”). 
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states where bank chartering and regulation were lax, currencies could vary 
in value relative to one another even within states.162 Wildcat Bank’s dollar 
might trade at twelve cents up in Omaha, while Eagle Bank’s dollar might 
trade at par in the same general vicinity. This patchwork form of reliability 
found reflection in merchants’ having to maintain periodically updated 
discount schedules for locally used currencies, advising for how many cents 
on the dollar to count various private bank currencies when these were 
offered in payment for goods or services.163 That too, of course, operated as 
an impediment to (intrastate) transaction activity—an impediment more 
pervasive than that to what was then still only nascent interstate 
commerce.164    
In many ways, this “wildcat” era in banking—called “free banking” 
by its advocates during the rare intervals that it was not in crisis—
confronted market participants with a bewildering array of wildly 
fluctuating payment media reminiscent of that which confronts those who 
use newly issued privately issued crypto-currencies today.165 I will have 
more to say on that later when I propose, in Part IV, a publicly administered 
Democratic Digital Dollar associated with my proposed system of Citizen 
and Resident Wallets. For present purposes, what matters is what ultimately 
emerged as the nineteenth century’s imperfect paper currency substitute for 
my proposal, which latter simply brings the former into the twenty-first 
century.  
I allude to the institution, through the Legal Tender Act of 1862,166 
the National Currency Act of 1863,167 and the National Banking Act of 
1864,168 of a nationwide network of federally chartered National Banks, 
located all over the nation, all subject to the same regulatory standards and 
all issuing notes convertible into the very same Treasury-issued currency—
                                                
162 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that notes fluctuated in value in every 
store); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 24 (explaining that regulations are needed 
for uniformity and stability). 
163 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (“Shopkeepers and tradesmen in consequence 
had to maintain regularly updated discount schedules behind their counters, instructing 
clerks how much to discount different banks’ notes in determining ‘how much’ (of what) to 
charge buyers for goods or for services.”). 
164 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (determining that transactions could take 
significantly long given the various calculations and valuations of notes). 
165 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“We are amidst, that is to say, digital currency’s 
‘wildcat’ era. For one thing, there are many such currencies—indeed, a bewildering and 
seemingly all-the-time growing array of them.”). 
166 Legal Tender Act of 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532 (1862). 
167 National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 85, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). 
168 National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864). 
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tellingly called then “the Greenback.”169 This was effectively the birth of 
the dollar as we now know it—a centrally issued and universally employed 
money that is not only a unit of account, but also a bona fide payment 
medium circulating throughout the entire republic.170 It was a centralized 
ledger-substitute,171 a uniform currency whose nationwide uniformity in 
effect substituted for the “centrality” of a centralized national ledger that at 
the time was not technologically feasible but now is in the way that Parts IV 
through VI below will elaborate.172  
The new 1860s regime marked the commencement of the American 
republic’s rendition of the full finance franchise described above.173 It 
delegated quality control duties to a newly established federal 
instrumentality whose name becomes comprehensible against the backdrop 
just narrated; I refer to the OCC.174 It is instructive that this agency, 
contemporarily described simply as a bank regulator, was originally a 
currency regulator.175 The Comptroller, whose name derives suggestively 
from an archaic English word for controller, was essentially the agent 
through whom our finance franchisor, the sovereign public, “controlled”—
that is, maintained the quality of—that which it franchised, the dollar.176  
Of course, this involved maintaining what we have ever since called 
the “safety and soundness” (believe it or not, that is a term of art) of the 
                                                
169 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that notes were converted into 
Treasury-issued currencies called Greenbacks after legislation); Rousseauvian Money, 
supra note 67, at 44 (stating that Greenbacks were seen as uniformed currency); CONANT, 
supra note 134, at 345-46 (stating that after Federal regulations notes were replaced with 
bills of credit). Since the drafting of this Part in late 2017, this author’s friends Lev Menand 
and Morgan Ricks have conducted further legislative-historical research that appears to 
corroborate my account in every detail. See Morgan Ricks & Lev Menand, Federal 
Corporate Law and the Business of Banking (2020) (working paper, on file with the 
author). 
170 CONANT, supra note 134, at 344 (explaining need for every dollar to be in 
circulation on the credit of the Fed). 
171 Rousseavian Money, supra note 67, at 24 (using analogy to highlight usefulness of 
a shared ledger). 
172 Rousseavian Money, supra note 67, at 30 (describing Federal notes as uniformed 
currency); CONANT, supra note 134, at 344 (describing necessity of uniformity on equal 
value). 
173 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 4 (outlining various acts of 1860s and explaining 
how financial landscape changed). 
174 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (describing OCC’s job). 
175 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (outlining history of OCC). 
176 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 5 (“The name is telling because ‘comptroller’ is 
merely archaic English for ‘controller.’  The OCC, housed in Treasury, was effectively the 
‘controller’—the administrator—of our national currency system.”). see also Rousseauvian 
Money, supra note 67, at 45 (“One could, in other words, ‘over-promise’ by issuing too 
many promissory notes, which would undercut the value of promise and promissory note 
alike.”). 
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franchisee institutions—the banks.177 But the primary reason for federally 
maintaining that safety and soundness was precisely the fact that, as 
distributors of that public good which is the public’s currency, these 
institutions were in effect privately owned public utilities.178 They were 
accordingly locked into partnership with the designated agent of the public 
itself—its Currency Controller.179  
The banking and currency reforms of the 1860s comprehensively 
transformed the United States’ interlinked banking, financial, and monetary 
systems.180 In very short order there were federally chartered banks in most 
states and territories of the Union, all of them subject to uniform regulatory 
standards—including that every $100 in notes be backed by $111 in U.S. 
sovereign securities—and all of them issuing, accordingly, a de facto 
uniform national currency with a uniform value.181 These banks also sold 
U.S. Treasury securities, effectively making them a system of outlets for the 
issuance of both of our federal government’s principal circulating liabilities 
                                                
177 “Safety and soundness” is a ubiquitous banking law term of art, used by legislators 
and all U.S. bank regulators to designate a sort of regulatory touchstone by reference to 
which banks are to be supervised. See Making Sense of the Federal Reserve: “Safety and 
Soundness,” FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Oct. 15, 2019, 5:45 PM), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/safety-and-soundness [https://perma.cc/DXN4-
K2GF]. 
178 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (describing current money system as “public-
private franchise system.”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39 (explaining that 
when one borrows money, they transform “private money into public money” and 
effectively exchange “your . . . promissory obligations” for “our promissory obligations.”); 
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1151 (“Private parties essentially borrow from or 
invest in one another, and one can only invest or borrow what is “already there” in 
previously accumulated, privately-owned form.”). 
179 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (describing our system as ‘outsourcing’ “credit-
checking and public money-dispensary functions to private institutions.”); Rousseauvian 
Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“One way of thinking of ‘private’ (yet always publicly 
licensed) banking and other financial institutions against this backdrop, as noted earlier, is 
as ‘outsourced’ credit-checking offices of the Fed and, in consequence, of Us (our joint 
political ‘we,’ our ‘We, the People’)—all Americans in their capacities as citizens of one 
shared republic (one res publica, or public thing), whose central bank the Fed is.”). 
180 Richard Sylla, The U.S. Banking System: Origin, Development, and Regulation, 
THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN HISTORY (last visited Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://ap.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/economics/essays/us-banking-system-origin-
development-and-regulation (discussing the changes in American banking from 1781 to the 
present). 
181 See BENNETT MCCALLUM, MONETARY ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 318 
(1989) (“The mechanism was simple: national banks were required to hold $111.11 worth 
of government bonds for each $100 of bank notes issued”); BORIS P. PESEK & THOMAS R. 
SAVING, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MONEY AND BANKING 397 (1968) (“For each $100 of bank 
notes produced, the national bank had to deposit with the U.S. Treasurer “eligible” U.S. 
bonds promising repayment of $111”). 
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at the time—Greenbacks and T-Bills.182 In very little time, “wildcat” 
banknotes lost value and drained out of circulation.183  
   
2. Temporal Uniformity: “Sound Money” & “Elastic Currency”  
The foregoing paragraphs implicate two of money’s oft-noted 
functions—its serving both as a “unit of account” and as a “medium of 
exchange.”184 The other role typically observed to be played by money—its 
function as a “store of value”—is what lay behind our polity’s later 
replacement of the Comptroller as money-modulator by a new central bank, 
the Fed.185  
Key to maintaining a currency’s stable value over time—that is, to 
preventing inordinate inflation and deflation—is the capacity to fine-tune 
and regularly readjust the supply of that currency as transaction volume in 
the “real” economy grows, shrinks, or fluctuates.186 The currency must, in 
the words I used earlier, be elastic and modulatable.187 Its supply must be 
adjustable (a) to accommodate, while not over-accommodating, transaction 
and credit demand, and (b) to counteract sudden and destabilizing credit 
expansions or contractions.188  
 
                                                
182 See MCCALLUM, supra note 163, at 318-319 (discussing the issuance of greenbacks 
and T-Bills). 
183 PESEK & SAVING, supra note 163, at 391-95 (illustrating the change from 
‘Greenbacks’ to the ‘Gold Standard’); Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 6 (“In very little 
time, ‘wildcat’ banknotes drained out of circulation”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, 
at 19 (discussing liabilities and assets). 
184 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 23 (“Our ‘chore money’ now will be 
transparently functioning not only as a ‘medium of exchange’ usable in ‘settling [chore] 
accounts,’ and not only as a ‘unit of account’ used in keeping such accounts, but also . . . 
.”). 
185 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 7 (“The Federal Reserve Act (‘FRA’) of 1913 
established the Fed that we all know today, and transferred de facto and de jure 
administration of the national money supply from the Comptroller to this new entity”); 
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 35 (“The ‘value’ component of money as ‘store of 
value’ stems from money’s status as a claim . . . .”). 
186 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (summarizing what an elastic currency is intended 
to do); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45-46 (discussing the danger of 
oversupplying currency into the market). 
187 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“A money whose supply can be ‘modulated’ in 
this way, as I call it, is essential if we’re to avoid needlessly disrupting either transaction 
activity, investment activity, or currency value”); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 
45 (expounding on the importance of an ‘elastic’ currency). 
188 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“An elastic currency is a currency whose supply 
can be adjusted (a) to accommodate, while not over-accommodating, transaction and credit 
demand, and (b) to counteract sudden credit expansions or contractions”). 
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The idea is to maintain just enough credit-money supply to 
accommodate desired transaction volumes and enable 
productive investment, so as not needlessly to squelch either, 
while at the same time preventing over-issuance of the sort 
that can spark inflation—the classic problem of ‘too much 
money’ chasing ‘too few goods.’ A money whose supply can 
be ‘modulated’ in this way . . . is essential if we’re to avoid 
needlessly disrupting either transaction activity, investment 
activity, or currency value. And that is to say it’s essential [if 
people would maintain smooth, steady growth of their 
national wealth and productive capacity.189  
 
This is why, as noted above, polities in the early modern era tolerated 
metal-smiths’ and then bankers’ issuances of what came to be widely 
spendable “claim checks” in excess of their sovereign-issued metal coin 
stores.190 It is also why they regulated them carefully; regulation was as 
much about monetary control—what I call “money modulation”—as it was 
about consumer protection.191 But the American republic, founded partly by 
landed aristocrats who were suspicious of centralized political governance 
and centralized banking alike, had to rediscover for itself the dependence of 
money’s temporal uniformity upon public money modulation.192  
 
The OCC in particular and Treasury more generally 
were not well equipped, operationally or transaction-
technologically speaking, to engage in the daily money-
modulatory task that maintaining a value-retentive elastic 
currency requires—particularly not so long as state-chartered 
banks now offering checkable deposits in lieu of private 
banknotes continued to operate alongside the new national 
banking system.193  
                                                
       189 Id.  
       190 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (explaining how bankers began issuing 
more notes than they had metal). 
       191 See id. (discussing metal and regulation). 
192 See Public Actors, supra note 17, at 117 (“This political side of the government, 
however, is also the perennial source of suspicion that accompanies state participation in 
economic activity”); Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10, at 113 (“Second is an attendant 
suspicion of large aggregations of financial capital . . . .”). See also Materializing 
Citizenship, supra note 10, at 2075 (discussing suspicion of large aggregating entities). 
193 Money’s Past, supra note 16, at 7. See also Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 
45 (discussing elasticity of currency); CONANT, supra note 134, at 20 (explaining the need 
for elasticity); SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 150-67 (discussing the development of the free 
banking system). 




The Second Bank of the U.S. from 1816 to 1836 on the one hand, 
and the central banks familiar to the rest of the world since the late 17th 
century, on the other hand, had shown the means of performing that 
function.194 In serving as “banks to other banks,” they had developed 
methods by which publicly to modulate private bank currency-issuance in 
ever more finely tuned and sophisticated ways, including a “public market-
actor” role.195  In a similar but unavoidably less complete manner, clearing 
house arrangements among U.S. private sector banks had developed means 
of at least partly buffering note-issuing private sector banks against periodic 
liquidity shocks.196  
The U.S. thus patterned its own version of a central bank partly on 
its own earlier Banks of the U.S., partly on European models, and partly on 
these clearinghouse arrangements. This it did with the Federal Reserve Act 
of 1913, which like the banking acts of the 1860s was proximately 
occasioned by a crisis—this time the market panic of 1907.197  
The Federal Reserve Act, especially as supplemented by further 
legislation during the New Deal, established the Fed that we all know today, 
and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national money 
supply from the Comptroller to the new instrumentality.198 Yesterday’s 
“Greenback” Treasury notes became today’s green “Federal Reserve Notes” 
[(Fed Notes)].199 That means that while we are still using “bank notes” of a 
                                                
194 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“The Second Bank of the U.S. from 1816 to 1836, 
and especially central banks of the kind found all over the ‘developed’ world circa 1913, by 
contrast, had shown themselves well suited to the task.”); RICHARD TIMBERLAKE, MONEY, 
BANKING, AND CENTRAL BANKING 163-71 (1965) (discussing the development of the 
Second Bank of the US, which was chartered in 1816). 
195 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“By acting as ‘banks to the banks,’ these 
institutions were able to modulate private bank money-issuance in ever more ‘fine-tuned’ 
manners, using ‘carrots’ as effectively as ‘sticks’”); Public Actors, supra note 4, at 158 
(characterizing a public market-actor); Governments as Market Actors, supra note 29, at 55 
(“We call the underappreciated governmental role that we have in mind here the "market 
actor" role”).  
196 EUGENE N. WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING 
SYSTEM, 1900-1929, 63-74 (1983) (discussing the development and impact of the Federal 
Reserve Act of 1913); Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining how New York and 
New England banks were reliable); Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 46 
(highlighting how the United States Fed followed actions taken by the Bank of England). 
197 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“Like the banking acts of the 1860s, this change 
too was proximately occasioned by a crisis – in this case, the panic of 1907”). 
198 Id. (“The Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”) of 1913 established the Fed that we all 
know today, and transferred de facto and de jure administration of the national money 
supply from the Comptroller to this new entity.”). 
199 Id. (“This is why the ‘Greenbacks’ you now find in your pocket call themselves, not 
‘Treasury Notes’, but ‘Federal Reserve Notes’.”). 
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sort as currency much as we did in the 19th century, the notes in question are 
now public bank notes—“central” bank notes—rather than private bank 
notes.200 We might even call them Citizen Notes, or claim-check 
equivalents of dollar-denominated credits in incipient Citizen Wallets 
tracked on an implicit or incipient Fed-administered Citizens’ Ledger.201 
They are issued and spent in the name of us all.202 And so we now have a 
publicly franchised good—a sovereign currency—that is more or less 
uniform not only across space, but also across time, as the Fed engages in 
daily monetary operations aimed at preventing inflation and deflation 
alike.203   
It bears repeating that what is true of Federal Reserve Notes in this 
connection is true of credit extended in Fed Note denominated increments 
too.204 The loan that a private sector bank or other Fed-accommodated 
financial institution makes in the form of a newly opened or credited 
deposit is made in the form of dollar-denominated drawing or spending 
rights—credits, or “assets.” By accounting convention, these correspond to 
counterpart dollar-denominated bank debits, or “liabilities.”205 Since our 
Fed-administered payments system recognizes payments made out of these 
deposits as settling transactions, dollar increments of these bank liabilities 
are functional equivalents of dollar bills.206  
Once we appreciate this, and once we remind ourselves both that 
those dollar bills are Fed Notes and that one gives the bank a signed 
promissory note for one’s loan, we are able to see something else in 
addition: a loan is simply a temporary swap of a citizen’s promissory note 
for Fed promissory notes—of one’s privately issued money for more widely 
                                                
200 Id. (“It is just that they are public bank notes – ‘central’ bank notes – rather than 
private bank notes now.”). 
201 Id. (“They are Citizen Notes, you might say.”). 
202 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 7 (“They are issued and spent in the name of us 
all.”). 
203 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 37 (observing that financial institutions 
enable “more exchange to take place across space by enabling exchange across time”). 
204 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“And what is true of Federal Reserve Notes here 
is true of bank credit extended in Fed Note – that is, dollar – increments too.”). 
205 Id. (“The loan the bank makes to you in the form of a newly opened or credited 
deposit it ‘makes’ in the form of dollar-denominated withdrawal or spending rights.”). 
206 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“The deposits, in other words, are functional 
equivalents of dollar bills.”). What makes this possible, again, is that a bank-issued card 
that you swipe in a machine at a retail outlet hooked up to the Fed-administered payments 
system “counts” as a payment and accordingly both debits your account and credits the 
retail outlet’s. Were I, who am not licensed as a bank, to issue you an identical card, 
nothing would happen other than that I would be arrested for fraud our counterfeiting.  
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spendable publicly issued money.207 This is the contemporary form taken by 
what I labeled above “vertical” tokens coming to function as “horizontal” 
tokens. Modern bank lending is in this sense just temporary private-public 
currency swapping.208 That is how things have long been in Europe and, for 
less long, in the rest of the world as well.209 The reasons are found in the 
tale just told.210  
But why do we still operate in this way? Why do we still franchise 
finance and in effect outsource much of our payment infrastructure’s 
provision to the private sector institutions whose managed accounts we use 
as its pillars? Must we continue to do so? Why not make publicly issued 
money elastic and modulatable, not by supplementing it with dollar-
denominated bank-ledger credit-money, as we now do, but with Fed- or 
Treasury-ledger money—Public Ledger money, as we will be able very 
soon to do? 211 
As it happens, there once were good functional reasons for 
incremental resort to public-private franchising where our republic’s 
financial and commercial infrastructures were concerned—reasons rooted in 
the American polity’s incomplete sovereignty during its first hundred years, 
give or take.212 But those reasons have by and large long since receded, as I 
will now indicate. This means our civilization’s long detour in the realm of 
ledger-substitute coin and currency can end. It means that a full publicly 
administered citizens’ ledger and associated Digital Dollar are now possible 
and indeed easily instituted, as I shall demonstrate.  
                                                
207 Id. (“Once you realize this, and once you remind yourself both that those dollars are 
Fed ‘Notes’ and that you give the bank a signed promissory note for your loan, you are 
able to see something else too: This is that a loan is simply a temporary swap of your 
promissory note for Fed promissory notes—of your privately issued money for more 
widely spendable publicly issued money.”). This point is emphasized, and its significance 
more fully elaborated, in Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39-40 (“When you 
borrow money, then—which you often do in this country by handing a bank your own 
promissory note in exchange for Fed promissory notes (or their depository or cashier’s 
check equivalents)—you just temporarily trade your own notes for Fed notes. It’s just a 
temporary swap.”).  
208 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (“Bank lending is just temporary private-public 
currency swapping.”). 
209 See e.g., CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING 
OF CAPITALISM 295-329 (2014) (discussing the history of currency in England and its 
origins in the 17th century). 
210 See generally id. (tracing the history of currency and the reasons for its 
development).  
211 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing the potential adoption of a Fed-issued 
digital currency & the subsequent feasibility of a Fed-administered central banking lender). 
212 CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (“A new country, poor in specie and in loanable 
capital, is almost forced by the necessities of her situation to adopt monetary devices which 
would not be tolerated under better conditions.”). 




III. HYBRID FINANCE: WHY WE RETAIN IT— AND WHY WE NEED NOT   
I have now elaborated both why a geographically and temporally 
uniform, elastic currency was necessary when consolidated nationwide 
ledger-accounting was not yet feasible and why it was all but inevitable that 
our sovereign republic would ultimately issue it.213 In this sense my account 
embeds a teleology. It tells a tale of steady development and improvement 
through a course of alternating improvisation and consolidation—a tale that, 
I argue below, will almost certainly be replicated in the space of digital 
payments technology and associated digital currency. There should be, and 
will be, a Fed- or Treasury-administered Digital Dollar affording the same 
spatial and temporal uniformity that previously Treasury-administered and 
now Fed-administered “green paper” dollars afford at present.214 
Matters are different when we turn from monetary uniformity and 
elasticity to monetary and financial hybridity. While the first two seem to be 
ultimately necessary in all times and places, and in this sense essential to 
commercial and financial optimization themselves, the third is historically 
contingent, a product of political and technological under-development and 
associated ideological inertia.215 And here the best explanation of what has 
been recommends change in what soon shall be. The story is still 
teleological, to be sure, but now the story of money’s returning to being 
fully public figures as simply the penultimate chapter in the story of 
finance’s returning to being fully public—in the form of a consolidated 
public ledger. We can see why when we ask ourselves what accounts for 
hybridity in the first place, then ask whether that which accounts for it 
continues to necessitate it. 
 
A.  Why We Retain It: New Facts, Old Thoughts 
 Why did we first take to franchising money and finance? Why do 
we still do so now? Why does our sovereign republic still outsource the 
allocation of its resource—its monetized full faith and credit—and privatize 
the seigniorage rents earned on its rental?    
In light of the foregoing discussion, it will not be surprising that I 
think the best explanation stems from popular assumptions that once were 
well founded in political and technological “facts on the ground,” but which 
                                                
213 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 26-27 (discussing the modern societal trend 
of centralizing and formalizing currency arrangement). 
214 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10-11 (concluding that a Fed-issued digital currency 
would be “more effective, saving-friendly and consumer-friendly” than the current system). 
215 Id. at 4 (discussing the historical necessity of U.S bank franchising). 
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have long since receded.216 Since the receding of those facts, popular beliefs 
have not yet been updated, and it is part of the purpose of this article to 
instigate just that updating.    
 The two most foundational popular assumptions to which I allude 
are that investable capital—a.k.a. “finance capital”—is both inherently 
scarce and unavoidably privately supplied.217 These two assumptions 
underwrite a third which stems also from other assumptions—namely that 
capital allocation decisions are most justly and efficiently made in the 
private sector, with the public sector playing at most a supportive and 
modulatory role in respect of credit aggregates so as to smoothen “the 
business cycle.”218 These assumptions all jointly underwrite the picture that 
I call the “intermediated scarce private capital myth.”219  
Investable capital, probably not accidentally, seems to figure almost 
like precious metal money in the intermediated scarce private capital 
picture. It is as if the publicly issued coins discussed above were both (a) 
not multiplied by paper currency, bank credits, or other tokens, and (b) not 
issued by republics or other sovereigns at all. There seems to be assumed, in 
other words, a finite and determinate quantity of metal money capital at any 
one time in the intermediated scarce private capital picture, and most if not 
all of it is viewed as rightfully owned and hence lent by domestic or foreign 
persons in the private sector.220 When you think about money in this way, it 
is easy then also to think that “intermediaries” can only “lend out” what 
                                                
216 Id. at 5 (“It is at best a holdover from earlier times: times when currencies were 
pegged to exogenously given stocks of precious metals, finance was indeed by and large 
privately supplied, and capital – at least liquid capital – was indeed scarce.”). 
217 Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1145-46 (“An unspoken assumption behind 
the orthodox picture of finance is that a certain defined quantum of unavoidably scarce 
finance capital first accumulates in private hands, after which financial intermediaries 
facilitate flows of the privately owned funds toward other private (and some public) 
actors.”); Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (“The dominant intermediated 
scarce private capital view of finance is, then, a myth.”). 
218 Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1211 (“It is simply assumed that efficient 
“one-to-one” financial intermediation naturally results in the right quantities from capital 
flowing to the right economic actors.”). 
219 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (arguing that financial 
institutions do indeed intermediate, capital is not actually “scarce”); Finance Franchise, 
supra note 14, at 1218 (claiming that the “the financial system operates essentially as a 
franchise arrangement in which the public is the franchisor, while the private institutions 
that dispense its full faith and credit are effectively its franchisees); see also Rousseauvian 
Money, supra note 67, at 33-34 (explaining misconceptions of the government’s role in 
managing markets). 
220 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67 (claiming that financial intermediation 
theories “conflate[-] an indefinitely extensible resource—finance capital—with a 
(momentarily) scarce resource – physical capital”). 
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they antecedently “take in,” and that those who supply what is lent are thus 
both entitled and best suited to directing it. 
The “sanctity of property” and “common sense about incentives” 
alike, the intermediated scarce private capital story accordingly continues, 
recommend leaving investment decisions to those who own and provide the 
putatively scarce money capital.221 These rentiers have every right to charge 
rents and every reason to do their homework and lend their money out 
cautiously only to those who will put it to productive use, using the 
temporary claims to productive resources that lent money affords them to 
add to the stock of society’s wealth over time, pay back their lenders, and 
pocket rich profits while at it.222  
Et voila, the miracle of “finance and development”—a tale told 
often in textbooks, journal articles, white papers, and speeches all valorizing 
the role of “financial liberalization” in fueling economic growth miracles.223 
The public sector typically is admitted into this picture at best as an 
afterthought, or as a necessary evil.224 The story begins with the need to 
standardize the monetary units into which precious metal capital, already 
used as a private money-form thanks to its putatively “intrinsic” value, is to 
be parceled.225 (Money as a unit of account, as noted above.) 
Standardization is an orthodox public good, the solution to a coordination 
problem. So is enforcement of standards. So the public can be permitted 
these roles, hence the role of a franchisor in the standard-maintenance, 
quality-control sense of the word.226 
The story might then reach, if narrated by people cognizant of the 
need for a currency that is not only spatially uniform but also temporally 
uniform (again, “elastic”), the need also to standardize paper 
representations of precious metal coins once it is recognized that wealth 
                                                
221 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 4-5 (debunking the intermediated 
scarce private capital myth). 
222 See id. at 5 (“[Intermediated scarce private capital view] is a myth whose 
widespread acceptance is no doubt convenient for certain rentier interests in contemporary 
‘financialized’ societies, but is a myth nonetheless.”). 
223 See id. at 4 (explaining the intermediated scarce private capital “view is routinely 
stated in treatises, textbooks, learned journals, and the popular media.”). 
224 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 41-42 (explaining early development of 
standardized monetary systems and the need for currency uniformity in commerce); 
Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1170-73 (explaining the essential role of government 
in regulation in fostering a stable economic environment). 
225 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 44-45 (discussing the origins and 
history of metal capital as backing for paper currency). 
226 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing the consistent standards across 
franchisors). 
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expansion is outstripping metal money supply expansion.227 Such 
imbalances are addressed, the story will continue, with adoption of an 
elastic currency that can be issued in excess of the metals that “back” it, so 
long as the currency volume isn’t allowed to become too great a multiple of 
the metal reserve.228 (Money as an elastically expansible means of exchange 
and a reliable store of value, again as noted above.)  
In both cases the public is grudgingly seen as provider of an 
orthodox public good that it is suited to providing—standard-setting and 
enforcement—while private sector agents are viewed as still acting as 
ultimate providers of the “monetary base,” hence the “real capital,” and thus 
as the proper deciders as to that capital’s disposition or allocation.229 Here is 
the kernel of the franchise arrangement to which I have referred, as it would 
be described by our still-ubiquitous purveyors of the intermediated scarce 
private capital myth. 
 What escapes notice in this picture, however, is that (a) what is 
monetary about the metal coin base is the stamp of the coin, not the metal in 
the coin;230 and (b) that once the money supply comes significantly to 
outstrip the coin supply, the putative “base money” does no real work any 
longer.231 It grows ever more vestigial as real wealth and its monetary 
representation—the full money supply—grow ever larger in relation to it. 
The real monetary work is thus done by the multiplier from putative “base” 
to full money supply, and that means that this work is done by the decider 
of the multiplier—that is, the public, which sets and enforces required 
reserve ratios in the first place.232  
In effect, then, the moment we move from putatively private moneys 
used among some people to public-private franchise money used among all 
people is the moment we move to the prospect of cutting out private 
moneys, and with them private payment platforms and private finance, 
altogether.233 For it is the moment we recognize money’s ineluctably public, 
                                                
227 Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 47-48 (describing how inflation results 
from printing more money without having additional backing for it). 
228 Id. at 45 (explaining the risk that “elastic currency could be ‘over-stretched,’ issued 
too far in excess of the metal that ‘backed’ it”). 
229 Id. at 45-46 (tracing the historical risks of unregulated private banks over-stretching 
their currency leading to the development of national standards and bank regulations). 
230 Id. at 44 and 51 (explaining that the stamp on the precious metal coin gave it 
recognition and value as currency; “currency and coin are not money, they represent 
money”). 
231 Id. at 46 (discussing the move from the metallic constraints of issuing notes to 
“credit-money”). 
232 Id. at 45-47 (describing the loss of the metallic constraints). 
233 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 40 (“For in effect private banking 
institutions are simply distributing that public resource which is the monetized full faith 
and credit of the United States, earning privatized seignorage for doing the credit checks 
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and hence ineluctably “fiat,” character.234 Now that we know it is possible, 
all that remains is to decide whether it is desirable. In other words, now that 
we know assumptions (a) and (b) above to be false and (c) therefore to be 
weakened, should we bring money and finance back “in house” and stop 
franchising it out to privately run institutions? 
 
B.  Why We Need Not: New Facts, New Prospects 
 I believe that the answer to that question is now largely, if not in fact 
wholly, “yes.” My reasons stem partly from changes in those facts on the 
ground that I alluded to before in accounting for assumptions (a) through (c) 
of the intermediated scarce private capital myth. I’ll explain this first before 
turning to additional reasons that I believe militate in favor of bringing 
money, payment, and finance back in-house for the public that is our 
republic.  
During the first century of the American republic, metal coin money 
was still, by tradition, the preferred form.235 And specie was indeed scarce, 
especially in North America.236 In this sense there was indeed capital 
scarcity.237 This meant, ironically, both that non-metal expedients grew 
urgently necessary quite early on in our nation’s history once economic 
                                                                                                                       
while being publicly licensed to play this role only so long as they maintain the ‘quality 
standards’ we demand through our franchisor Fed and its co-regulators.”). 
234 Id. at 46-48 (discussing the history of gold currency and sovereign backing of the 
same). 
235 A History of American Currency, AMERICAN NUMISMATIC SOCIETY (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2019) (discussing the evolution of currency in the United States). 
236 See CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (“A new country, poor in specie and in 
loanable capital, is almost forced by the necessities of her situation to adopt monetary 
devices which would not be tolerated under better conditions.”); SEAVOY, supra note 139, 
at 154 (describing banking policy in the early 1830’s as responsive in part to the scarcity of 
specie at several distinct financial crises).  
237 Id. (describing banking regulations regulating the denominations of paper bills to be 
circulated in response to the shortages of coins). Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s 
fiscal and banking plans were all about simultaneously addressing this scarcity and the 
incomplete centralization and sovereignty that perpetuated it. See, e.g., Public Actors, 
supra note 17, at 109-111 (introducing Hamilton’s banking policy ideas designed to 
introduce capital into American markets and centralize sovereign financial regulation); 
Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10; Materializing Citizenship, supra note 10, at 2077-79 
(describing the decentralized early-American financial landscape preferred by the 
government at the time, to which Hamilton’s banking plans responded); Jeffersonian 
Republic, supra note 29 (describing the “Hamiltonian spirit” of developments in American 
financial policy encouraging access to capital and diversified sources of wealth amidst a 
backdrop of a decentralized, agrarian early economy); see also Robert C. Hockett, When 
All Enterprise Was ‘Social,’ in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 
(Benjamin Means & Joseph Yockey eds., Cambridge University Press 2019) (referencing 
the “free banking” period of American financial history that lasted from 1836-1863). 
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growth had got underway, and that hastily adopted non-metal money 
expedients came often to grief in those early days, ironically reinforcing 
beliefs that metal moneys were somehow inherently more “sound” (another 
term of art)238  
 Just as its supply of reliable money had difficulty keeping up with 
its economic growth, moreover, so did our new republic’s governance 
structures at first have difficulty keeping up with its geographic and 
populational growth.239 It proved as difficult to integrate the nation 
politically and administratively as it was to integrate the nation 
monetarily.240 Indeed, the latter difficulty, in large measure, both stemmed 
from and reinforced the former difficulty in ways noted above. Incomplete 
sovereignty and incompletely sovereign money were mutually 
exacerbating.241  
Partly this was a matter of antecedent political ideation and attitude 
—southern plantation owners’ suspicions of centralized federal government 
and centralized finance continued to hold sway in the years that culminated 
in the Civil War.242 Partly it was also a matter of consequent incapacity’s— 
“imbecility’s,” as our Constitution’s co-drafter and first Treasury Secretary 
Hamilton called it—seeming to validate those suspicions in self-fulfillingly 
prophetic fashion.243 And partly it was a matter of communications 
infrastructure, fiscal infrastructure, and other technical determinants of 
governmental capacity’s still being underdeveloped in the early decades of 
the American republic.244 A federal government without deep reach or a 
                                                
238 See CONANT, supra note 134, at 286, 291, 346, 356 (discussing the early money-
printing policies of the banks of several early states and the abrupt and adverse regulatory 
reactions to the influx of new capital therein and the American public’s general trust in a 
metallic currency standard); SEAVOY, supra note 139, at 154 (describing a collective 
national “panic” due to the shortage of metal currency and its replacement with paper 
currency).  
239 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 25 (“When populations grow larger and 
asset/liability relations grow more far-flung and complex, however, things must be 
‘formalized’ and ‘regularized.’”). 
240 See Sylla, supra note 162 (discussing the history of American banking). 
241 See generally CONANT, supra note 134 (arguing the decentralized political structure 
of the early United States served as an impediment to effective centralized banking and 
financial policy). 
242 Id. at 345 (comparing the state banks of northern, midwestern, and southern states). 
243 See Public Actors, supra note 4, at 109 (contrasting Hamilton’s notion of the 
“imbecilic” agrarian economy with his notion of the “energetic” economy, built on 
technical prowess and a “well-developed system of finance”). 
244 Id. at 108-114 (detailing how the early policies of Alexander Hamilton addressed 
structural perceived weaknesses in the American economy to create the idea of centralized 
finance as we know it in America); see generally CONANT, supra note 134 (arguing that the 
agrarian, decentralized nature of early American society created myriad challenges to 
creating an effective, centralized financial system). 
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widely used currency of its own could take but a minimal role in the 
allocation of finance capital throughout its own territorial jurisdiction.245 
 The upshot was a system of commerce and finance in which 
inherently imperfect private ordering was bound to play a key role until 
such time as the nation’s sovereignty and capacity both fiscally and 
physically to act as a sovereign, in respect of both money and beyond, had 
fully coalesced.246 The divided sovereignty of the pre-Civil War era, 
pursuant to which the states ironically were constitutionally barred from 
issuing currencies even as they retained sufficient powers to prevent the 
federal government from doing so and the sole power to charter banking 
institutions, was effectively incomplete sovereignty.247 And incomplete 
sovereignty meant incomplete money and incomplete commerce and 
finance.248  
Once both national and monetary sovereignty finally were settled by 
the non-accidentally concurrent Civil War and banking-cum-currency 
reforms of the 1860s, however, our republic’s monetary and financial 
system moved into its present hybrid state.249 The public sector grew 
steadily better able, through practice and time, to handle the money-
modulatory task.250 Establishment of the Fed—our present day public sector 
money-issuer and money-modulator—in 1913 marked our republic’s 
monetary coming of age, and it took very little time from then on for the 
new institution to begin in effect calling the shots even in the putatively 
private sector money and financial markets. 
As early as the 1920s, foreign central bankers were noting how Fed 
open market operations had become the primary determinants, not only of 
                                                
245 See CONANT, supra note 134, at 311 (positing that the United States government 
was severely restricted in its early years because of its lack of centralized currency and 
capital).  
246 Id. at 310-335 (describing the proliferation of small banks in early decades of the 
American Republic, which had four systems of note, and the diversity of their charters and 
loaning practices). 
247 A History of American Currency, supra note 220 (“With the adoption of the 
Constitution, monetary production was redefined and restricted as a national prerogative. . . 
. Although the actual states were constitutionally forbidden to issue their own money, 
hundreds of private firms circumvented the law by producing what became generally 
known as “broken-bank notes.”). 
248 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 14-15 (arguing that money, in any form 
of ‘commercial exchange’ is necessary for any political or social entity to exist). 
249 See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1147 (characterizing the U.S. financial 
system in two forms where the first form “comprises directly-issued public liabilities,” and 
the second form comprises “publicly accommodated and monetized private liabilities”). 
250 See FELIKS MLYNARSKI, GOLD AND CENTRAL BANKS 33-34 (1928) (demonstrating 
the steady increase of gold reserves and deposits during the 1920s in America). 
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the American, but indeed also of the global money supply.251 Our republic 
also developed considerable facility with the allocative task complementing 
the modulatory task.252 This began partly with the institution of overtly 
allocative regional Federal Reserve Banks as part of the Federal Reserve 
System itself, charged with discounting productive project associated 
business paper in manners I shall advocate resuming below.253 It was then 
furthered by the operations of the twinned War Industries Board (WIB) and 
War Finance Corporation (WFC), established in 1918 to mobilize and 
channel investment capital toward war-related production following U.S. 
entry into the First World War—a cluster of necessarily coordinated tasks 
that classic collective action challenges would have rendered privately 
ordered financial markets incapable of performing.254 Federal involvement 
in finance allocation then grew even more impressively during the New 
Deal through the WFC’s successor, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC), supplemented ten years later by a WIB-inspired War Production 
Board (WPB)—a model on which I have partly drawn elsewhere and will 
draw on again, in a critically modified fashion, below.255  
The RFC in effect made amends for earlier switch-sleeping by the 
public member of our finance franchise, which had effectively fueled 
financial explosion in the 1920s and meltdown in 1929 by not taking the 
tiller during the bubble-inflating “Roaring ‘20s.”256 During its twenty years 
of operation, the RFC was by far the world’s largest financial institution, 
with a portfolio dwarfing those of all private financial institutions 
                                                
251 Id. at 52-70 (discussing effects of open market operations). 
252 See generally Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; and National 
Investment Authority, supra note 17, at 458 (discussing the ways in which “dedicated 
public investment vehicles…played a pivotal role in rescuing the American economy”). 
253 See Robert Hockett, Spread the Fed: Distributed Central Banking in Pandemic and 
Beyond, 19 U. VA. J. BUS. & FIN. L. __ (2020) (forthcoming).  
254 See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17; Hockett, FSOC for Public 
Investment, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 458 (“The WFC 
made direct loans, backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, both to banking 
institutions and to strategically and economically important industrial enterprises. . . .”). 
255 See Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17, at 458 (describing the RFC’s creation during the Great 
Depression, and how it was modeled after the WFC). 
256 See id. (stating that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was significant in 
guiding the nation out of the Great Depression). On public switch-sleeping in the 1920s, 
see Robert Hockett & Richard Vague, Debt, Deflation, and Debacle: Of Private Debt 
Writedown and Public Recovery (white paper, Global Interdependence Center, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 2013), available at https://www.interdependence.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf (last visited March 
7, 2020).   
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combined.257  That portfolio included assets as small as micro-loans to 
Watts barber shops and as large as multimillion dollar debt and equity 
holdings in banks, thrifts, railroads, power and light companies, and such 
still-operating entities as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA; Fannie Mae), the Small 
Business Administration (SBA), and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im 
Bank).258 And in all of these investments, the RFC made substantial profits, 
all of which were either plowed into further investments or remitted to the 
Treasury.259    
 The WFC and, especially, the RFC showed decisively that the 
public finance franchisor ultimately needs private finance franchisee 
institutions little more for the allocative task than it does for the modulatory 
task, not to mention that getting modulation right requires getting allocation 
right.260 They showed that public-private finance-franchising, however 
useful it might have been during the early years of the new national money 
regime in the final decades of the nineteenth century, was no longer 
necessary for the bulk of financing by the second decade of the twentieth 
century, and that it was downright dysfunctional in any economy beset by 
coordination needs and recursive collective action problems of the kind that 
afflict all decentralized markets—especially those in which credit is 
endogenously generated.261 Indeed, perhaps partly in recognition of this 
very fact, influential economist John Maynard Keynes began advocating a 
“National Board of Investments” for the United Kingdom in the same 
                                                
257 Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17 at 460 (“. . . at its peak the RFC had a balance sheet that dwarfed 
the combined balance sheets of Wall Street banks.”). 
258 Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17 at 459 (“Once demand in previously depressed sectors of the 
economy began to pick up, the RFC commenced large-scale direct lending to 
municipalities, school districts, commercial businesses, railroads, farmers and farm co-ops, 
production credit associations, joint-stock land banks, livestock credit corporations, and 
local banks and other lending institutions.”). 
259 Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17 at 459-61 (describing why the RFC was so successful in its time). 
260 Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17 at 458-463 (developing the history and purpose of the WFC and 
its successor, the RFC, and how they helped pull the U.S. out of the Great Depression and 
post-War years). 
261 Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 17; National Investment 
Authority, supra note 17 at 463 (discussing the winding down of the RFC from the end of 
the 19th century through World War II). On recursive collective action problems and their 
ubiquity in decentralized modern financial markets, see Robert Hockett, Recursive 
Collective Action Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial Markets, 
Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. 1 (2015). 
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period, predicting that it would naturally come to account for some two-
thirds of Great Britain’s total investments.262 
And yet nevertheless, a resurgence of nineteenth century folk belief 
about finance as intermediated scarce private capital in the 1950s, perhaps 
partly brought on by Cold War fears of Soviet “socialism,” brought about a 
winding-down of the RFC and, with it, the late nineteenth century franchise 
arrangement in the U.S.263 Popular conceptions of money and finance 
formed during the pre-sovereign period had apparently continued to linger 
as a sort of “lagging indicator,” and thus preserved supposedly 
indispensable roles for both rentiers and what came to be called a “financial 
services” industry, in the minds of those ignorant about money, banking, 
and finance in some precincts of the academy, the professions, and the lay 
public alike.264 
And so here we still linger both as a polity and as an economy over 
which that polity presides, as described above in introducing this article, 
oscillating continually between misallocation and consequent under-
modulation and associated asset price inflation on the one hand, and bust 
and ensuing debt-deflation on the other hand—all because the job that we 
started in 1862, though haltingly improved and fine-tuned through the 
1910s, 1930s, 1940s, early 1970s, and 2010s, has still to be finished, with 
even the good done quite often being undone. The job that remains to be 
done is that of finally more fully federalizing finance as we have federalized 
money and governance in the century-and-a-half since the 1860s, leaving 
private players to play with their own private money holdings but not 
ours—the public’s. To that task of completion I now turn.  
 
IV. CITIZEN FINANCE: WHAT WE NOW CAN AND MUST DO 
The foregoing discussion culminates in three suggestive 
conclusions. The first is that the sovereign—in a republic that is the 
public—must issue and modulate the supply of the polity’s sovereign 
credit-money. The second is that the sovereign public both can and should 
                                                
262  See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN MAYNARD 
KEYNES 384-395 (Donald Moggridge ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1978) (developing 
Keynes’ economic theories); see also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 336 (Palgrave Macmillan 2018) (1936) (discussing 
the same). 
263 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 1-7 (explaining the intermediated 
scarce private capital myth and the finance franchise). 
264 See generally John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, Financial Aspects of Economic 
Development, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 515 (1955); John G. Gurley & Edward S. Shaw, 
Financial Intermediaries and the Savings-Investment Process, 11 J. FIN. 257 (1956); 
James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of "Money”, COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER 
205 (1963) (representing examples of 1950s and 1960s economic theory). 
 The Capital Commons - DRAFT [1-June-18 
 
52
actively allocate much of that vital resource, especially toward productive 
primary and away from speculative secondary and tertiary markets—partly 
in furtherance of the modulatory task itself, and partly for reasons quite 
independent of that task, including reasons of justice, macroeconomic 
stability, and the solving of ubiquitous recursive collective action problems 
that impede productive investment.265 And the third is that sovereign coin 
and currency represent what I have here been calling an “intermediate 
stage” monetary technology, necessary for purposes of monetary uniformity 
and elasticity only (a) after populations outgrow mental or paper account 
book ledger-money practicability and (b) before those populations develop 
digital account book ledger-money capacity.    
I have more fully elaborated and argued for the truth of these 
propositions, as a theoretical matter, both in the previous two Parts and in 
prior work.266 And above I have also now provided a brief explanatory 
historical narrative showing both how and why we as a polity arrived at our 
present set of no-longer necessary or even desirable hybrid arrangements. 
What remains to do now is to show how to integrate the modulatory and 
allocative functions practically in the design of one fully federalized system 
of digital finance—what I shall call, since we are a republic, “Citizen 
Finance.” That is the task of this Part. 
What I shall sketch here is a system of Fed “Citizen” and “Resident” 
Wallets maintained on a single digitized national account book—a 
consolidated public ledger—to which will correspond public assets that will 
be generated by public investment along the lines indicated above. These 
will fall into three classes. One will be public Discount Window loans to 
both public and private sector lending institutions, which will take the place 
of much in the way of deposit liabilities currently owed by contemporary 
private sector commercial banks to the borrowers whose accounts they 
credit. Second will come issuances of the National Investment Council 
(NIC) mentioned above, along with other public investment institutions 
such as the Small Business Administration (SBA), all as more fully 
described below. And third will come other assets that the Fed or Treasury 
will hold and deal in in the interest of socially just credit allocation and 
stability-maintaining credit modulation, as I shall also describe below. 
The implications of these changes for private sector banking, capital 
markets, and “shadow banks,” not to mention traditional distinctions 
between Fed and Treasury monetary and fiscal policy instruments and 
operations, will be extensive, as I shall show.267 But what they will all have 
                                                
265 See again Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 261.  
266 See supra nn. 1, 4, and 67 (offering arguments in support of the preceding 
conclusion). 
267 In particular, infra Part IV.C. 
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in common is one simple feature: private sector finance in all subsectors of 
our financial sector now will indeed be private, and hence veritably 
“intermediated” as orthodoxy now falsely describes. Public credit-money, 
for its part, which is generated rather than “intermediated,”268 will flow 
only toward publicly approved projects, meaning that public allocation will 
be forthrightly embraced and Fed/Treasury operations accordingly by and 
large consolidated as described in Part IV.C. below.   
 
A.  Liability Side: Reserve Accounts, Citizen Wallets, and Resident Wallets 
Let us begin on the liability side of the present-day public sector 
balance sheet. On the liability side of a digitized national account ledger, 
which can constitute either the Fed’s balance sheet, the Treasury’s balance 
sheet, or a consolidated balance sheet comprising both,269 my proposal is 
quite simple. Indeed it is surprisingly so because, once one sees just how 
simple it is, the wonder is that we have not done something like it since 
1913 or, at latest, 1918 or 1933. Indeed, for some institutions, we have been 
doing it since then, as I will indicate in due course. 
1. What We Do Now: Reserve Accounts 
Begin with what we do now. All nationally and most state-chartered 
banks, including U.S. affiliates of foreign banks, hold Reserve Accounts 
with the Fed.270 It is through these accounts that the Fed manages its day-to-
day bank reserve requirement and liquidity management regime, to which 
all banks chartered or operating in the United States are subject.271  
                                                
268 See again supra, Part I, and my work cited there. 
269 Again, for reasons discussed infra, Part IV.C. In brief, the reason is that ending the 
franchise means narrowing, if not indeed closing, the traditional gap between fiscal and 
monetary policy.  
270 See 12 U.S.C. § 342 (2012) (authorizing federal reserve accounts for federal reserve 
member banks). A limited number of other categories of entities are authorized to hold 
Federal Reserve Accounts. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 391 (2012) (authorizing federal reserve 
accounts for the Treasury) 12 U.S.C. §§ 1435, 1452(d),1723a(g) (2012) (authorizing 
federal reserve accounts for mortgage GSEs); 12 U.S.C. §§ 347d, 358 (2012) (authorizing 
federal reserve accounts for foreign governments, banks, and central banks); 12 U.S.C. § 
286d (authorizing federal reserve accounts for BIS, IBRD, IMF); 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012) 
(authorizing federal reserve accounts for designated financial market utilities). 
271 See Reserve Maintenance Manual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 
(Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reserve-maintenance-
manual-account-structure.htm [https://perma.cc/PCG4-NCD8] (explaining daily 
maintenance of account relationship between depository institution and Federal Reserve 
banks). 
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Bank reserve accounts with the Fed are essentially deposits, hence 
assets of the banks and liabilities of the Fed.272 The private sector banks 
stand to the public sector Fed, in other words, as ordinary citizens with 
demand deposits stand to their private sector banks.273 The Fed in this sense 
truly is a “bank to the banks”—a central bank—and has been since its 
inception.274 
Since the crash of 2008, the Fed has paid interest on bank reserve 
accounts held with it—so-called interest on reserves, or IOR.275 This is 
another respect in which Fed reserve accounts are like bank deposit 
accounts, save that the Fed pays much more than our banks do.276 It also 
confers upon Fed reserves a characteristic once limited to Treasury 
securities—IOR is effectively the coupon on a bond.  
Interest on reserves affords the Fed a liability-side monetary policy 
tool supplementing its ample kit of asset side tools, and renders Fed 
reserves rather like coupon-bearing Treasury securities to their holders—
one reason I will keep saying “Fed or Treasury” in what I elaborate 
immediately below, and suggest Fed/Treasury consolidation a bit further 
below.277 Other such tools include the federal funds rate the Fed sets in the 
                                                
272 See Credit and Liquidity Program and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_frliabilities.htm 
[https://perma.cc/73BZ-NM7Z] [hereinafter Balance Sheet] (explaining the system of 
federal reserve liabilities and institutional deposits). 
273 See How is the Federal Reserve System structured? BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS. (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12593.htm [https://perma.cc/S72Q-TGMS] 
(explaining the structure of the federal reserve system). 
274 See Why does the Federal Reserve lend money to banks? BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS. (June 17, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12841.htm [https://perma.cc/8249-CWUL] 
(explaining why the federal reserve lends money to banks). 
275 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 128, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3796 (2008) (authorizing the Federal Reserve to pay interest to depository 
institutions on the reserves they are required to hold against their deposit liability). IOR had 
been planned since 2006, to commence in 2011. The crash led Congress to bring up the 
target date in the name of emergency stabilization. See Peter N. Ireland, Interest on 
Reserves: History and Rationale, Complications and Risks, 39 CATO J. 327, 328 (2019). 
The crash led Congress to bring up the target date in the name of emergency stabilization. 
Id. 
276 This is a source of sheer rent-extraction by banks; they ‘earn’ a premium on their 
accounts with the Fed, only a fraction of which they pass on to those holding deposits with 
them. See, e.g., Is the Federal Reserve Giving Banks a $12 Billion Subsidy? THE 
ECONOMIST, March 18, 2017, at 70 (exploring income received by banks from interest on 
reserves). 
277 The interest on reserves is equivalent to the coupon on a bill or bond. See The 
Discount Rate, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 15, 2019), 
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interbank lending market, open market operations in Treasury securities and 
some other instruments, repo and reverse repo transactions on various forms 
of collateral, and of course discount rates that the Fed applies when 
purchasing eligible instruments through its asset-monetizing Discount 
Window.278 
All of these tools, some of long standing and others more recently 
developed in the face of financial exigency,279 are means by which the Fed 
engages both in liquidity-maintenance and in what I have been calling its 
money-modulatory task in the name of our republic.280 Some of these tools 
also have been used in more recent times in pursuit of what I have been 
calling the credit-allocative task.281 A conspicuous case of the latter in 
recent years has been the third round of quantitative easing—QE3—
                                                                                                                       
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm [https://perma.cc/FLC3-
Z5EY] (explaining how interest rates are applied by the Fed to depository institutions). 
More on this infra, Part IV.C. 
278 The Discount Window is the primary facility through which the Fed affords 
liquidity by directly or indirectly monetizing assets deemed both (a) worthy of 
monetization in the interest of maintaining systemic liquidity or encouraging specific 
industries or sectors of the national economy in need of solicitude, and (b) sufficiently safe 
as not to raise moral hazard concerns. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §347b 
(authorizing the federal reserve to use discount rates); see generally Discount Window 
Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 30, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm [https://perma.cc/T3BD-
L4MF] [hereinafter Discount Window Lending]; FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PUBLICATION, 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 35, 50, 104, (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH5-
6NKY] (explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and 
monitors financial institutions). 
279 The Fed actually invented the repo transaction, for example, over one hundred years 
ago as an incident of First World War finance. See Stephen Mihm, The Repo Market is 
More than Mere Plumbing, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-09/the-repo-market-has-a-history-of-
intrigue (exploring history of the repo market and repo transactions). ‘Private’ participants 
in financial markets began mimicking the arrangement decades later. Id. More recently, 
yield-curve-bending via quantitative easing, and swap line arrangements with counterpart 
central banks, have been pioneered to address the difficulties occasioned by the 2008 crash 
and its aftermath. See Public Actors, supra note 4, at 130-133 (examining the ways in 
which public actors intervene in private economics). 
280 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PUBLICATION, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 35, 50, 104 (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH5-
6NKY] [hereinafter THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS] 
(explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and monitoring 
financial institutions). 
281 Id. (explaining how the federal reserve engages in monetary policymaking and 
monitoring financial institutions). 
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initiated in the autumn of 2012.282 Through QE3, the Fed committed to 
purchasing $85 billion in mortgage-related assets in order to establish and 
then raise a floor under housing prices, until such time as residential real 
estate markets would stabilize.283 I will have more to say about the 
importance of this as a precedent below. 
Now as noted a moment ago, some of the Fed’s monetary policy 
instruments operate on the asset side of the balance sheet, while 
correspondingly affecting the liability side of that sheet.284 Other 
instruments work in the other direction.285 Fed open market operations in 
Treasury securities, or in mortgage instruments pursuant to QE3, commence 
with a purchase of instruments into or sale of instruments out of the Fed’s 
asset portfolio, to which correspond creditings or debitings of “primary 
dealer bank” reserve accounts on the liability side of the Fed’s balance 
sheet.286 Interest paid on reserve accounts held with the Fed, conversely, are 
immediate creditings of banks’ deposits on the liability side of the Fed’s 
balance sheet, which will be balanced by additions the Fed makes to its 
asset portfolio.287  
As a general matter, the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet 
consists of (a) its note issuance, (b) the sum of reserve account moneys, and 
(c) repo and swap line liabilities to dealer banks and other central banks.288 
The asset side, for its part, consists primarily of financial instruments the 
Fed holds in the form of Treasury securities, mortgage instruments, reverse 
repo claims, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and accounts with the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS).289  
                                                
282 John Kandrac and Bernd Schlusche, Quantitative Easing and Bank Risk Taking: 
Evidence from Lending, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES: 2017-125, at 16 
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017125pap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S86W-WST6] (discussing the QE3 program initiated in 2012). 
283 The plan commenced in September, with a commitment to purchase $40 billion per 
month. See Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20121212a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8NU5-WAFR] (outlining economic recovery plan). The quantum was 
raised to $85 billion in December. Id.  
284 See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of federal reserve 
liabilities and institutional deposits). 
285 Id. (explaining the other instruments).  
286 THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS, supra note 260, at 21-
22 (explaining the function and method of open market operations). 
287 See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of federal reserve 
liabilities and institutional deposits). 
288 Id. (discussing the Federal Reserve’s liabilities). 
289 International Summary Statistics: U.S. Reserve Assets (Table 3.12), BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Oct. 25, 2019), 
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Needless to say, the Fed’s is a very large balance sheet—especially 
since the crash of 2008 and its aftermath, and now since the onset of 
pandemic in 2020, both of which have required significant Fed intervention 
to prop up both failing franchisee institutions and plummeting financial 
assets.290 To track this balance sheet’s changes over time is essentially to 
track the Fed’s operations as our republic’s primary money-modulator and, 
ever more both of late and of necessity, credit-allocator.291 It is to track, in 
other words, an incipient form of a full citizens’ account book or ledger.292  

















                                                                                                                       
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/current.htm [https://perma.cc/RHJ8-J23Z] 
(showing U.S. reserve assets); International Summary Statistics: Selected Foreign Official 
Assets Held at Federal Reserve Banks (Table 3.13), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 29, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/forassets20190930.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GL4M-VX68] (showing selected foreign official assets held at federal 
reserve banks); International Summary Statistics: Selected U.S. Liabilities to Foreign 
Official Institutions (Table 3.15), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sep. 27, 
2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/intlsumm/usliabforinst20190930.htm 
[https://perma.cc/HBL9-T5HS] (showing selected U.S. liabilities to foreign official 
institutions). 
290 See generally Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, The 
Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet as a Financial-Stability Tool, ECON. POL’Y SYMP. PROC. 
335, 387 (2016) (indicating generally that the Fed has a large balance sheet: “[T]he Fed 
should keep a large balance sheet indefinitely going forward, even as rates rise well above 
the ZLB.”).  
291 Id. at 339 (“When the Fed maintains a larger balance sheet, it effectively takes over 
a part of the traditional debt management role from the Treasury, along with the associated 
fiscal risk.”). 
292 See id. 
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Figure 1: Regular Fed/Bank Arrangements & Financial Flows 
 
        
                                       
  
                                                    
        
                




                         
 







One feature of the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet is of 
particular interest for present purposes. This is that apart from the note 
issuance, the liabilities in connection with which run to all holders of U.S. 
currency, the Fed’s liabilities run solely to public instrumentalities and a 
privileged few private sector financial institutions—what I have been 
calling our finance franchisee institutions.293 This fact, arresting once one 
thinks about it (why Note and Treasury security availability for all but not 
Wallet availability for all?), underwrites three lines of criticism easily 
directed at our present way of doing things, lines that converge with those I 
laid out in introducing this article. None of these criticisms would be 
warranted were the national or central bank ledger to be digitally opened to 
all citizens, qualified residents, and business firms in the way I shall 
momentarily be advocating, rather than merely a privileged few banking 
and other financial institutions of large size.   
First, the present arrangement needlessly privileges large, 
systemically important financial institutions, affording them a form of 
“public banking option” not offered to other firms, local governments, 
citizens, or legal residents.294 It also affords those institutions a gratuitous 
rent in the form of IOR, which they do not pass on to depositors in the form 
                                                
293 See Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (explaining the system of Federal Reserve 
liabilities and institutional deposits). 
294 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2019) (allowing only "depository institutions" to hold 
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of equivalent IOD—interest on deposits.295 This is strikingly inequitable, 
particularly under circumstances in which “the government” often looks to 
be in bed with “Wall Street” or “high finance,” all while significant sectors 
of the American population are unbanked or underbanked, hence 
commercially and financially disenfranchised.296  Call these the financial-
commercial inequity and exclusion problems. 
Second, the present arrangement enables large franchisee 
institutions to spend or dispense public credit with abandon, particularly 
when Fed leadership, as it did during the Alan Greenspan era, loses 
understanding of its modulatory and associated allocative and quality 
control responsibilities as our primary franchise administrator.297 That fuels 
financial market volatility, asset price bubbles, and catastrophic busts, not to 
mention an associated egregious misallocation—a counterproductive 
allocation—of the nation’s credit supply.298 I call this the “rogue franchisee 
problem.” It is especially galling in juxtaposition with the financial-
commercial inequity and exclusion problems just noted.299  
Finally, third, conducting monetary policy—that is, money-
modulation and credit-allocation—through intermediaries, as using the 
medium of dealer banks amounts to, is an inefficient and leak-prone mode 
of operation. Part of the idea behind both quantitative easing and other 
extraordinary measures taken by the Fed and Treasury alike in our name 
from 2008 to 2012, for example, was to pump liquidity into our financial 
                                                
295 Note that what makes this rent possible is citizens’ need of transaction accounts 
irrespective of whether they be ‘paid’ by someone for the privilege of maintaining and 
using them. This need could readily be supplied by the public free of charge, as it is to 
large banking institutions not only free of charge, but with a ‘bonus’ in the form of IOR. 
See Rousseauvian Money supra note 67, at 33 (“Financial Institutions and markets now 
spring up as ‘middle men’ to enable these surplus and deficit units to find one another, 
overcoming ‘search,’ ‘monitoring’ and ‘maturity-matching’ costs in so doing. [Banks] 
broker (or contractually substitute for) contracts between parties for the use of ‘scarce 
capital’ at a price be that price ‘interest,’ . . . .”); see also Ann Saphir, Yellen Draws Fire 
for Fed Policy to Pay Banks, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-fed-yellen-politics/yellen-draws-fire-for-fed-policy-to-
pay-banks-idUSL2N15P1Z7 [https://perma.cc/ZJV4-B3WX] (indicating that the Fed 
provides interest to banks). 
296 See Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked 
in America, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (2015) (stating that of the adult population of the 
United States, 10% are unbanked and 17% are underbanked). 
297 This is one thrust of Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1214 (“The underlying 
cause of this failure is continuing public accommodation of private credit-generation . . . 
without effective public "quality control" over franchisees' performance of their delegated 
responsibilities.”). 
298 Id. (indicting that bubbles are possible as a result of ineffective quality control). 
299 See Christopher, supra note 276, at 224 (referring to the population of un- and 
underbanked Americans) 
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system by enabling banks to keep lending even in the face and aftermath of 
the 2008 credit crunch.300 There were three glitches, however, that impeded 
the efficacy of money-modulation and -allocation via private intermediary 
during times of crisis.   
The first glitch was that many banks preferred simply to hoard their 
additional liquidity while fearfully riding out the continuing storm.301 The 
second was that other banks found it more promisingly lucrative to 
speculate with their additional liquidity on secondary and tertiary financial, 
commodities, and derivative markets than to lend to would-be producers 
and consumers in primary markets, especially in the absence of any 
commitment to aggregate demand support or debt-cancelation by federal 
authorities.302 And the third was that many citizens, left owing more than 
they owned in the debt-deflationary aftermath of the national housing and 
financial market crashes, were not keen to borrow more during the 
protracted slump anyway.303  
These problems all added up to what came to be known as the 
“pushing on a string” problem, the insight essentially being that supply side 
solutions are not well adapted to addressing demand side disasters.304 In 
response, many critics argued that monetary policy alone does not suffice to 
address crises, particularly in a liquidity trap.305 Fiscal measures also were 
                                                
300 See, e.g., Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 11 (“In the midst of recession or liquidity 
trap, for example, our central bank will no longer need to supply cheap money to private 
banks and then hope they will lend it to ordinary citizens so as to prime the consumer 
spending pump.”). 
301 See, e.g., Daniel Alpert, Robert C. Hockett, & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward, 
NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.newamerica.org/economic-
growth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/ [https://perma.cc/279V-XLXT] (stating that the 
private sector “hoard[s] liquidity in the face of uncertainty over future investment 
prospects”). 
302 See e.g., Robert C. Hockett & Richard Vague, Debt, Deflation, and Debacle, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA (Apr. 9, 2013), 
https://www.interdependence.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-
Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZFH-V6VK] (discussing how consumers are 
in debt and the need, and implied absence, of, debt forgiveness for private debt); see also 
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 490 (indicating that speculative, secondary 
markets have abundant capital compared to primary markets). 
303 Hockett & Vague, supra note 282 (indicating that student debt was the only type of 
debt to increase in the period after the Great Recession). 
304 National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 438 (implying that solutions require 
changes to policy, indirectly indicating that supply/demand solutions do not work); see also 
Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 281 (inferring that supply-side solutions are 
inadequate). You can lead a horse to water, we might say, but you can’t make him drink 
when he’s not thirsty and will have, in any case, to pay the water back with interest.  
305 Public Actors, supra note 4, at 133-34 (describing the importance of liquidity). 
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needed.306 I agree with that criticism, but note also that the weaknesses of 
monetary policy observed during 2009-12 are more rooted in franchised 
monetary policy than in monetary policy as such. This paper’s insourcing 
and digital national ledger proposal shows why—in effect, to take out the 
middleman institutions is to narrow the space between fiscal and monetary 
policy, potentially even to the point of consolidating them. But more of that 
in due course, specifically IV.C. below. 
2. What We Must Add: Citizen Wallets, Resident Wallets, and Their 
Common Ledger 
I find all three of the foregoing criticisms of our present Reserve 
Account arrangements compelling, and see no downside to cutting the 
ground out from under them with one single stroke. That is simply to offer 
all citizens, along with state and local governments, small businesses, and 
other nonbanking firms too, digital wallet accounts with the Fed or the 
Treasury much like the Reserve Accounts privileged banks have enjoyed 
with the Fed now for well over a century.307  
In effect, parties depicted on the far left side of Figure 1 would 
“bank,” instead of with the private sector institutions depicted immediately 
to their right, with the Fed or Treasury one step to the right of those 
institutions in the same diagram. Wallets would also enjoy peer-to-peer 
(“P2P”) interoperability just as do paper currency and bank-issued strip-
cards and chip-cards, meaning that wallet-holders would transact with one 
another simply through simultaneous debiting of payor and crediting of 
payee wallets. In other words, ignoring for the moment Fed and Treasury 
assets and looking only to the liability sides of their balance sheets, the 
primary national money and payments system, instead of being built upon 
transaction accounts held at multiple banking institutions, payment cards 
associated with the same, and the plethora of now proliferating “Venmo”s, 
“PayPals,” “ApplePay”s and the like, would be instantly streamlined into 





                                                
306 Private Wealth, supra note 4, at 449 (“Traditional fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments-sometimes supplemented by other actions like wage-price freezes, minimum 
wage laws, or finance-regulatory measures-can be used to provide for at least some 
stability in connection with some SIPIs.”). 
307 See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A) (2019) (allowing only "depository institutions" to 
hold accounts at the reserve: excluding individuals, governments, companies, etc.). On why 
“Fed or Treasury,” see infra, Part III.C.2. 
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 In short, the “Master Account” depicted here would simply be one 
of the liability portfolios on the liability side of the Fed’s or Treasury’s 
balance sheet—the portfolio to which the Depositors at the left of Figure 1 
would now directly connect rather than only indirectly connecting via the 
medium of private sector banking institutions as depicted immediately to 
their right in that same diagram. Payments inter se would simply be 
simultaneous creditings and debitings within that portfolio, effectively 
replicating, in more direct and consolidated form, what we now do 
indirectly via the medium of private sector bank accounts (bank liabilities) 
balanced against reserve accounts (bank assets) held with the Fed. (I pay 
you by instructing my bank to debit my account held with it and 
simultaneously credit you via your account at your bank, with these changes 
to banks’ accounts then registering in their accounts on the liability side of 
the Fed balance sheet.)  
In effect, then, this portfolio on the liability side of the Fed or 
Treasury’s balance sheet will constitute a single, uniform national payment 
ledger and associate system of digital wallets. In this sense, it will amount 
to a return to ledger money of the kind that Part II above indicated societies 
U.S. Fed or Treasury-Administered Master Account 
a.k.a. Consolidated Ledger 
 
U.S. Fed or Treasury Account Administrator 
1. Payment 
Instruction 
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and smaller groups historically have maintained before growing too large 
and complex to maintain comprehensive account books on paper yet too 
technologically underdeveloped to digitize and thus avoid circulating 
uniformly valuable public IOUs as public ledger-entry substitutes. It will 
also amount to a form of digital sovereign-issued cash, as all digital wallet 
dollars will be direct issuances of the Fed or Treasury. There will be no 
more “bank money” here other than literal “Fed money” or “Treasury 
money.”      
This in turn will offer not only the benefit of banking and 
commercial inclusion and a simplified, far more efficient payments 
architecture than our present one has become, but will also bring multiple 
advantages where transaction volume and thus economic growth, monetary 
policy, productive national investment, and financial stability are 
concerned. We will get to all of that, in addition to anticipated objections 
about privacy, “Big Brother,” and so on. But first we must fill-out a bit 
more in the way of mechanical and logistical detail.     
Now I referred to “offering” digital wallets before. This can take 
either or both of two forms. One form would be to make wallets available to 
all and only those who might ask. The other form would be to open such 
wallets automatically, with beneficiaries free at any time to activate or not 
as they prefer. Probably the most sensible option will be to open the wallets 
automatically upon birth or naturalization for individuals born in or recently 
become citizens of the United States, and to offer such wallets upon request 
to states, local governments, businesses and other institutions, and resident 
aliens who do not pose security threats.  
I call wallet accounts of the first kind Citizen Wallets, which can be 
credited automatically with federal benefits that citizens regularly receive 
such as Social Security payments, tax refunds, and the like.308 This will 
simplify the task of federal payments to—that is, crediting of—citizens. 
Citizen Wallets also can receive “baby bond” or sovereign wealth fund 
proceeds,309 if and when we at some point adopt such things, not to mention 
earnings on NIC investments, more on which presently. And, of course, 
Citizen Wallets can and should earn interest, just as bank reserve accounts 
                                                
308 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting “[a]ll citizens will be able to 
maintain what I call ‘Citizen Wallets’ with the Fed”); see also Darylanda Bogle, What Day 
of the Month Do I Get my Social Security Payment?, SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS, (June 6, 
2019), https://blog.ssa.gov/what-day-of-the-month-do-i-get-my-social-security-payment/ 
[https://perma.cc/RG6T-KS23] (describing the systems through which Social Security 
benefits, based partially on birth dates but also including other considerations). 
309 See Alaska Permanent Fund, INT’L FORUM OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, 
https://www.ifswf.org/members/usa [https://perma.cc/W24U-E3EV] (discussing the 
creation of Alaska Permanent Fund “as a way to save a portion of the state’s oil revenues 
for the needs of future generations). 
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held with the Fed and as U.S. Treasury securities do.310 These rates, along 
with direct “QE for the People” or “helicopter drop” measures in extremis, 
can then serve as Fed or Treasury monetary policy instruments far more 
direct and effective in their operation than can our current set of 
intermediary-dependent “string-pushing” tools.311 I’ll return to this too 
when I turn to a systematic tracing of the systemic ramifications that will 
flow out of full implementation my full proposal. 
I call accounts of the second kind Resident Wallets, which 
beneficiaries can use as ordinary deposit accounts and which the Fed or 
Treasury also can use, like Citizen Wallets, for monetary policy purposes. 
For most if not all intents and purposes, Resident Wallets will function 
identically to Citizen Wallets. The principal differences will be (a) that they 
are opened on request rather than automatically upon birth or attainment to 
citizenship; and (b) that they close out more frequently, at least in the case 
of some short-lived business enterprises and other institutions.  
One additional difference might be (c) that “QE for the People” or 
“Citizen Helicopter Drop” measures, should they at any point be taken, 
probably ought to be either restricted to Citizen Wallets, or restricted to 
Citizen Wallets and the Resident Wallets only of (a) state and local 
governments and (b) such private sector entities as can verifiably commit to 
                                                
310 See Reserve Maintenance Manual, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES., (Nov. 19, 
2018) https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reserve-maintenance-manual-
account-structure.htm [https://perma.cc/3R9F-FR44] (stating inter alia that “[i]f an 
institution is not required to maintain balances to satisfy a reserve requirement, it may still 
establish a master account with a Reserve Bank and earn interest on reserve balances at the 
interest rate paid on excess balances, provided the institution is eligible to receive interest 
payments”). 
311 For more on ‘QE for the People’ and ‘Helicopter Money’ proposals, see, e.g., 
Anatole Kaletsky, How About Quantitative Easing for the People?, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 
2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2012/08/01/how-about-quantitative-
easing-for-the-people/ [https://perma.cc/3ERH-JPZ2] (suggesting that “[g]iving away free 
money may sound too good to be true or wildly irresponsible, but it is exactly what the 
Fed[eral Reserve] and the BoE [Bank of England] have been doing for bond traders and 
bankers since 2009. Directing QE to the general public would not only be much fairer but 
also much more effective”); Martin Wolf, The Case for Helicopter Money, FINANCIAL 
TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/9bcf0eea-6f98-11e2-b906-
00144feab49a (“But the view that it is never right to respond to a financial crisis with 
monetary financing of a consciously expanded fiscal deficit—helicopter money, in brief—
is wrong. It simply has to be in the tool kit.”). The ‘helicopter’ colloquialism originates 
with Milton Friedman. Milton Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
1 (1968). Keynes used the metaphor of burying money in bottles a bit over 30 years earlier. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY (1936). 
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spending the proceeds of drops on real goods and services rather than 
speculative securities or derivative instruments.312    
Affording digital Fed or Treasury wallets to all in the way here 
proposed will visit several immediate effects on the liability sides of the 
Fed’s and other banks’ balance sheets.313 It will of course also bear 
corresponding implications for the asset sides of these balance sheets, and 
for the regulatory apparatus through which banks and other financial 
institutions and markets are regulated. And, of course, it will raise various 
systemic, logistical, technological, and related questions that will have to be 
addressed before or during the course of implementation. None of these, 
however, are especially thorny or difficult, as I shall now show. 
To begin with the liability side, the Fed or Treasury’s balance sheet 
will quickly begin to expand, as some—probably many—citizens and other 
residents switch from holding barely remunerated funds with privately 
owned banking institutions, money market funds, and other bank deposit 
substitutes to holding interest-bearing wallets with the Fed or Treasury.314 
This they will do in virtue both of the rates earned on Wallet savings and of 
the immediate free access to the economy-wide, universal payments 
platform that the system of Wallets will constitute. Banks, in turn, as their 
deposit bases shrink, will replace customer deposits with Discount Window 
loans from the Fed or counterpart loans from the Treasury, which will be 
the new and sole “choke point(s)” through which the public sector allows 
for any private sector role in “gate-keeping,” “credit-checking,” or “project-
evaluating” assistance in the productive channeling of public credit, more 
on which immediately below.   
These changes will convert many, probably most bank deposit and 
deposit-like liabilities now owed to depositors and other “near-depositors” 
into bank liabilities owed to the Fed through its Discount Window or to the 
Treasury through a similar facility, as depositors and near-depositors 
transfer funds, first gradually and then at a likely accelerating rate, from one 
set of accounts to the other.315 It will of course correspondingly grow the 
                                                
312 See Kaletsky, supra note 291 (discussing “QE for the People”). 
313 Cf. Balance Sheet, supra note 252 (describing the Federal Reserve’s Balance 
Sheets). 
314 Cf. Jeff Cox, Powell Says the Fed Will Start Expanding its Balance Sheet ‘Soon’ in 
Response to Funding Issues, CNBC, (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/powell-says-the-fed-will-start-expanding-its-balance-
sheet-soon.html [https://perma.cc/D6EA-YMMQ]. 
315 By “near-depositors,” I mean holders of “near-monies” pursuant to short-term 
lending arrangements of the kind constituting the so-called shadow-banking sector. This 
sector too is now part of our franchise arrangement. Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 
1175 (describing the shadow banking sector as necessary for credit-money proliferation 
and “with lending volumes rivaling those of the traditional banking sector”). 
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Fed’s or the Treasury’s asset portfolio, for these new Discount Window 
loans will be Fed or Treasury assets.316 I will have more to say about this 
new class of Fed- or Treasury-held asset—especially its money-modulatory 
and credit-allocative potential—below.   
The asset sides of private bank balance sheets need not immediately 
change all that much in response to the opening of Fed Citizen and Resident 
Wallets—at least not if we do not wish for them to change either too much 
or too rapidly. Current portfolios can be left to wind-down in due course, 
per the maturities of the assets that are already held. All that will change 
quickly is the identity of the creditor on a newly large portion of the banks’ 
liabilities that replaces a correspondingly diminishing portion of banks’ 
liabilities. That new creditor will be the Fed or the Treasury, pursuant to the 
Discount Window or like lending just mentioned.317 This affords a benefit 
to banking institutions: neither the Fed nor the Treasury is subject to the 
depositor collective action problem—nor, therefore, apt to “run” on the 
banks that will now owe it, meaning in turn that banks’ required reserve and 
paid deposit insurance obligations will in aggregate be significantly 
lightened if not eliminated.318   
Indeed, deposit insurance will become a significantly less 
prominent, if not indeed unnecessary, part of our bank-regulatory toolkit, 
meaning in turn that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will 
diminish in importance relative to the Fed and/or Treasury if we retain it at 
all.319 This in turn will mean that the task of capital regulation, which 
historically has fallen primarily to the FDIC on the theory that it must 
protect the public insurance fund, continues and completes its already 
ongoing migration to Fed administration in the name of enhanced 
macroprudential regulation under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act.320 In 
effect, as more fully described below in Part IV.C, all private sector lending 
not funded by Fed or Treasury Discount Window lending will be subject to 
a 100% capital requirement—that is, it will be bona fide credit-
                                                
316 See Discount Window Lending, supra note 258 (explaining the relationship between 
Discount Windows loans as credits to banks and as assets for the Fed). 
317 Id. (emphasizing the Fed acting as a creditor when it issues loans through the 
Discount Window). 
318 See again Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 261; and Finance 
Franchise, supra note 14, at 1195 (detailing increasing deposit insurance as a by-product of 
the U.S. government’s full faith and credit behind banks’ deposit liabilities for individual 
investors). 
319 Id. at 1157 (listing the Fed and the Department of Treasury as the two more 
prominent regulators in the banking industry). 
320 See Macroprudential Turn, supra note 4, at 246 (highlighting the historical and 
current position of the FDIC as the primary regulator). 
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intermediation rather than credit-multiplication or –generation.321 It will be, 
that’s to say, “narrow banking” of various kinds.322 As this transition 
proceeds, no administrative difficulties of any great significance need be 
posed; capital-regulatory staff now at the FDIC will simply become de facto 
or de jure staff at the Fed or Treasury, and will transition from imposing 
traditional “capital buffers” to developing and administering Discount 
Window lending conditionality, as I shall describe next. 
If and insofar as we permit private sector banks to continue to lend 
in ways that find expression in the form of newly opened deposits, the latter 
will have to be deposits into Citizen and Resident Wallets, meaning in turn 
that the banks will have to borrow through the Fed Discount Window or a 
Treasury equivalent—for example, the Federal Financing Bank—going 
forward.323 This presents a welcome opportunity to the public for purposes 
of money-modulation and credit-allocation—an opportunity that lies at the 
core, and is indeed part of the object, of Citizen Finance. For the Fed 
already conditions Discount Window lending upon the possession of 
socially desirable attributes on the part of that which it lends against, such 
that converting all levered private sector lending to Discount Window 
lending will be to convert all such lending to explicitly publicly evaluated 
and approved lending.324 It will also restore the original function of our 
regional Federal Reserve Banks, as I’ve been advocating of late in my 
‘Spread the Fed’ and ‘Re-Distributed Central Banking’ proposals.325 
The Fed or the Treasury will in other words now add conditions that 
further their evolving credit-modulatory and -allocative missions—much as 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and associated GSEs have 
historically limited their insurance provision and secondary market making 
activities, respectively, to so-called “conforming” loans whose criteria 
evolve over time.326 Among such investment attributes that seem 
incontestably desirable will be those associated with the financing of small 
                                                
321 See again supra, Part I, and infra, Part IV.C for more on these distinctions and their 
significance. 
322 Id. Also infra, Part VII, on narrow banking. 
323 See Richard A. Werner, Can Banks Individually Create Money Out of Nothing? —
The Theories and the Empirical Evidence, 36 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 1, 3 (2014) 
(explaining one-way banks lend credit is “in the form of what bankers call ‘deposits’ and 
this credit is money”). 
324 See Discount Window Lending, supra note 258 (“Primary credit is a lending 
program available to depository institutions in generally sound financial condition.”). 
325 See Hockett, supra note 253, and associated text. Also infra, next Subpart B.  
326  See Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29, at 15 (“FHA still operates today, 
guaranteeing and, in many cases, originating or refinancing mortgage loans that conform to 
the prudent standards that it maintains (so-called ‘conforming’ mortgage loans).”);  
Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 29, at 148-152 (comparing the similarities between the 
FHA and the GSE, Sallie Mae, in terms of loan requirements and limitations). 
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and start-up businesses, bona fide small family farms, employee-owned 
firms, non-outsourcing firms, renewable energy and other eco-friendly 
firms, and the like—all of the things that collective action challenges and 
other market failures of the kind discussed earlier in Part III prevent our 
adequately financing now.327  
As noted above and further discussed below, classic collective 
action challenges now prevent adequate capital flows from reaching such 
enterprises and enabling them to scale-up. Citizen Finance is all about 
changing that, and the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset portfolio will be the site of 
that action. This form of financial democratization will be the asset side 
counterpart to that liability side democratization which is the system of 
Citizen and Resident Wallets. In effect, then, the Fed Discount Window or a 
Treasury equivalent will become the forthrightly public sector 
“gatekeeper’s”—that is, credit-allocator’s—“gate,” and thus the focal point 
at which limiting private sector lending activity solely to healthy forms of 
primary market, not speculative secondary and tertiary market, credit-
extension takes place.  
It will, in other words, become the site of a new Glass-Steagall 
regime far more fine-tuned and effective than the first, to say nothing of 
weaker Glass-Steagall successors like the Volcker Rule or Liikanen style 
“ring-fencing.”328 For now, instead of simply imposing one vaguely 
contoured categorical proscription (“no investment banking,” or “no 
proprietary trading”) and saying “have at it” for all else, we shall be laying 
down specific affirmative criteria and saying “nothing apart from this.” 
Changing the presumption in this way, and thus in effect conditioning 
public credit extension on “conformity” of the “conforming loan” type that 
we require for FHA mortgage insurance, will convert the entirety of the 
public portion of our financial system into an engine of simultaneous 
primary market growth and secondary/tertiary market reduction, as I shall 
systematically indicate below.329 And that is to say it will reverse and undo 
the past 50 years’ course of “financialization.”330   
In sum, then, most FDIC personnel now employed administering our 
present-day capital-regulatory regime, and many OCC personnel or their 
state bank equivalents now employed administering our portfolio-regulatory 
regime, will accordingly be transitioned to administering a newly enhanced 
Discount Window conditionality regime. By conditioning their own asset 
purchases in this way, crucially, the Fed or Treasury will be governing bank 
                                                
327 Id.  
328 For more on these regulatory segregation strategies and their significance, see 
Macroprudential Turn, supra note 17. 
329 See again infra, Part IV.C. 
330 Id. 
1-June-18] The Capital Commons - DRAFT  
 
69
asset-creation as well. And in so doing they will be publicly assuming the 
task of credit allocation upon which both credit modulation and sustainable 
economic growth depend. This takes us to a more careful look at the Fed’s 
or Treasury’s asset portfolio changes under my proposal. 
 
B.  Asset Side: NIC, SBA, PSF, and Other Public Issuances  
The asset side of the public sector balance sheet, in some contrast to 
those of private bank balance sheets, will undergo significant changes over 
time with the offering of Citizen and Resident Wallets. Once again, I will 
first say a bit about what we do now, then turn to what should and will 
change in a regime of full Citizen Finance.  
1. What We Do Now: Treasury Debt, Agency Debt, & (Sometimes) 
Other 
Prior to the troubles of 2008, the Federal Reserve System’s principal 
asset holdings consisted of Treasury securities of varying maturities, agency 
securities also of varying maturities, and miscellaneous other assets with 
dollar values that paled in comparison to those of the first two categories.331 
Among the latter were gold certificates, SDRs with the IMF, and various 
small loans and similar assets acquired in the course of affording liquidity 
to financial institutions in need of it.332 Until 2020, matters were similar 
post-2008, save that the two prior categories had grown much in magnitude, 
while several new categories also had been added.333  
The prior categories that expanded post-2008 include (a) longer-
term Treasury instruments, taken on both to accommodate fiscal stimulus 
spending and, pursuant to QE1 and QE2, to afford “forward guidance” on 
future interest rates; and (b) mortgage-related agency and non-agency 
securities, purchased pursuant to QE3 as noted earlier.334 These categories 
                                                
331 FED. RES. SYS., 94TH ANNUAL REPORT (2007), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual07/sec6/c3.htm 
[https://perma.cc/23GB-QAC5] (listing U.S. government securities as $745,629 million out 
of the Federal Reserve Bank’s total asset value of $915,129 million in 2007). 
332 See Id. (reporting the Federal Reserve Banks’ gold certificates and Special Drawing 
Rights making up 1.2% and 0.2% of total assets in 2007).  
333 See FED. RES. SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK’S COMBINED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2018 AND 2017 AND 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 1, 3 (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/combinedfinstmt2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SR49-ZFLZ] [hereinafter FED. RES. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS] (reporting 
the Federal Reserve Banks’ gold certificates and Special Drawing Rights being valued at 
$11,037 million and $5,200 million out of a total of $4,057,880 million assets in 2018). 
334 Id. (valuing the 2018 mortgage-backed securities at $1,683,532 million, and the 
amount of long-term treasury securities lent before 2017 at $2,249,307 million, out of a 
total of $4,057,880 million assets). 
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continued to represent by far the greater part of Fed asset holdings until 
2020, with the only changes from pre-2008 being first, the absolute 
quantities held, which were much larger than before, and second, the greater 
portion of mortgage instruments that had come to be represented by private 
issuances.335  
A more qualitative than quantitative change to the Fed’s asset 
portfolio since 2008 came with the addition of new classes of asset 
corresponding to emergency measures the Fed took from 2008 onward to 
address domestic and foreign liquidity and solvency dangers associated with 
the crash and its aftermath.336 These included, among other things, (a) swap 
lines provided to other central banks worldwide, and (b) a number of 
Discount Window lending programs and other ad hoc facilities to prop up 
banking, insurance, money market funds, and other financial institutions, 
including “shadow banks,” imperiled after 2008.337    
The quantitative growth of and qualitative changes to the Fed’s asset 
portfolio were not worthy of the term “radical,” at least in any pejorative 
sense, even if they were admittedly important and, if what I propose is 
adopted, precedent-setting.338 They were straightforward extensions of 
familiar Fed operations into new magnitudes or domains, undertaken to 
prevent a complete collapse of the nation’s and world’s financial systems.339 
Though controversial in some cases, they came over time to be accepted as 
necessary, even if only as necessary evils by some, tolerated on the 
understanding that they would be temporary.340 This is why we continued, 
                                                
335 Id. at 3 (reporting Fed’s 2018 total assets as $4,057,880, including $2,302,462 in 
Treasury Securities and $1,683,532 in mortgage-backed securities). 
336 See Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas Klagge, The Federal Reserve’s Foreign 
Exchange Swap Lines, 16 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONS. AND FIN. 4, at 1 (Apr. 2010), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/current_issues/ci16-4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U522-CK8J] (“[T]he Fed[] . . . established the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) to provide funding to U.S. banks . . . [and] swap lines . . . [to] reduc[e] funding 
pressures on [central banks] . . .”). 
337 FED. RES. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, supra note 306, at 10, 12, 18 (describing Fed’s 
“liquidity swap lines,” “Discount Window borrowing privileges,” and “reverse repurchase 
agreements”). 
338 See Stephen D. Williamson, The Balance Sheet and the Future of Fed Policy, 25 
OPEN ECON. REV. 163, 163-64 (2014) (“The Fed’s balance sheet has changed in important 
ways—both in size and composition—from what existed before the financial crisis.”). 
339 See Allen N. Berger et al., Bank Loan Supply Responses to Federal Reserve 
Emergency Liquidity Facilities, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION, Oct. 2017, at 2-3 (“[T]o address 
the stigma associated with the Discount Window, the Fed[] . . . began the Term Auction 
Facility . . . [and] [c]ollateral eligibility and valuation procedures for the TAF were the 
same as for the Discount Window.”). See also Fleming & Klagge, supra note 309, at 3 
(“The Fed’s establishment of swap lines with other central banks was not unprecedented.”). 
340 See James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, The Role of the U.S. Federal Reserve, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 20, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/role-us-
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at regular intervals until 2020, to hear talk of winding-down the Fed’s 
balance sheet.341 The winding-down never occurred in any serious sense, 
however, as each move in that direction quickly was met by “taper 
tantrums” in the financial markets and obliging Fed postponement of the 
offload.342   
This is of course to say nothing of the far greater expansion of the 
Fed’s balance sheet in response to the Covid pandemic of 2020. Not only 
are multiple trillions of dollars’ worth of new Treasury issuances now (as of 
April) held, but so are corporate bonds, paycheck-protection loans, other 
business loans, repos, swaps, munis, and a host of additional investments 
now totaling at approximately $6.5 trillion and headed for upwards of $9 
trillion. Figure 3, compiled by my colleague Lev Menand, summarizes in 


















                                                                                                                       
federal-reserve [https://perma.cc/N39R-8G7L] (“Though many economists argued that 
additional monetary easing doesn’t help . . . many also considered QE to have been largely 
successful in staving off the worst effect of financial turmoil.”). 
341 See Trevor Hunnicutt, Fed Announces Plan to End Balance Sheet Runoff in 
September, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2019, 5:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
fed-balancesheet-idUSKCN1R12QA [https://perma.cc/2LPK-H3ZZ] (“[The Fed’s] current 
practice . . . allow[s] up to $50 billion of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities . . . to 
roll of its balance sheet each month . . . .”). 
342 See id. (“The Fed[] . . . unveiled a long-awaited plan to stop scaling back the vast 
portfolio of bonds it built up.”); McBride & Chatzky, supra note 313 (“While markets have 
remained strong, some analysts worry that the reversal of the Fed’s expansionary policy 
could cause a repeat of the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’ . . . ”). 
343 See Lev Menand, Unappropriated Dollars (2020) (working paper, on file with the 
author). 
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Figure 3: Fed Portfolio, Measured in $ Trillions, as of Spring 2020 
 
    
In my view, the Fed’s inability to shrink its portfolio since 2008, 
like the federal government’s now decade-long receivership of Fannie 
Mae,344 signals a “new normal” where public maintenance of financial and, 
with it, macroeconomic stability are concerned.345 The fact of the matter is 
that, at least unless and until certain underlying structural conditions of our 
decentralized exchange economy can change—in particular, any such 
economy’s subjection to recursive collective action challenges and cognate 
market failures of the kind discussed above in Part III—the public’s asset 
portfolio will have not only to remain as large as it has become since 2008, 
                                                
344 See Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29 (“Ten years after failing and being 
rescued by our federal government . . . Fannie Mae . . . remain[s] in federal receivership.”). 
345See Williamson, supra note 311, at 166 (“There’s a sense now in which, at the 
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but indeed even to grow further in proportion to GDP.346 It might indeed 
ultimately have to constitute at least two-thirds of the full national portfolio, 
as I noted Keynes to have predicted above. What will change first in the 
coming years, then, is the portfolio’s composition, as we transition from ad 
hoc emergency measures to longer-term public investment and price 
stability maintenance measures.347 And what will change subsequently is 
the portfolio’s size. To the rough details of these changes I now turn. 
2. What We Must Add: FRB-Discounted Paper, NIC Issuances, SBA 
Issuances, PSF Holdings, & Other  
Changes to the asset side of the Fed’s or Treasury’s balance sheet 
under my proposal will emanate from two sources. The first source will be 
some of the liability side changes described above. The second will be 
certain structural changes that we as a polity must make to our 
infrastructural and other productive finance arrangements in order to 
address the concerns I have laid out above and in prior work.348   
There are two liability-side sources of likely change to the Fed’s or 
Treasury’s asset portfolio. Both will stem from the addition of Citizen and 
Resident Wallets to that side of the balance sheet.  
First, the assets corresponding to many present-day shadow bank 
liabilities—in effect, short term loans—that the Fed or Treasury will 
effectively take over in paying IOR are at present substantially, if not 
indeed almost exclusively, speculative in character.349 The institutions that 
now issue short-term shadow bank-like liabilities do so specifically to 
secure cheap funding to gamble on price movements among favored longer-
term assets, and succeed in so doing by offering low returns to “cash 
                                                
346 See Andrew Foerster & Sylvain Leduc, Why is the Fed’s Balance Sheet Still So 
Big?, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F.: ECONOMIC LETTERS (June 3, 2019) (“The amount of 
currency in circulation has grown so much that it is not possible to shrink the balance sheet 
to its earlier size.”). 
347 See Loretta J. Mester, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of 
Cleveland, The Economic Outlook, Monetary Policy, and Normal Policymaking Now and 
in the Future, Address Before Money Marketeers of New York University, Inc. (Oct. 25, 
2018), https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/speeches/sp-20181025-
economic-outlook-monetary-policy-and-normal-policymaking-now-and-in-the-future 
[https://perma.cc/4NQW-WJ8P] (“[A] relatively large balance sheet . . . might . . . generate 
requests for the Fed to aid other industries or use the balance sheet to fund government 
initiatives.”). 
348 See supra Part II (discussing circumstances causing public/private hybridity); supra 
nn. 1, 6, 61, 76 (suggesting structural changes now that functional reasons for private-
public franchising have receded). Also Hockett, FSOC for Public Investment, supra note 
17.  
349 See Laura E. Kodres, What is Shadow Banking?, FIN. & DEV., June 2013, at 42-43 
(“Shadow banks . . . raise . . . short-term funds in the money markets and use those funds to 
buy assets with longer-term maturities.”). 
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managers” that at least exceed rates on bank deposits.350 The Fed and 
Treasury have no interest—pun ratified if not quite intended—in gambling 
on price changes among these assets with the short-term borrowings that 
their offering Citizen and Resident Wallets will equate to.351 Indeed, they 
have every reason to edge-out and end such gambling much as Treasury 
Greenbacks edged out private sector bank monies in the late 19th century as 
described above, by affording interest-bearing Wallet-deposits of the kind 
sought by the cash-management departments of shadow-bank lenders 
without using the proceeds of that short-term borrowing to gamble.352  
The Fed or Treasury is accordingly apt, as in fact we should require, 
to pair new deposit liabilities that it takes over from the shadow-banking 
sector with safer assets associated with productive primary market activity 
and the infrastructures on which such activity depends rather than 
speculative secondary and tertiary market assets of the kind shadow bank 
borrowing funds now.353 Prominent among these will be NIC, SBA, and 
Regional Fed-discounted community bank and public bank issuances, as 
well as what I call “systemically significant” issuances, of the kinds I 
reprise briefly below and describe in detail elsewhere.354 
In this sense, the Fed’s or Treasury’s replacement of the banking 
and shadow banking sectors where deposit-taking and account-managing 
are concerned—their bringing these currently outsourced franchisee 
functions back “in-house”—will be a critical component of that reassertion 
of the public franchisor’s role in our republic’s money-modulation and 
credit-allocation tasks which I have been describing and prescribing both in 
the present paper and in earlier work.355  And it will essentially complement 
that Discount Window conditionality I mentioned above.     
                                                
350 See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1175-93 (“[S]ecuritization . . . functions 
to lever up the bank-generated credit-money supply.”). 
351 See 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012) (commanding the Fed to promote stable prices). 
352 See Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1175-93 (discussing “[t]he Fed’s post-
crisis efforts to limit risk-taking by tri-party repo clearing banks). 
353 See Lending to Depository Institutions, FED. RES. BD. (Aug. 13, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_lendingdepository.htm 
[http://perma.cc/4P2S-VTGK] (“The Federal Reserve generally accepts as collateral for 
Discount Window loans any assets that meet regulatory standards for sound asset quality . . 
. includ[ing] most performing loans and most investment-grade securities.”). 
354 See Hockett, Spread the Fed, supra note 253; Hockett, FSOC for Public 
Investment, supra note17; Hockett, Financing the Green New Deal, supra note 2; and 
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439-43 (proposing a National Investment 
Authority which would offer a “new ‘safe’ asset class”). 
355 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14; National Investment Authority, supra 
note 4, at 488 (“Keeping the investment management function in-house along the lines of 
the RFC model, on the other hand, would enhance the NIC's legitimacy as a capable market 
actor acting solely in the public interest. Once the NIC's internal asset-management and 
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The second liability-side reason that the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset 
portfolio will change over time dovetails with the first. It is that, over a yet 
longer period of time, a growing portion of Fed or Treasury deposit 
liabilities will not simply be transferred from current private sector bank 
and shadow bank balance sheets, but will be Fed or Treasury liabilities from 
the get-go as citizens, residents and firms (a) borrow from institutions that 
credit their Citizen or Resident Wallets with loan proceeds, and (b) move to 
directly depositing, or directing the direct depositing of, funds from other 
persons and entities that transfer money to them, be those transfers 
payments or benefits, into their Citizen and Resident Wallets.  
The Fed or Treasury will presumably retain some discretion to 
determine what new assets to set off against some of these growing deposit 
liabilities—the ones to which no Discount Window loans to private lending 
institutions correspond.356 But this discretion must be legislatively guided in 
significant part toward investment in assets associated with the enhanced 
modulatory and allocative tasks that I have elsewhere advocated and in 
Parts II and III of this article have been reprising. This means that many of 
the new assets will be issuances of the NIC or SBA, more on which below, 
while others will be acquired pursuant to renewed Fed discounting and Fed 
engagement in what I call “SIPI Stabilization,” again both in prior work and 
below.357  
It will be helpful here briefly to recount these NIC, SBA, and PSF 
proposals, which I have developed at greater length elsewhere, since they 
will afford ideal assets to add to the Fed’s or Treasury’s asset portfolios as 
liabilities associated with Citizen and Resident Wallets grow. 
Starting with the NIC, the idea here is quite simple. On the one 
hand, much needed public infrastructure and even industrial investment is in 
the nature of an orthodox public good—it offers returns that are not 
capturable by individual investors thanks to their comparatively brief 
                                                                                                                       
credit-allocation capabilities increase and mature, however, it might be less problematic to 
hire specialized private financial firms to manage some specialized asset portfolios.”); 
Public Actors, supra note 4. 
356 National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 747. 
357 See, e.g., Open Labor, supra note 29, at 1 (“The public agents in question work at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in lower Manhattan. There they conduct familiar 
Fed open market operations—what I shall also call ‘OMO.’”); Robert C. Hockett, How to 
Make QE More Helpful—By Fed Shorting of Commodities, BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011, 8:41 
PM), https://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988109/how-to-make-qe-more-helpful-by-
fed-shorting-of-commodities [https://perma.cc/HC7G-XZGP] [hereinafter How to Make 
QE More Helpful] (“Monetary policy conducted by open market operations in Treasuries is 
meant to stabilize prices - usually consumer prices.”); see also Public Actors, supra note 4, 
at 130 (“Perhaps the most familiar example of such routine market-moving in modern 
financial markets is that of the so-called open market operations (OMO) in which central 
banks or monetary authorities purchase or sell government debt securities.”). 
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lifespans and lack of taxing authority. This in turn renders it individually 
rational to over-invest in speculative bets on short term price movements in 
secondary and tertiary markets, and correspondingly to under-invest in 
long-term improvements in infrastructure and primary market productivity 
improvements.358  
Since this is in turn collectively irrational inasmuch as it depresses 
long-term productivity improvement and associated benefits that everyone 
would choose could they control the macro environment and capture 
benefits commensurate to desired investment, we are faced with a classic 
collective action predicament much like those that prompted the nation to 
establish the WIB and WFC in 1917 and the RFC, then WPB in 1932 and 
1942 as noted above.359 Constituted by the heads of federal departments 
with jurisdiction over national infrastructures—e.g., the Department of 
Energy, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of 
Transportation, etc.—the NIC will coordinate in developing coherent 
national infrastructure and industrial policy across sectors, regions, and the 
public and private sectors much as the Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(“FSOC”) does in developing and implementing finance-regulatory policy 
across subsectors of our complex and hybrid financial sector.360  
Most importantly for present purposes, the NIC will, in 
collaboration with the Fed and Treasury or their consolidated successor, 
issue multiple classes of financial instrument in connection with specific 
infrastructure projects.361 It will thereby offer investment outlets to “patient 
capital” now unable to find yields in productive as distinguished from 
speculative investments, counteract inflationary pressures otherwise 
generated by public infrastructure spending, and capitalize on markets’ 
“price discovery” functions in determining the likely successes and public 
benefits thrown off by sundry prospective investments.362   
A complementary role that the NIC will play is to coordinated with, 
and provide support for, certain other instrumentalities at all levels of 
government that themselves work to assist in capitalizing small businesses, 
small family farms, start-up firms, and the like. Prominent among these are 
the SBA and certain state and local development institutions. The SBA is 
particularly important in the present context because it both (a) has 
                                                
358 See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Robert Hockett, Finance 
without Financiers, supra, note 14; National Investment Authority, supra, note 17.  
359 See sources cited id. See also Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra, note 
261. 
360 See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without 
Financiers, supra, note 14; How to Make QE More Helpful, supra, note 357. On a possible 
“consolidated successor” to the Fed and Treasury, see infra Part IV.C. 
361  See sources cited id.  
362  Id.  
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specialized in aiding small businesses for decades, and (b) was in fact a 
subsidiary-successor of the RFC itself when the latter was wound down in 
the late 1940s.363 Depending on what form the NIC ultimately takes, it will 
likely make sense to bring the SBA “back” into its “family,” along with 
such other still-functioning former RFC-subsidiaries as aforementioned 
Fannie Mae and the Export-Import Bank.364  
Similarly, if and as state and local governments develop 
infrastructure plans and local business support institutions, including public 
banks patterned after the Bank of North Dakota model,365 the NIC will 
serve in both a coordinating and a supporting role. Importantly for present 
purposes, that can mean either or both (a) direct investment in such efforts 
themselves through the purchase of state government, local government, 
public bank and small business issuances, and (b) “screening” of the latter 
on behalf of the Fed or Treasury, which than can purchase such issuances 
directly for the asset side of the balance sheet.366   
The U.S. has a much richer past and even present with these forms 
of public sector capital allocation in support of socially desirable sectors of 
the economy than most people seem to realize, perhaps because large, 
dominant firms draw most of our attention but require no aid in attracting 
capital, while smaller firms, start-up firms, and other firms with desirable 
attributes—e.g., employee-owned firms, “green” eco-friendly firms, urban 
and rural “enterprise zone” firms, non-“outsourcing” firms, and the like—
that escape our attention do often require, and receive, such assistance.367 
The NIC will significantly expand, systematize, and publicly report on such 
operations in the cause of making a grand, democratically determined 
national project of inclusive republican investment and capital allocation. It 
will, in short, serve as a primary agent of our republic’s meaningful 
democratization of the financing of genuinely productive and socially 
desirable enterprise and infrastructure.368         
The Price Stabilization Fund (“PSF”), or what I also call the 
“People’s Portfolio,” will complement the efforts just rehearsed as a 
secondary market complement to the NIC, SBA, and public investment 
institutions’ primary market roles—rather as Fannie Mae was originally 
founded in 1938 as a secondary market complement to the 1934 FHA’s 
                                                
363  See sources cited supra, note 2. See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, 
note 17; Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14  
364 Id. 
365 See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without 
Financiers, supra, note 14. 
366 Id. 
367  Id. See also REPUBLIC OF OWNERS, supra note 1. 
368  See sources cited supra, note 360. 
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primary market role in democratizing home-ownership.369 But it will also 
have a significance all its own.370  
The idea here, too, is once again simple and straightforward. It is 
that more than just interest rates and housing prices are systemically 
important and thus in need of public “open market operations” conducted 
with a view to keeping them within reasonably narrow bands over time to 
assure overall macroeconomic stability and predictable investment 
horizons.371 Many food, fuel, and other commodity prices are similarly 
influential on economic activity across the board.372 Indeed, so are 
prevailing wages and salaries.373 That is why our public instrumentalities 
have frequently made use not only of New York Fed Treasury purchases 
and sales, but also of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the Department of 
Agriculture, and other agencies to stabilize critical prices in the past.374 
A PSF, administered by the Fed, Treasury, or NIC, will accordingly 
conduct open market operations in the markets in question with a view to 
“collaring” their swings just as we collar borrowing (“interest”) and 
mortgage rate swings now and have collared other swings in the past.375 In 
effect, it will amount to a public fund counterpart to the market portfolio, 
through which the public will modulate price-swings within certain 
systemically important markets that are every bit as significant as are the 
“systemically important financial institutions,” or “SIFIs,” that we have 
recognized to be in need of “enhanced prudential regulation” since the 
passage of Dodd-Frank.376   
The key point for present purposes is that NIC and PSF issuances 
will be ideal candidates for new assets that the Fed or Treasury will have to 
hold on the asset side of the balance sheet to associate with some of the new 
liabilities, in the form of new Citizen and Resident Wallet deposits, that will 
be tracked on the liability side of the balance sheet.377 In effect, the Fed or 
Treasury will then stand as the intermediating link between the nation’s 
savers and investors (liability side) on the one hand, and its stable and 
                                                
369  Cf. Republican Home-Owning, supra note 43 
370 See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without 
Financiers, supra, note 14. 
371  Id.  
372  See FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17; Finance without 
Financiers, supra, note 14; How to Make QE More Helpful, supra, note 357. 
373  Id. See also Open Labor Market Operations, supra, note 357. 
374  Id.  
375  Id.  
376  Id.  
377 FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 35-37 (elaborating NIC 
issuances in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 471-72 
(discussing similar new asset classes). 
1-June-18] The Capital Commons - DRAFT  
 
79
steady wealth and productivity growth (asset side) on the other hand, all 
while the liability side of the balance sheet serves also as a single public 
payments ledger on which all payment transactions, commercial and 
financial, take place.378  
This will be fully digitally integrated, fully public, and purely 
productive and stable, as distinguished from speculative and volatile 
(secondary and tertiary price-gambling) finance.379 It will amount to full 
public recognition, and counterpart action on the basis of that recognition, 
that (a) in a “commercial society” or “exchange economy” such as our own, 
a payments platform and associated system of digital wallets and digital 
currency is an essential public infrastructure, and (b) that finance being 
rooted in money in any such society, with money in turn being no more and 
no less than “that which pays” and “that which counts” in a system of 
payments and value-accounting, any such platform will be the core of the 
nation’s financial system as well—as indeed today’s banking and payments 
system constitutes the core of its financial system.380  
As noted earlier, private finance will continue under the Citizen 
Finance reform I here advocate, but it will no longer be readily fueled by or 
supplied with our republic’s public full faith and credit.381 The public credit 
prerequisite for endogenous private sector “money creation” will no longer 
be liberally “outsourced” to private sector gate-keepers, credit-checkers, and 
project-evaluators, but instead limited to strict public sector Discount 
Window conditionality.382 Private sector finance will, for its part, in effect 
be made to conform to its own oft-repeated false claims of itself—namely, 
that it is all a matter of intermediating between private suppliers and end-
                                                
378 Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1143-44 (stating that an intermediating link 
“stands between the lender and the borrower” and matches “checking account deposits” 
with “commercial loans”). 
379 FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 34-35 (elaborating NIC’s 
capital-absorption functions in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note 4, 
at 441 (“[T]he NIA will diffuse potentially destabilizing demand for privately-issued 
substitutes and channel it into non-speculative, longer-term productive investments.”). 
380 FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra, note 17, at 37-39 (elaborating NIC’s 
relations to Fed and Treasury in greater detail); National Investment Authority, supra note 
4, at 456 (“Functionally situated between the Treasury and the Fed, the NIA will serve as a 
separate institutional base from which to conduct a more cohesive and targeted allocation 
of patient public and private capital toward specific economic activities likely to facilitate 
and enhance inclusive and sustainable long-term growth on the part of the national 
economy.”). 
381 Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1167 (“[P]ublic full faith and credit serves to 
underwrite putatively private finance in the capital markets.”). 
382 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14 (discussing the public credit). 
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users of “scarce capital.”383 Private lending and other forms of finance will, 
in other words, be made to conform to the intermediated scarce private 
capital story, channeling antecedently accumulated finance capital from 
accumulators to users in “one-to-one,” rather than “one-to-many” or “none-
to-many” fashion as described in Part I.   
Private sector banking will thus become much more like narrow 
banking, funded by actual private sector deposits that are not themselves 
bank loans.384 Credit-generative banking—dependent as it is upon the 
monetized full faith and credit of us, the sovereign public that constitutes 
our republic—will for its part be reserved to (a) our public instrumentalities, 
and (b) private banks able to secure Fed or Treasury Discount Window 
lending, through strict conformity with the earlier mentioned conditionality, 
in connection with any loans they originate.385  
The less proximate, more distant ramifications of these changes will 
be much more far-reaching than might at first meet the eye. For one thing, 
the entirety of the nominally private sector side of our financial system will 
change as the public sector by and large withdraws from it, converting it to 
being truly private sector rather than mixed public-private—that is, 
franchised—finance. For another thing, the public sector side of our 
financial system will change as well, as many commonly drawn distinctions 
to which we have grown accustomed over the past 160 years but have not 
recognized to be outgrowths of franchising itself—distinctions, e.g., 
between Fed functions and Treasury functions, between monetary policy 
and fiscal policy, and even between dollar bills (Fed notes), sovereign 
securities (Treasury paper), and metallic coins (Mint tokens), diminish to 
near the vanishing point. To those I now turn. 
 
C.  Systemic Ramifications: Private Sector Transformation, Public Sector 
Consolidation 
 
As just noted, the transition to full Citizens’ Finance will bear 
farther reaching consequences that might not be immediately appreciated. It 
will accordingly be helpful briefly to catalogue the more important among 
them, starting with the nominally private sector side of things, then turning 
to the forthrightly public sector side. 
 
                                                
383 Id., at 9 (“[O]ur entire financial system is a site of monetized public credit 
dissemination.”). 
384 Id. See also infra Part VI. 
385 Id.  
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1. Private Money: From Credit-Generation & -Multiplication to Honest 
Intermediation 
In earlier work I have traced the flow of monetized public full faith 
and credit throughout the financial system—from the Fed, the Treasury, and 
the commercial banking core to the farthest reaches of our capital, money, 
and shadow banking markets.386 That is what mapping the franchise 
consists in. Since what I propose here is meant to replace that hybrid 
financial system with a system in which public credit-money originates 
from and flows primarily if not exclusively through public institutions while 
only genuinely pre-accumulated, “private money” flows through private 
sector institutions, the best way to trace the impact of Citizens’ Finance on 
“private” sector finance might be to proceed in the same order that I follow 
in that earlier franchise-expository work. I shall do that now, systematically 
indicating what private sector finance will come to look like as the finance 
franchisor—that is, our republic—withdraws from the franchise and brings 
our republic’s own public credit-money operations back “in house.” 
 Beginning with the banking core, then, the Fed or Treasury—
whichever administers the digital Wallets saving and payments architecture 
and holds assets offsetting those liabilities—will now channel monetized 
public full faith and credit primarily through the public sector NIC and PSF 
as described above. It will channel any such “public money” through 
private sector banking institutions only insofar as the latter originate 
productive (primary market), not speculative (secondary or tertiary market) 
loans that conform to newlt enhanced, strict Discount Window lending 
criteria applied by newly empowered Regional Federal Reserve Banks.387 
Earnings—privatized seignorage—on such lending will thus essentially be 
simply the spreads between interest charged on private sector bank-
originated loans and interest paid on Discount Window loans.  
Because demonstrably productive planned projects will be eligible 
for NIC and other forms of direct public financing, private rates on bank-
originated loans meeting the Discount Window criteria are unlikely to 
become usurious—there will, in effect, be “public options” with which 
private sector lenders will be competing. But it is also always possible to 
regulate spreads, and of course to lower both discount rates and the rates 
paid on Wallet savings, in the event that private sector rates do come to 
seem to be discouraging productive investment.  
Private sector bank lending that doesn’t conform to newly enhanced 
Discount Window conditionality, for its part, will have to be fully funded 
by private sector loans stemming from pre-accumulated private sector 
                                                
386 See supra, Part I, and sources cited supra, note 14. 
387 See again Hockett, Spread the Fed, supra note 253. 
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money—be these loans short-term “deposits,” medium-term certificates of 
deposit (CDs), or the like—that the banks are able to attract. They will be, 
in other words, “narrow bank” loans of the kind advocated by “100% 
money” and, to a lesser extent, “40% money advocates of the stripe that I 
noted in introducing this article and discuss more fully below in Part VII. 
The banks that extend credit on this (pre-accumulated) basis—that is, on the 
basis of so-called “base money”—will in that sense at long last conform to 
the one-to-one intermediation tale that they tell of themselves, and hence 
effectively function as today’s lending companies or money market funds 
function.388 
Turning from the banking core to the capital market near-periphery 
as Part I above and my earlier work does,389 commercial bank lending for 
the purpose of purchasing firm-issued equities or other securities, and 
investment bank margin lending for the same, will no longer be possible.390 
For these loans, used as they are to fund secondary or tertiary market 
purchases, will not be eligible for Discount Window lending and, therefore, 
public sector credit allocation outsourced to private sector franchisee 
institutions.391 Rather, they will have to be funded, “one-to-one,” again as 
any narrow bank, mutual fund, or lending company’s investments are 
funded.392 That is, again, with antecedently accumulated private sector 
“loanable funds.”393  
The same now will hold true of securitization and repo markets as 
well, at least in their capacities as recipients of monetized public full faith 
and credit.394 Banks will not be able to offload loans “originated to 
distribute” onto securitization trusts in order to amplify lending and thereby 
disseminate ever more public credit.395 For again, all lending now will be 
either fully privately funded lending or Discount Window-conforming 
                                                
     388 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 3-4, 5-6 (elaborating what the 
author calls the “(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” and “(one-to-many) credit-
multiplication” models of financial flows, and the role played by “base money” in the 
latter).  
     389 See, e.g., id. at 12-17. 
     390 Id. (elaborating how bank-extended credit fuels purchases of firm-issued securities 
on the capital markets).  
     391 Id. 
     392 See again Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 3-4, 5-6 (elaborating what 
the author calls the “(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” and “(one-to-many) credit-
multiplication” models of financial flows.  
     393 Id. at 9-10 (explaining the “loanable funds” misconception and its connection to the 
“(one-to-one) credit-intermediation” picture of financial flows.    
     394 Id. at 15-19 (describing the functions and operations of the securitization and repo 
markets, as well as the “originate to distribute” model of credit-extension that securitization 
encourages); Finance Franchise, supra note 14 at 1175-83 (same). 
     395 Id. 
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lending. And, the latter will be almost exclusively “buy and hold” lending 
since the usual justifications for “originate to distribute” lending—viz., 
liquidity needs and associated “cost of capital” minimization—will, as I 
now will explain, no longer be applicable. 396  
On the latter justification for origination to distribute, it cannot be 
emphasized enough that the usual benign-sounding justifications given for 
allowing loan sales on secondary markets and the “origination to distribute” 
into which that always degenerates—the need for liquidity and the capacity 
thereby to “lower the cost of credit”—simply will no longer be applicable. 
For liquidity-availability and the “cost of capital” are, crucially, public 
policy variables, variables that must be democratically determined in any 
democratic commercial republic such as our own. And they are variables 
that, under the reforms mapped above, now will be directly and 
transparently—hence again, democratically—controlled by the public’s 
own Fed or Treasury, rather than merely indirectly, opaquely, and 
ineffectively “influenced” through (seemingly always lax) liquidity and 
capital regulation of private sector financial institutions.397  
This is just one, albeit very important, sense in which arguments 
commonly made in order to justify either tightening or loosening regulatory 
requirements will simply no longer be pertinent under the republican 
Citizens’ Finance arrangements I am proposing. For all such justifications 
stem from our current system of Hybrid Finance. That is, they stem from 
the fact that credit-money availability is on the one hand a republican policy 
variable, while the means of varying that variable presently make use of 
private sector institutions—that is, are “franchised out.”398  
End the franchise and bring public credit-money modulation and 
allocation fully back “in house,” and you remove the indispensable factual 
predicate of literally all such discussions. “Financial regulation” then 
divides and reduces to public finance policy on the one hand, corresponding 
to public sector credit-money generation, modulation, and allocation; and 
anti-fraud/consumer protection law on the other hand, corresponding to 
regulated private sector intermediation. 399  
                                                
     396 Id. 
     397 See supra, Part I, rehearsing the nature of our public/private system of finance and 
the role of regulations as “franchise contract terms” therein.  
     398 Id. 
     399 Id. See also Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 2-9 (laying out and 
comparing the credit-intermediation, -multiplication, and -generation models of financial 
flows).  
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Turning now to private sector repo, this will become smaller-scale 
and reduce to “one-to-one” intermediation as well.400 For returns on Citizen 
and Resident Wallets will eliminate most if not all incentive for cash-
managers to lend in the repo markets.401 And the practice of 
rehypothecating repo collateral, which presently renders repo market 
practice something akin to credit-multiplying fractional reserve banking, 
will be prohibited per the “one-to-one” credit-intermediation principle to 
which all private sector financial institutions now will be required to 
conform.402  
Once again the usual justifications given for what we do now—
putative liquidity and short term funding needs, the satisfaction of which 
“lowers the cost of capital”—simply will not be applicable. For again, 
liquidity and the cost of capital are policy variables that now will be 
handled directly by the public, not indirectly through “incentives” offered 
by the public sector franchisor to private sector franchisees. Repo will 
accordingly return to being what it was when the Fed invented it in 1917—a 
convenient form of bona fide short-term credit-intermediation, instead of 
indefinitely extended private sector credit-amplification. 403   
Turning next to derivatives markets and clearing houses, the primary 
source of public credit here has in the past been the ex post rescue of failing 
such markets when they have grown “systemically important,” and now 
includes additional ex ante assurances (and some accompanying regulation) 
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank reforms.404 There are two reasons that this 
outlet of public support will largely if not fully close under the Citizen 
Finance proposals outlined above. First, public credit use is the primary 
enabler of private sector financial institutions’ and markets’ growing 
systemically important in the first place. Cutting off that public credit 
channel as my proposals do in the ways just described—viz., prohibiting 
bank lending with public credit-money to secondary and tertiary market 
speculators—accordingly cuts off the source of systemic importance itself.  
The only “SIFIs” left under my reforms, in other words, are our 
republic’s public sector FIs that preside over the “[financial] system” 
itself—our republic’s franchisor institutions. Second, should this somehow 
not suffice to derivatives markets from becoming systemically important, 
                                                
     400 Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 17-19 (laying out the mechanics of 
repo transactions); and 2-9 (laying out and comparing the credit-intermediation, -
multiplication, and -generation models of financial flows). 
     401 Id.  
     402 Id.  
     403 Id. See also infra, Part VII, for more on the history of the Fed-invented repo markets. 
     404 Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 19-21 (describing the operations of the 
derivatives markets and clearing houses); Finance Franchise, supra note 14 at 1183-88 
(same). 
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simply reinstating the “insurable interest doctrine” in derivatives markets 
will eliminate any remaining vestige of pure gambling in derivatives just as 
ending the rehypothecation of repo collateral as described above does in 
repo.405 For these are the modes by which “one-to-one” credit 
intermediation balloons into “one-to-many” credit multiplication in these 
two spheres.406 
Finally, coming full circle back to commercial paper (CP) and 
money market funds (MMFs) as my “franchise”-tracing work elsewhere 
does,407 eliminating the practice of margin lending to funds that purchase 
paper in the commercial paper markets, along the lines described just above 
in connection with the capital markets, will immediately leave public credit 
only one channel into CP markets. Again, that will be Discount Window 
lending, which as noted above amounts simply to the public’s directly 
determining the conditions of its own credit-extending and associated 
monetization, i.e., swapping of public IOUs for private IOUs.                   
 
2. Public Money: From Fed & Treasury, Fiscal & Monetary, and T-
Bill, Fed Note & Mint Coin Separation to Digital Consolidation 
Perhaps most surprising of all to those who do not often think of 
these matters will be the implications of Citizen Finance for traditional 
distinctions familiar to public finance. We are accustomed to most modern 
polities’ having both treasuries or fiscal authorities on the one hand, and 
central banks or monetary authorities on the other hand. We are also 
accustomed to characterizing instrumentalities of the first kind as being 
engaged in forthrightly allocative “fiscal” policy on the one hand, and 
instrumentalities of the second kind as being engaged in putatively 
separable “monetary” policy on the other hand. And finally, some also are 
used to thinking of fiscal policy’s making use of interest-bearing treasury or 
exchequer paper (sovereign bonds, bills, etc.) on the one hand, and of 
monetary policy’s being concerned more with non-interest-bearing central 
bank notes (currency) on the other hand. 
What we do not tend to think about, I suspect, is how all of these 
distinctions are rooted in finance-franchising itself, such that to back away 
from the franchise is to diminish the distinctions. The reason for, and nature 
of, the link are quite clear when one thinks on the matter: the whole point of 
the franchise arrangement is to delegate credit allocation primarily to 
private sector financial institutions, while consigning whatever public 
                                                
     405 Id.  
     406 Id.  
     407 Finance without Financiers, supra, note 14 at 21-24 (describing the operations of the 
commercial paper markets and money market funds); Finance Franchise, supra note 14 at 
1188-93 (same). 
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allocation we wish to engage in to our democratically accountable fiscal 
authorities. We then confer what we mistakenly think to be separable 
modulatory functions on monetary authorities, and expressly insulate them 
from democratic decision-making precisely in order to preserve what Part II 
called a “temporal uniformity” on the part of the value of public currencies. 
But this means that once we grow skeptical of (a) modulation’s 
practical separability from allocation, (b) private sector institutions’ 
superiority as allocators to public sector institutions, and thus (c) the utility 
of attempting to distinguish between “neutral” monetary policy and 
forthrightly “winner-” and “loser-picking” fiscal policy at all, we effectively 
grow skeptical of the ultimate rationale for franchising itself, as well as for 
separating central banking from treasury operations and currency from 
sovereign debt. Something we might have begun to suspect once, say, Fed 
Reserve accounts began paying IOR and thus became functional equivalents 
of Treasury securities408—namely, that Fed and Treasury might not be 
necessarily different at all—then begins looking to be possibly confirmed. 
Likewise suspicions that grow when we notice the Fed is prohibited from 
directly purchasing Treasurys from Treasury on the one hand, while 
routinely purchasing Treasurys from “dealer banks” that are effectively 
required to purchase whatever the Treasury issues on the other hand.409  
The whole business of allocation/modulation, fiscal/monetary, 
Treasury/Fed separation then begins to look like an odd sort of sham—a 
“Noble Lie,” perhaps, that we all tell ourselves so as to dodge the 
responsibility of deciding, together and democratically, how we shall spend 
our own money. This “Noble Lie” is the foundation of finance-franchising. 
It’s why we do it. Yet the litany of dysfunctions with which I introduced 
this article indicates that this lie might not be so noble. It might be no more 
than a destructive and opportunity-squandering self-deception.  
As the foregoing Parts of this paper and other work indicates, there 
is no reason to think fragmented private sector institutions, unable to 
capture the benefits of public goods provision, unable to control macro-
economies, and unable even to plan, let alone coordinate across, vast 
                                                
408 See again supra, Part IV.A. 
409 By law, the Fed may not purchase Treasury paper directly from the Treasury, but 
only on “the open market.” See 12 U.S.C.A. §14. The Fed accordingly simply purchases 
Treasurys from “primary dealer” banks that maintain “an established trading relationship” 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the one hand, the U.S. Treasury on the 
other hand. See Federal Reserve Board, “FAQ: Why Doesn’t the Federal Reserve Just Buy 
Treasury Securities Directly from the U.S. Treasury,” available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12851.htm. The “established relationship” in 
each case is such that primary dealers step-in as counterparties when either Fed or Treasury 
wish to purchase or sell newly issued or previously issued Treasurys. In effect, the primary 
dealer banks serve as permanent funnels between Fed and Treasury. 
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stretches of national geographical space or of time, are the best allocators of 
capital to productive primary market or infrastructural uses.410 To the 
contrary, agents who act in the name of our spatially and temporally 
extended republic as a whole are the only ones suited to that task, while 
spatially fragmented and temporally ephemeral private sector actors will 
nearly always find there is more to be gained by gambling on short-term 
price-swings in bubble-inflating secondary and tertiary financial and 
derivative markets than by investing “patiently” in productive primary and 
infrastructural markets.411  
That is precisely the secret of, and the reason behind, the malady 
known as “financialization,” which I define as the growth of secondary and 
tertiary market transaction volume, or “churn,” relative to primary market 
capitalization.412 Hence it is also the key to the steady erosion of the 
industrial and infrastructural base of our productive economy, of our middle 
class, and hence of our commercial republic itself.413  It is time, then, to 
work a separation—private money for private uses, public money for public 
uses. And this separation is in effect the consolidation of traditional fiscal 
and monetary policy, of traditional fiscal and monetary instruments, and of 
traditional Treasury and Fed operations. This is one of the reasons that I 
have repeatedly used the locution “Fed or Treasury” above, and continue to 
use it below. It is because I do not believe that our franchise arrangement 
either can or will endure for much longer, or that any meaningful 
Fed/Treasury distinction can long outlast it.   
The consolidated digital ledger I laid out above, then, and the 
associated Democratic Digital Dollar that I discuss in more detail below, 
amount in a way to the natural monetary outgrowth of this form of fiscal 
and monetary, Fed and Treasury, T-Bill and Fed Note consolidation. 
Indeed, they are its transparent accounting and institutional expression. 
They elide both the Fed Note and Treasury Paper distinction as discussed 
above, and the present-day “token”/“account” distinction that I treat of 
below. They similarly elide the distinction between Fed-issued “currency” 
and Mint- (hence Treasury-) issued “coin.”  
What is going to matter in future is our productive commercial 
republic’s digital value-storage, -transfer, and -accounting platform—our 
republic’s full digital ledger—along with the Democratic Digital Dollar that 
will be its unit of account. That Digital Dollar and the interest-bearing 
Citizen and Resident Wallets that will be credited and debited “in” Digital 
                                                
410 See, e.g., Finance without Financiers, supra note 14; FINANCING THE GREEN NEW 
DEAL, supra note 17; National Investment Authority, supra note 17. 
411 Id.  
412 Finance without Financiers, supra note 14. 
413 Id.  
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Dollars will be simultaneously currency and coin, token and account, 
monetary and fiscal policy instrument, … in short, Fed or Treasury liability.  
Against that digital backdrop, in which “all that [was once 
monetarily or fiscally] solid melts into air,”414 what difference does it make 
whether we call our commercial and financial platform the Treasury or the 
Fed? Let us just call it the Consolidated Ledger, and its authority the Office 
of Public Finance (OPF).       
And that’s it. Public and private finance separate, Fed and Treasury 
consolidate, and public money flows only to bona fide publicly chosen, 
productive investments. To sum up diagrammatically, public money and our 
public money-modulator’s and -allocator’s financial relations to private 
sector persons and other entities under Citizen Finance will then come to 
look as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
 
























                                                
414 The allusion is the Marx & Engels’ celebrated observation concerning capital’s 
capacity to break down all previous legal, social, and cultural distinctions, in THE 
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (1848). 
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Figure 4: Reformed Bank/ Fed/ Treasury/ NIC w/ Stabilization Fund 
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V. CITIZEN FINANCE: LOGISTICS & TECHNICS   
Parts I through III worked to motivate, and Part IV worked to 
schematize, the proposal of full Citizen Finance in broad outline, organizing 
discussion under the familiar balance sheet categories of assets and 
liabilities. I now turn to more detailed matters of implementation and 
logistics, by reference both to familiar and to now newly emergent finance 
and payment technologies. 
A. From Abstract Accounting to Concrete Logistics: Making It Happen 
I begin with some very basic questions that the Citizen Finance 
proposal will implicate. For example, will there be Fed or Treasury bank 
branches, teller windows, and ATMs? Will there be Fed or Treasury online 
banking and mobile banking? Will the Fed or Treasury lend to individuals, 
small businesses, and large firms as banks do? And what will credit-
modulatory monetary policy look like? 
Some of these queries are readily answered quite quickly, while 
others present optionalities that we should discuss. To begin with, because 
digital wallet and P2P payments technology, discussed briefly above and in 
detail below, are by definition device-associated and in that sense “online,” 
public banking will indeed be online banking. The question accordingly is 
what role, if any, we wish to retain for cash, perhaps for reasons sounding in 
privacy or familiarity, and how to accommodate this role in the event we 
decide to retain it for some time to come. That takes us to branches, tellers, 
ATMs and the like.  
Assuming we wish to allow for some cash continuance and ready 
convertibility of Citizen or Resident Wallet dollars to paper dollars, one 
possibility is that private sector banking institutions, as they lose their 
traditional deposit-taking business to the Fed or the Treasury, will want to 
downsize their workforces and physical plant.415 These trained personnel 
and facilities then can be simply taken on by the Fed or Treasury and 
continue, respectively, as public sector personnel and facilities.  
Another possibility here would be simply to require, as a condition 
of bank licensure, that private sector bank branches offer necessary man 
hours and teller window face time to the conduct of Citizen and Resident 
Account deposit-taking, withdrawing, money-transferring, money-
                                                
415 See Thomas Heath, Bank Tellers are the Next Blacksmiths, WASHINGTON POST 
(Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bank-tellers-are-the-
next-blacksmiths/2017/02/08/fdf78618-ee1c-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html 
(explaining Bank of America’s reduction in bank tellers and expansion of robo-banking 
services). 
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exchanging, check-ordering, cashiers’ check franking, and so forth.416 
Banks can similarly be required to forgo charging fees on ATM and debit 
card transactions for Citizen and Resident Account users.417 The appropriate 
regional Federal Reserve Banks can then monitor compliance with these 
requirements.418 
With respect to online banking and similar services, there is no 
reason the system of Citizen and Resident Wallets and associated P2P 
payments system cannot offer everything that private banking institutions 
do to their depositors with online access—save without exploitative rent-
seeking fees and collateral services.419 Indeed, the very large boost to its 
seigniorage revenues that the Fed or Treasury will realize on a new system 
of Citizen and Resident Wallets should enable it to cover any new personnel 
and administrative costs occasioned by the new regime and then some.420  
In time, most deposit, payment, online, and other services currently 
handled in person or via the web will likely migrate to mobile phones and 
other devices, as is of course already happening quickly in the United States 
                                                
416 See generally What We Do, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2019), https://occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/index-what-we-do.html 
[https://perma.cc/RTN9-F4FA] (explaining the power of the OCC to issue rules and 
regulations over the banks it supervises). 
417 Id. (explaining the power of the OCC to issue rules and regulations over the banks 
it supervises). 
418 See Consumer Compliance, FED. RES. BOARD (last visited Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/consumer-compliance.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NS2D-K5JM] (“A primary Federal Reserve responsibility is to ensure 
that the financial institutions under its jurisdiction comply with applicable laws and 
regulations established by Congress and the federal regulatory agencies.”). 
419 For more on these, see, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Wells Fargo, Glass-Steagall, and 
“Do You Want Fries with That?” Banking, THE HILL (Sep. 22, 2016), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/297256-wells-fargo-glass-steagall-and-do-
you-want-fries-with-that-banking [https://perma.cc/JF8Q-VAR8] [hereinafter, Do You 
Want Fries With That?] (discussing how Glass-Steagall would have prohibited banks from 
selling collateral services such as life insurance annuities, investment advisory services, 
and other financial products). 
420 The Fed, for example, regularly earns a wide spread between the returns on its asset 
portfolio and the interest payments it makes. In recent years Fed seignorage has approached 
$100 billion annually. I anticipate that these revenues will rise substantially when the Fed 
or Treasury grows its portfolio in tandem with new Citizen and Resident Account 
liabilities. For more on recent Fed seignorage revenues, see Press Release: Federal 
Reserve Board Announces Reserve Bank Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the 
Treasury for 2017, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, (Jan. 10, 
2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20180110a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZL3K-TULM] (announcing Federal Reserve net income of $80.2B after 
payment of its interest expense). 
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and, even more quickly, in other jurisdictions today.421 Indeed, if 
developments throughout Asia, Africa, and Northern Europe are any 
indication, we will achieve 100% financial inclusion through device-
accessible digital banking long before we could build out any system of 
renewed postal or brick and mortar public banking.422 The Fed or Treasury 
will be well equipped both to benefit by and to shape this new revolution, as 
I detail below in Part VI on the “Democratic Digital Dollar.” And I believe 
it a matter of urgent public interest that it do so now with all deliberate 
speed, for neither other jurisdictions nor the fintech industry is tarrying, as 
discussed below.  
For purposes of the present discussion, however, the point to be 
noted is that logistical questions concerning bank facilities, spaces, and 
traditional services already are being addressed in new ways by private 
sector banking institutions themselves as new financial technology 
develops.423 This means the Citizen and Resident Wallet regime will not so 
much “disrupt” today’s retail banking and fintech development as take 
charge of, in the name of the citizenry, our republic, and our financial and 
payment systems, a disruption that is already well underway.424   
How about lending, and other “asset-side” activities in which private 
sector banks presently engage? Will banks no longer be lenders?425 Well, 
this is in effect already answered at least partly above. Primary investment 
will be the primary function of the NIC referenced already, as well as of 
commercial banks whose loans will now have to conform to strict Discount 
Window conditionality as also described above.426 In addition, commercial 
                                                
421 In Kenya, for example, 90% of adults use the M-Pesa e-money phone app to 
transact, while in China the AliPay phone-based payment app accounts for nearly $19 
trillion in transactions per annum. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Facebook’s “Stablecoin” Libra 
Raises Questions for Regulators, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/d4c1e00c-8dd6-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37 (on central banks 
serious reaction to Facebook’s introduction of Libra through nations’ reaction to other 
nation’s stablecoins). I will have much more to say about all of this infra Part VI.B.  
422 Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A 
New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271, 1273-74, 1298 (2016). (discussing the 
rise in Asia and Africa of “recent FinTech developments” in the “pursuit of economic 
development."). 
423 World Economic Forum, Beyond Fintech: A Pragmatic Assessment Of Disruptive 
Potential In Financial Services, at 90-94 (Aug. 2017) (documenting traditional banks’ 
methods of partnering with and developing fintech options to gain market share). 
424 Id. at 84-88 (chronicling the changes among banks methods of payments and 
applications available to customers). 
425 See Andrew F. Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 336-
337 (2017) (arguing that banks’ role as traditional lenders to consumers and businesses 
began to change after the financial crisis of 2007-2009). 
426 David Schmidde, Responding to the Subprime Mess: The New Regulatory 
Landscape, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 709, 715 (2009) (indicating “conforming 
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banks and other financial institutions—e.g., loan companies, money market 
funds, and even many shadow banking institutions—will continue to lend, 
but will simply have to do so with funds they are able to acquire from 
others, in one-to-one “narrow bank” fashion. They will no longer be able to 
lend public credit-money save through the Fed Discount Window or some 
comparable facility established at Treasury. 
In sum, then, I envisage private banks continuing to engage in safer 
renditions of their customary lending and retail investment functions, 
simply owing their liabilities now to the Fed or Treasury rather than to 
borrower-depositors and thus required to conform to Discount Window 
conditionality. This will continue as the NIC and perhaps public banks of 
the Bank of North Dakota variety fill the plethora of small, large, and 
medium-sized gaps that relying solely on private sector franchisee 
institutions for credit-allocation now leaves unfilled.427 
It bears noting also that what I propose here is fully compatible and 
interoperable with other public option in lending proposals, including my 
own. The NIC itself, as described above, can lever the full faith and credit 
and superior risk-bearing capacities of the United States to assist public 
banks, local development banks, co-op banks, land banks, and all manner of 
other local development institution with their tasks.428 Indeed, doing so can 
be interpreted as a form of fiscal-cum-monetary subsidiarity.429  
What is true of the NIC here can be true of the Fed or Treasury too 
as it develops its asset portfolio in tandem with its growing Wallet liability 
                                                                                                                       
loans” as loans meeting an amount limit and certain funding criteria established by 
government bodies); National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439 (suggesting the 
role of the NIC as a public partnership with greater influence with investors and lenders as 
an investment vehicle). 
427 Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (“[R]edefining the financial system's core 
dynamics along the proposed lines allows for more accurate, less superficial diagnoses of 
that system's present dysfunctions, which fundamentally constitute manifestations of an 
underlying failure on the part of the franchisor to modulate and oversee the allocation of 
credit. It also opens the policy agenda to bolder and more comprehensive reform options 
for restoring a healthy relation between the financial and ‘real’ economies.”). 
428 More on these matters, see infra Part V (discussing the implementation and 
logistics in finance and payment technologies for the Citizen Finance program). See also, 
National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 439 (discussing the role of the National 
Investment Authority in supporting banking institutions and the abilities of collective 
banks). See also FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17, which discusses these 
options at length.  
429 Cf. Elizabeth J. Upton, Chartering Fintech: The OCC's Newest Nonbank Proposal, 
86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1396 (2018) (arguing state level banks may act as a better 
“subsidiarity” in regulation as opposed to the federal government in light of their ability to 
govern “at the most local level”). 
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ledger.430 It will do so both in the form of NIC investments and perhaps in 
the form of portfolio-management under a PSF regime as mentioned above 
and elaborated in other work.431 It can coordinate with the NIC in so doing, 
or act on its own, depending on public comfort at any given time with the 
central bank’s or public fisc’s being as forthrightly allocative in its asset-
acquisition decisions as the NIC for its part is explicitly designed to be.432 
The advantages offered by Citizen Finance as I propose it here are 
many. The first are perhaps best grasped by reference to the three problems 
noted above to afflict present arrangements. The problems of financial 
exclusion, the unbanked and underbanked, will be eliminated in a single 
stroke, as will the exploitative practices often engaged in by retail banks 
vis-à-vis less sophisticated depositors.433 Additionally, the problem of rogue 
franchisee banks will be all but eliminated, as (1) their source of their 
cheapest funding—depositors—will significantly recede, while (2) the 
primary creditor to whom their liabilities are owed—the Fed or Treasury—
will now be better situated, and motivated, to monitor them and their 
compliance with Discount Window conditionality than are their scattered 
depositors.434  
And finally, the pushing-on-a-string problem—and monetary policy 
leakage more generally—will be fully eliminated as well.435 The Fed or 
                                                
430 Assets of the Federal Reserve, Classification under Recent Balance Sheet Trends, 
FED. RESERVE (Oct. 2, 2019 7:35 PM), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_recenttrends.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9BWZ-GC8H] (“Total assets of the Federal Reserve have increased 
significantly from $870 billion on August 8, 2007, to $4.5 trillion on January 14, 2015”); 
see also id. at Selected Liabilities of the Federal Reserve (“On the liabilities side of the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, the amount of currency outstanding has continued to rise 
gradually, but reserve balances (deposits of depository institutions) have increased 
dramatically relative to prior to the financial crisis.”). 
431 See generally, Part IV.B.2. (arguing that certain changes to the balance of assets 
will stem from liability side sources, including from asset issuances from NIC, and addition 
of the Citizen and Resident Wallets); Open Labor, supra note 29, at 462 (documenting the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation as a form of “OMO Plus” and its effects on the 
Federal Reserve’s balance). Also, again, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17. 
432 See again, FINANCING THE GREEN NEW DEAL, supra note 17. See also National 
Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 472 (advocating for the NIC’s structure similar to the 
Federal Reserve System). 
433 For more on these, see Do You Want Fries With That?, supra note 352 (utilizing the 
need to insulate depository institutions from large financial firms as reason to update the 
Glass-Steagall Act). 
434 Another collective action problem—that faced by depositors—will hereby be 
solved. Id. (“Another of Glass-Steagall's concerns was to limit the cheap funds that bank 
affiliates would make available to speculative non-bank investors whose activities in late 
asset price bubbles like those which burst in 1929 and 2008.”). 
435 National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 459 n.91 (2018) (citing Daniel 
Alpert, Robert C. Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward, NEW AM. (Oct. 2011), 
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Treasury will be able to act directly to rein-in spending activity during 
booms and encourage or directly finance spending during busts, thereby 
affording us much more rapid and reliable macroeconomic growth. It can 
do this via changes in interest offered on Citizen and Resident Wallets, and 
via direct “helicopter drops”436 in the unlikely event of any deep slump like 
that of 2008-12—unlikely because solving the rogue franchisee problem as 
mentioned above will eliminate a primary source of the bubble inflation that 
culminates in busts in the first place. Similarly, it could temporarily 
impound funds to slow “runaway inflation,” after the manner suggested by 
Keynes in his How to Pay for the War.437 But again this is virtually 
inconceivable during peacetime, for the source of inflation—public money 
disseminated by rogue private sector franchisees—will simply be closed.   
There are additional upshots to recommend what I propose here, but 
these are best handled under the heading of new financial technology, to 
which I turn next. 
B. From Macro Logistics to Micro Technics: Why to Digitize Now 
I have noted that the new financial and payments technologies now 
sparking hype and, sometimes, more sober attention are not strictly 
necessary to institute or implement Citizen Finance.438 We could probably 
have offered some lower tech rendition of what I propose just as early as we 
began doing it for private banking institutions with Fed Reserve Accounts 
over a century ago, and certainly by the time of Fedwire’s and the WFC’s 
                                                                                                                       
https://www.newamerica.org/economic-growth/policy-papers/the-way-forward/ 
[https://perma.cc/WWJ5-72LG]) (exemplifying the pushing on a string problem through 
the actions of the government in to affect supply and demand in 1932 and comparing it to 
actions to effectuate consumer demand in 2009 to 2013); Ashton S. Phillips, Bank-Created 
Money, Monetary Sovereignty, and the Federal Deficit: Toward a New Paradigm in the 
Government-Spending Debate, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 221, 243 n.68 (2014) (citing 
Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base-H.3, BD. GOV. FED. 
RES. (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/ 
[https://perma.cc/8JYT-Q8XU]) (“[B]anks, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. . . 
often retain ‘excess reserves’. . . Economists refer to [this and] the reality that individuals 
sometimes prefer to hold their money in cash as ‘leakages.’”). 
436 See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing the term ‘Helicopter Drop’ 
and its proposals). 
437 J.M. KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940) (proposing the preemption of inflation 
occasioned by war spending through a system of national savings accounts which will be 
drawable on only in extremis during wartime, then opened up to fuel stimulus once 
demobilization begins and war spending ramps down. 
438 See New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 736–737 (stating that fintech is 
“by far the hottest topic in today’s finance”); Betting on Betacoin, supra note 17 
(discussing the concerns related to “buyers flocking to Bitcoin specifically”). 
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introduction in 1918 or of the banking reforms of the New Deal era—by 
which time we even had a full-on proto-NIC in the form of the RFC.439  
But the rapid spread and development of the new fintech modalities 
now underway present a particularly opportune time to move forward with 
alacrity. There are a number of reasons for saying this, some of which can 
be catalogued under what might be called the brighter, or more positive side 
of the ledger, and others of which belong under a darker, or more negative 
side of the same.440 I will accordingly first say a bit about these two sides of 
the ledger. Then, I will discuss, in Part VI, more detailed options for what I 
shall call the “Democratic Digital Dollar,” or “3D”—the currency 
counterpart of both the consolidated public ledger and the public payment 
platform that the system of Citizen and Resident Wallets will effectively 
constitute. 
1. The Bright Side of the Ledger 
As just noted, there are reasons that sound in affirmative benefit for 
going digital where Citizen Finance is concerned, and there are reasons that 
sound more in risk-preemption.441 On the positive side, twenty or more 
central banks and monetary authorities worldwide, including the Bank of 
England (BOE), the European Central Bank (ECB), the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Bank of Japan (BOJ), 
and our Fed, are looking to upgrade their payments systems.442 Indeed some 
are already doing so—or have already done so—as I recount more fully 
below in Part VI.443 Most seem to be considering some form of blockchain 
                                                
439 On the history of Fedwire, see, e.g., Adam Gilbert, Dara Hunt & Kenneth C. 
Winch, Creating an Integrated Payment System: The Evolution of Fedwire, 3 FED. RES. 
BANK N.Y.  ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 1–4 (1997) (describing the origins of the Fedwire system 
and its challenges). On the RFC, see National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 458–
463 (summarizing the development of the RFC). 
440 See discussion infra Parts V.B.1, V.B.2 (discussing positive and negative aspects of 
the implementation of the Citizen and Resident Wallets regime). 
441 Id. (observing benefits and risks associated with the Citizen and Resident Wallets 
regime). 
442 See Agustin Carstens, Guest View: Innovation Transforms Central Banking, 
REUTERS (June 3, 2019, 6:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cenbank-
technology-breakingviews/breakingviews-guest-view-innovation-transforms-central-
banking-idUSKCN1T41AB [https://perma.cc/WVK6-3FEA] (discussing how central banks 
are upgrading payment systems to work with fintech, mobile payments, and more). 
443 When I began this project during late 2014, only a few digital currency enthusiasts 
seemed to be devoting substantial time and attention to this prospect. Since then the 
number of studies and proposals has burgeoned to seemingly no longer comprehensively 
citable proportions. A few early and notable examples are those cited supra note 21 
(enumerating the proposals to offer central bank accounts to the public by different 
authors). Among the 20 or more central banks now issuing, or actively researching the 
prospect of issuing, digital fiat currencies on new fintech platforms are those of Brazil, 
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technology, partly for the replicability and associated indelibility properties 
these platforms offer where recording and tracking transactions is 
concerned, partly for the privacy and security optionality they offer, and 
partly for the simultaneity of clearing and settlement they afford as real 
prospects.444 An added benefit is the ease of system interoperability they 
offer when it comes to linking up multiple national, subnational, and 
transnational payments infrastructures.445  
There are at least three ways that these developments render the 
present an opportune time to move forward with implementing the new 
Citizen and Resident Wallets regime that I am here calling for, along with 
its associated Democratic Digital Dollar—the monetary form that is 
counterpart to the payments system this regime will effectively constitute—
which I sketch out below.  
First, if the Fed or Treasury decides to upgrade our payments 
infrastructure in any event, as it is likely to do, it will be comparatively easy 
to include an expansion to Citizen and Resident Wallets and an associated 
Digital Dollar as part of that upgrade.446 The change then can be 
characterized as simply an added benefit of that upgrade, much as new 
optionality accompanying phone, laptop, and other device operating system 
(OS) upgrades typically are characterized.447 And, crucially, this need not 
                                                                                                                       
Canada, China, Ecuador, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Norway, 
Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, the U.K., and the U.S., among others. A helpful 
recent survey of the now rapidly flowering terrain is COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT. 
INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK 
DIGITAL CURRENCIES (2018), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZW5-KPV5] (explaining the concept of central bank digital currencies 
and their benefits and risks). 
444 Id. See also Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9–11 (heralding “digital currency 
development” in the United States); Betting on Betacoin, supra note 17 (propounding that 
Bitcoin may be outcompeted by other cryptocurrencies); Robert C. Hockett, Facebook’s 
Proposed Crypto-Currency: More Pisces Than Libra For Now, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 
2:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/06/20/facebooks-proposed-crypto-
currency-more-pisces-than-libra-for-now/#1d6ca7992be2 [https://perma.cc/4L8G-HWGD] 
[hereinafter More Pisces Than Libra] (asserting problems and vulnerabilities of Libra). 
445 See Thomas Lammer, Jose Antonio Garcia & Sacha Polverini, Establishing 
Payments Interoperability: Coordination is Key, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Sep. 26, 2016), 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/establishing-payments-interoperability-coordination-key 
[https://perma.cc/B24P-EGDK] (discussing the benefits of worldwide interoperable 
payment systems). 
446 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9–10 (predicting that the U.S. payment system 
“will be built upon something a lot like distributed ledgers” which will “render . . . ‘Citizen 
Central Banking’” and that the “dollar will go digital”). 
447 See id. at 10 (“A Fed-issued and -administered digital dollar will be every bit as 
uniform and elastic as the Fed-issued and administered pre-digital dollar has been. Indeed it 
will likely be even more easily managed. . . .”). 
 The Capital Commons - DRAFT [1-June-18 
 
9
be marketing hype. It can be made true, inasmuch as the Fed or Treasury, 
with the overwhelming bargaining power it will have in whatever 
partnership it might enter into in developing the new payment system 
architecture, can effectively bake optimal Citizen and Resident Account 
functionality in to whatever emerges.448 I will say more about this below in 
Part VI, where I lay out the new payments system and Democratic Digital 
Dollar that Fed Citizen and Resident Wallets will effectively constitute.    
Second, current fascination with crypto-currencies and other forms 
of fintech offers both Congress and the Fed or Treasury a rare public 
relations opportunity to “lean in” to what clearly is appealing to many 
people as an important new technological and associated social 
development, in making the transition to a system of Citizen and Resident 
Wallets and an associated new payments infrastructure with a Digital 
Dollar.449 While the legislative change required to make such a transition is 
surprisingly simple—it can involve, if we wish, literally no more than the 
addition of one category to the eight or so categories of entity currently 
authorized to bank with the Fed450—popular buy-in could be more difficult 
until the benefits and absence of costs occasioned by the plan come to be 
more widely appreciated.451 Riding the current wave of enthusiasm for all 
things fintech would help the Fed or Treasury sidestep that source of 
friction.452 So would riding the new wave of revulsion inspired by 
                                                
448 See id. (asserting that “[a] Fed-issued and-administered digital dollar will be every 
bit as uniform and elastic as the Fed-issued and administered pre-digital dollar has been”). 
449 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (discussing the popularity of 
cryptocurrencies and central banks’ plans to develop digital currencies based on 
cryptocurrencies and related financial technologies). 
450 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (citing to 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 391, 1435, 
1452(d) & 1723a(g), 347d & 358, 286d, and 5465, which provide that, respectively, banks, 
the U.S. Treasury, government-sponsored enterprises providing mortgages, foreign 
governments, foreign banks, foreign central banks, and designated financial market utilities 
may hold accounts with the Federal Reserve). 
451 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS & MKT. 
INFRASTRUCTURES, CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 1 (2018), 
https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP2G-8Y55] [hereinafter BIS 
CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPORT] (suggesting that the provision of a digital 
currency by central banks “could bring substantial benefits” but the “benefits of a widely 
accessible [central bank digital currency] may be limited if fast (even instant) and efficient 
private retail payment products are already in place or in development”). 
452 See generally New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 735 (arguing that fintech 
“may present a unique opportunity to correct the increasingly problematic imbalance 
between private misallocation of credit and the public's ability to modulate credit 
aggregates,” but that, so far, private actors have taken the lead in fintech development, and 
that “unless the public side proactively counters new technologies' potentially destabilizing 
systemic effects, it may soon find itself in an impossible position of having to back up an 
uncontrollable and unsustainably self-referential financial system”). 
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Facebook’s latest Libra proposal—a proposal that enjoys the rare distinction 
of having alienated Congressional Democrats and Republicans alike.453   
Finally, the new technologies do seem to offer many of the benefits 
noted above in connection with central banks’ proffered reasons for taking 
interest in digital fiat currency and its associated platforms in the first 
place.454 It is certainly true that the dollar, and most other sovereign 
currencies, already are digital in one sense of the word, and have been for as 
long as our banking and payments systems have been accommodating and 
employing electronic payments infrastructures—including Fedwire, which 
has been with us since 1918.455 It is also true, however, that some of the 
better-known crypto platforms warrant considerable skepticism where their 
putative speed and “frictionlessness” benefits are concerned.456 But some of 
                                                
453 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (commenting that lawmakers have 
been very concerned about technology companies’ use of consumers’ personal data, and 
that “[a]dding money and payments to the mix only heightens the worry—as our already 
extensive regime of bank depositor privacy regulation, and as recent bipartisan 
Congressional hearings on fintech, abundantly attest”). 
454 See BIS CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPORT, supra note 384, at 1 
(commenting that some central banks are “analysing a [central bank digital currency] that 
could be made widely available to the general public and serve as an alternative safe, 
robust and convenient payment instrument” and that in places where cash is disappearing, 
“the provision of [central bank digital currencies] could bring substantial benefits”). 
455 FEDWIRE FUNDS SERVICE, ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE 
PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS 7 (2014) (“In the early 
1900s, settlement of interbank payment obligations often involved the physical delivery of 
cash or gold to counterparties, which was both risky and costly. To mitigate these risks, in 
1918, the Reserve Banks introduced a dedicated funds transfer network featuring a Morse 
code system that connected the 12 Reserve Banks, the Board, and the United States 
Department of the Treasury.”). Retail payment networks in the United States are quite slow 
by global standards, as are wire transfers and credit card payments. Ironically, only 
interbank transfers, for which the Fed uses “real time gross settlement” (RTGS), are 
instantaneous. See FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE, THE U.S. PATH TO FASTER PAYMENTS 
FINAL REPORT PART 1: THE FASTER PAYMENTS TASK FORCE APPROACH 52-54 (2017) 
(showing in a table how various types of payments in the United States are currently 
handled). While the Fed could presumably offer RTGS for all payments between Citizen 
Wallets and Resident Wallets using present technology, in particular Fedwire, currently 
developing payments platforms appear to be designed with precisely this optionality in 
mind. See Gilbert, Hunt, & Winch, supra note 197. For more on the history of RTGS, 
which dates to the 1970s, see Morton L. Bech & Bart Hobijn, Technology Diffusion within 
Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement 1–3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. 
Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 260, 2006) (discussing the history and development of real-
time gross settlement systems and their use by banks).  
456 See, e.g., Alexander Kroeger & Asani Sarkar, Is Bitcoin Really Frictionless? FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.: LIBERTY ST. ECON. (Mar. 23, 2016), 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/is-bitcoin-really-frictionless.html 
[https://perma.cc/4L7Y-QN54] (discussing the transactional friction that arises when 
Bitcoin is traded on exchanges). 
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the new platforms now being developed and experimented with do seem to 
offer the prospect, in the not-too-distant future, of faster (even real time), 
safer, more private, and even user-friendly payment, clearing, and 
settlement than can presently be had, particularly among institutions not 
using Fedwire.457  
One need not be a breathless fadster or deluded “cypherpunk” to 
believe that our payments system is changing—and doing so, as I will 
elaborate in Part VI, in ways that we now both can and should capitalize on. 
One need only look to the roughly forty-four jurisdictions that I will report 
on below, where central bank digital currency (CBDC) development is 
already well underway.458 Or one can look, as I also will in Part VI, toward 
Europe, China, or Africa, where a large portion of transaction volume is 
now carried on via mobile phones and similar devices. Or one can look to 
the many largely rural countries in which citizens now do all banking by 
phone,459 then remind oneself that digital wallets” can link just as readily to 
                                                
457 See FEDWIRE FUNDS SERVICE supra, note 388; Morton L. Bech & Bart Hobijn, 
Technology Diffusion within Central Banking: The Case of Real-Time Gross Settlement 1–
3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Reports, Staff Report No. 260, 2006) for a discussion 
about the development of real-time settlement and payment systems).  
458 See Christian Barontini & Henry Holden, Proceeding with Caution — A Survey on 
Central Bank Digital Currency 7 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS Paper No. 101, 2019) 
(presenting the results of a survey showing that 70 percent of sixty-three jurisdictions 
surveyed now have development of various central bank digital currencies underway). 
With regard to the ubiquity of mobile payments in African countries, see generally Mutsa 
Chironga, Hillary De Grandis, & Yassir Zouaoui, Mobile Financial Services in Africa: 
Winning the Battle for the Customer, MCKINSEY & CO. (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/mobile-financial-
services-in-africa-winning-the-battle-for-the-customer# [https://perma.cc/HS4Y-RQAU] 
(concluding that “Africa is the global leader in mobile money” and showing that the M-
Pesa mobile payment platform is used by 90 percent of Kenyan adults). On the growth of 
mobile payments in Europe, see generally Sukriti Bansal et al., Global Payments 2018: A 
Dynamic Industry Continues to Break New Ground, MCKENZIE & CO. GLOBAL BANKING 
PRACTICE, Oct. 2018, at 5 (presenting data showing that “individual European countries 
such as Sweden and Norway are executing no more than 20 percent of their transactions in 
cash”). On the growth of mobile payments in China, see generally Aaron Klein, Is China’s 
New Payment System the Future?, ECON. STUD. BROOKINGS (Brookings Inst., Washington, 
D.C.), June 2019, at 8, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/ES_20190620_Klein_ChinaPayments.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VV9B-5JW7] (“Over 90 percent of people in China’s largest cities use 
WeChat and Alipay as their primary payment method, with cash second, and card-based 
debit/credit a distant third.”). 
459 A few examples. China, Africa, South Asia. See Moses Mozart Dzawu, Mobile 
Phones Are Replacing Bank Accounts in Africa, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-13/mobile-phones-are-replacing-bank-
accounts-in-africa (discussing the rapid growth of digital mobile payments platforms in 
Africa, and concluding that “once people have phones there’s no need for a bank account”). 
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Fed or Treasury Master Accounts as they can to anything else—another fact 
I highlight below in Part VI.  
One can also, of course, look to China in connection with the darker 
side reasons for our central bank to get ahead of, rather than trailing or 
falling behind, the fintech revolution.460 I turn to those reasons now. 
2. The Dark Side of the Ledger  
There are also risk-avoidance reasons for the Fed or Treasury to 
associate Citizen and Resident Wallets with fintech developments. These 
reasons all complement the more opportunity-levering reasons just 
catalogued. The main one is the speed with which large private financial 
conglomerates and social media firms are now storming into this space, 
hoping to employ new financial technologies as means both to circumvent 
present-day finance-regulatory regimes and to exploit clientele.461 Getting 
out front of fintech development will enable the Fed or Treasury both to 
redirect wind from these sails and affirmatively to shape, indeed to 
determine, the course of fintech development itself.462  
The wind in the sails to which I refer takes two forms, one of which 
amounts to hot air but operates insidiously nonetheless. First, profit-seeking 
private sector institutions appear to be beginning to use new fintech 
technologies to replicate, in not yet declaredly illegal ways, transactions that 
                                                
460 See Robert Hockett, When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2019/01/03/when-is-social-credit-orwellian/ 
[https://perma.cc/NAL2-YUHA] [hereinafter, When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?] 
(discussing moral and policy concerns with China’s electronically managed “social credit” 
system, which extensively surveys and assigns scores to citizens). 
461 See, e.g., More Pisces than Libra, supra note 377; New Tech versus New Deal, 
supra note 4, at 742 (“What is commonly seen as the key micro-level advantage of fintech 
its ability to eliminate transactional ‘frictions’ and to circumvent traditional market 
boundaries-also operates to amplify the system's capacity to fuel financial speculation on 
an unprecedented scale. On a macro-level, therefore, the key risk posed by fintech lies in its 
(still not fully known) potential to exacerbate the financial system’s dysfunctional tendency 
toward unsustainably self-referential growth.”). For more background information on how 
regulators are looking to cope with the challenges posed by new fintech platforms, see 
Fintech: Examining Digitization, Data, and Technology: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 45–58 (2018) (prepared statement of Saule 
T. Omarova,  Professor of Law, Cornell University), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg32753/pdf/CHRG-115shrg32753.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FSL7-8RWZ] [hereinafter Omarova Testimony]. 
462 See generally Jeff Galvin et al., Synergy and Disruption: Ten Trends Shaping 
Fintech, MCKENZIE & CO. GLOBAL BANKING PRACTICE, Dec. 2018, at 3–4 (explaining that 
“[t]o successfully enter new markets, [fintech developers] must adapt to new sets of market 
dynamics and government regulations and select new markets based on a clear 
understanding of regional variations”). 
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would themselves be illegal.463 The most salient cases at the moment 
probably are (a) Facebook’s ill-begotten new Libra proposal, which 
amounts to a combined money market fund and forex platform that 
Facebook either naively or disingenuously proclaims will be no more 
carefully regulated than PayPal;464 and (b) various initial coin offerings, and 
exchange traded coin funds, all of which appear to be aimed at exploiting 
ambiguities both in the definitions of “securities” and “commodities” under 
the nation’s securities- and derivatives-regulatory regimes, and relatedly to 
exploit unclarity as to the boundary between the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s 
jurisdictions.465 But, there are many more cases of this sort now in 
gestation, and we can expect to see more of them proliferate at an 
accelerating rate in the near future.  
                                                
463 See New Tech versus New Deal, supra note 4, at 753–55 (describing the ways in 
which the growth of fintech has led to the creation of a “shadow banking” sector and an 
erosion of the post-New Deal “settlement” in the American financial sector that helped 
constrain systemic risk); see also Amy Castor, Judge Applies Long-Established Securities 
Law to ICOs, Bitcoin Magazine (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/federal-judge-applies-long-established-securities-law-
icos/ [https://perma.cc/L5LA-AA42] (quoting former CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler as 
saying that many cryptocurrency exchanges “re basically operating outside of U.S. law”); 
Frank Chaparro, It Was True for Tulips, BUS. INSIDER, (June 23, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/ico-community-should-be-worried-about-a-coming-
wave-2018-6 (highlighting the SEC’s legal concerns about initial coin offerings); Aislinn 
Keely, Facebook’s Libra Could Meet Prying Regulatory Eyes from the U.S. and Beyond, 
Experts Say, THE BLOCK (June 27, 2019, 7:52 PM), 
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/27/facebooks-libra-could-meet-prying-
regulatory-eyes-from-the-u-s-and-beyond-experts-say/ (explaining that regulatory bodies in 
the United States and Europe have voiced grave concerns about Facebook’s proposed 
cryptocurrency project); Celia Wan, Kik’s Troubles Mount SEC Files Suit Claiming 
Securities Law Violations, Lawyers Say, THE BLOCK (June 5, 2019, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/2019/06/05/kiks-troubles-mount-as-sec-files-suit-
claiming-securities-law-violation-lawyers-say/ (highlighting attorneys’ view and 
predictions about the SEC’s allegations that Kik broke U.S. securities law with its initial 
coin offering). 
464 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (suggesting that it is not clear what 
value Facebook’s Libra will add to the current financial ecosystem, “particularly in light of 
the regulatory burdens that they will inevitably and indeed necessarily face in connection 
with any such offering that isn’t a mere glorified PayPal or Venmo”). 
465 Id. (explaining that Facebook’s Libra will “likely have to register as and submit to 
exacting regulation both as a de facto money market fund and as a systemically important 
financial institution (SIFI) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), respectively”); Allen Kogan, Note, Not 
All Virtual Currencies are Created Equal: Regulatory Guidance in the Aftermath of CFTC 
v. McDonnell, 8 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 199, 209–17 (2019) (explaining that currently, 
cryptocurrencies are regulated in part by the SEC and in part by the CFTC, and concluding 
that this regulatory regime is not satisfactory). 
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Second, financial services industry personnel already are enjoying 
considerable success, as they have in the past, in convincing gullible or 
contribution-dependent White House officials and legislators into believing 
that fintech is an exciting new field of only “upside” innovation, which 
Congress must protect from innovation-stifling regulation with preemptive 
legislation.466 The arguments offered on behalf of such urgings are in some 
cases difficult to articulate with a straight face, as they are literally the very 
same arguments offered in earlier times for insulating junk bonds, then 
financial conglomerates, then generic derivatives, then subprime mortgage 
loans and associated products, then credit default swaps, and then payday 
and auto loans against regulation.467 It is always about consumer choice, 
synergies, and efficiency-producing innovation, we are told, when in fact it 
is about rule-evasion and rents.468  
This is all inadvertent false advertising or advertent propaganda, as 
the litany of innovations just cited should make plain.469 But it is evidently 
persuasive propaganda in some quarters.470 And one way to preempt its 
persuasive force at least among people who think and act in good faith is for 
citizen-owned instrumentalities like the Fed or Treasury to embrace and 
commandeer the new technologies themselves, ensuring that they develop 
                                                
466 See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett, Let’s Get Real About “Financial CHOICE,” FORBES 
(June 11, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhockett/2017/06/11/lets-get-real-about-
financial-choice/#55c3fe6e4c86 [https://perma.cc/TFT4-FCUG] (discussing dangers of the 
“F-CHOICE Act”).  
467 Id. (“It is that weaker or non-existent financial regulation somehow promotes —or 
even equates to—"innovation, growth, and jobs" in the broader economy.”). 
468 Id. (“What is the sophistical argument to which I refer? It is that weaker or non-
existent financial regulation somehow promotes – or even equates to – "innovation, 
growth, and jobs" in the broader economy. Republicans and finance industry lobbyists are 
now routinely trafficking in this false equation, apparently hoping that we too will 
eventually come to associate the two things, Pavlov-style, if only we hear the words often 
enough. Take a look at what House Speaker Paul Ryan said on behalf of the F-CHOICE 
Act last week, for example ("a jobs bill for Main Street"). Or have a gander at what House 
Financial Services Chair Jeb Hensarling had to say ("economic growth for all”). . .”). 
469 Id. (“Notwithstanding its Pravda-redolent repetition by partisan politicians and 
bank lobbying outfits, however, the putative ‘growth’ argument for gutting financial 
regulation is complete and intentional nonsense. It is not merely "flawed" or misleading. It 
literally lacks any basis in truth at all, and in fact stands the truth on its head.”). 
470 Id. (“Notwithstanding the Act’s impending death on arrival in the Senate, however, 
it is urgent that we attend nonetheless to the would-be real-world effects of the F-CHOICE 
Act, along with what has emerged as the favored sophistical ‘argument’ that House 
Republicans and their clients now make on the F-CHOICE Act’s behalf. For this phony 
pseudo-argument will be made in the Senate this week as it was in the House last week. 
And, as importantly, it will be made on behalf of much additional legislative mischief soon 
to be proffered by White House and Congressional Republicans in coming weeks.”). 
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in salutary and public-benefitting rather than corrupt and public-exploiting 
directions.  
This is not as fanciful as it might sound to those whose stereotyped 
impressions of public sector and private sector action have been conditioned 
by well-financed corporate and financial sector, not to mention privately 
financed think tank, public relations campaigns. As noted before, the Fed 
itself invented the repo transaction, which grew publicly salient only during 
the shadow-banking boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, over a century 
ago.471 And the federal home finance GSEs—Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and 
Freddie Mac—invented securitization at least three and arguably six 
decades before securitization became publicly salient as yet another 
modality of shadow-banking in connection with private label subprime 
mortgage lending.472 And in both cases, everything worked smoothly until, 
ironically, profit-seeking private sector entities were allowed into the act 
(not unlike what subsequently happened to formerly public entities in 
Eastern Europe after their handovers to private sector oligarchs).473 
What distinguishes public sector franchisor from private sector 
franchisee finance, then, is not innovation. It is what the innovation is 
developed for, and how it is then deployed. Public sector franchisor 
innovation, which remarkably (given private sector public relations 
campaigns) often seems to precede private sector franchisee innovation, is 
always developed and deployed for public purposes, and actually benefits 
the public in whose name it is developed.474 Private sector franchisee 
innovation, by contrast, is seldom either innovative—copied as it is from 
public prototypes—or publicly beneficial. Unlike the internet, then, which 
the public sector invented and then relinquished to highly concentrated 
                                                
471 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 28 (“Turning from bank-
replication to public accommodation and monetization, it is first worth noting, if only in 
passing, that the Fed actually invented repo, as a means of financing First World War 
expenditures, while the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) now acts as the 
largest counterparty in repo markets.”). 
472 See Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 25, at 91 n.114. (“‘Securitization’ has grown 
rapidly in the last decade and has given rise to some of the largest and fastest growing 
securities markets. . . . It is often overlooked that all of this began with, and continues to be 
largely driven by, the activities of erstwhile ‘government sponsored enterprises’ (‘GSEs’) 
like Fannie Mae.”). 
473 Republican Home-Owning, supra note 29, at 19 (“What changed after sixty odd 
years of republican home-spreading and price-maintaining success? In essence, the story is 
one of creeping privatization, deregulation, and attendant speculative profit-seeking, 
accompanied by classic asset price bubble dynamics that our principal money-modulator—
the Fed—didn’t see fit to tamp down till too late.”). 
474 Per Koch & Johan Hauknes, INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 18 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“In the Public case studies we have found that idealism and the urge to develop a better 
society is an important driving force for public innovation.”). 
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private platform companies, fintech, which looks poised to prove nearly as 
transformative as the internet promised to become two or three decades ago, 
should from the get-go be kept principally public.475 The Fed’s or 
Treasury’s taking charge of it in the cause of central banking and public 
payments infrastructure for all citizens and citizen-owned enterprises would 
be a most fitting way to ensure such a status.   
It is worth noting in this connection, even if in closing this Part, that 
once the we do this the messy array of coins, “stable coins,” “coin funds” 
and cryptocurrencies on which too many ordinary Americans are now 
wasting their real money and attention will likely disappear.476 These things 
are little more than crypto renditions of the nineteenth century “wildcat” 
currencies discussed above, which died out when the Treasury, then the 
Fed, began issuing the Greenback that became today’s dollar.477 They will 
go the way of those currencies virtually the minute the Fed begins issuing 
Democratic Digital Dollars into new Citizen and Resident Wallets via a new 
digital payments platform made possible by these Accounts themselves.478 
They will have no use but small in-group uses and criminal uses.479 
VI. FROM CITIZEN FINANCE TO CITIZEN FINTECH: THE DEMOCRATIC 
DIGITAL DOLLAR & ITS POSSIBLE FORMS 
As noted above, contemporary fintech is not strictly necessary for a 
set of proposals of the sort I make here, but it does make things 
simultaneously easier and more urgently necessary.480 This Part accordingly 
situates the Citizen Finance proposal within the contemporary fintech 
                                                
475 PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION, supra note 10, at 3 (2013) (“Banking, money and credit 
are not market goods but are economic infrastructure, just as roads and bridges are physical 
infrastructure. Banking and credit need to be public utilities for a capitalist market 
economy to run properly.”). 
476 Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (“When we get there, what do you suppose 
happens? This too seems easy: The dollar will go digital. The Fed will issue ‘Federal 
Reserve Coins” and their keystroke equivalents much as it issues ‘Federal Reserve ‘Notes’ 
and their keystroke equivalents now. In this new world, there will be little more use for 
what I will call ‘Wildcat Crypto’ than there was for ‘Wildcat Currency’ after the Legal 
Tender, National Currency, and National Banking Acts of the 1860s. These ‘assets’ will 
simply fade out, retained only as curiosities on a par with Colonial Scrip and ‘Confederate 
money’ or as means of illicitly transacting in criminal activities until caught.”); 
Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67. 
477 Id.  
478 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (concluding that the demise of bank-issued 
“wildcat” banknotes was inevitable when the Fed began issuing a centralized currency). 
479 See id. at 10 (alluding to the fate of Colonial Scrip and Confederate dollars when 
these currencies were replaced and thus lost their value as cash). 
480 Id. (concluding that “the speed, reliability, and tractability of distributed-ledger-
tracked credits and debits” will help enable banking services directly between citizens and 
the Fed). 
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landscape and describes in greater detail a modern Democratic Digital 
Dollar design that can be thought of as the technical, payments system face 
of the broader Citizen Finance proposal. It also takes stock of what other 
central banks and monetary authorities—the Fed’s and Treasury’s 
counterparts—worldwide are now doing in this space.481  
A. Moneys and Payment Systems 
In view of the intimate linkages among finance, moneys, and 
payment systems on the one hand,482 and the way the Fed or Treasury 
balance sheet under my plan will immediately constitute a potential 
payment platform on the other hand, it will be both crucial and 
straightforward for the Fed or Treasury to pair up my proposed system of 
Citizen and Resident Wallets with what I am calling a Democratic Digital 
Dollar and associated savings and payments platform. While there are 
various forms that a Fed-administered digital dollar could take,483 I think 
that one form in particular is both natural and clearly preferable in light both 
of the nature of Citizen and Resident Wallets and of the values that prompt 
my push for more fully republican, Citizen Finance in the first place. I will 
accordingly first briefly note options that now figure in the literature, then 
describe the best option for present purposes, then report briefly on what 
other central banks and monetary authorities are already doing.  
To begin with options, it might at first glance look as though there is 
a bewildering array of candidates to offer. Adequately assessing alternatives 
for digitizing Citizen and Resident Account money might accordingly look 
to require that one write a distinct essay devoted to that task alone. The 
existing literature is replete, for example, with centralized electronic “bank 
money” options like card, wire, and check-image services that build upon 
                                                
481 See TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, CASTING LIGHT 
ON CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY 27 (2018) (providing examples of nations 
“actively exploring” the use of centralized or decentralized digital currencies). 
482 Conference Report, Eur. Cent. Bank-Bank of Eng., Payments and Monetary and 
Fin. Stability (Nov. 12–13, 2007), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/paymentsmonetaryfinancialstability200801en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M65N-27GK] (“In the most basic terms, the central bank seeks to ensure 
the ongoing ability of payment systems to support the monetary economy and, by 
extension, the desired path of economic growth.”). 
483 Chris Matthews, Why the Coming Recession Could Force the Federal Reserve to 
Swap Greenbacks for Digital Dollars, MarketWatch (Sep. 21, 2019), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-coming-recession-could-force-the-federal-
reserve-to-swap-greenbacks-for-digital-dollars-2019-09-06/print [https://perma.cc/GY33-
JHJ8] (“‘The debate isn’t about whether we need [a digital currency],’ Michael Bordo, an 
economist at Rutgers University and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, the public-policy 
think tank at Stanford University, told MarketWatch. ‘It’s about how you do it.’”). 
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sovereign money claims.484 It also features much on both centralized and 
decentralized electronic money, or “e-money,” services like AliPay, Paxos, 
and M-Pesa.485 And then there are variously centralized and decentralized 
currency substitutes that include CBDC; privately issued crypto-currencies 
like Bitcoin, Etherium; and so-called “stable coins” with comforting names 
such as “Havven,” “TrueCoin,” or “TrueUSD,” vaguely worrisome names 
such as “Tether,” or groovy lyrical names such as Facebook’s Libra.486  
What, figuratively and literally, are we to make of all this? How 
should we choose among options in digitizing a Fed or Treasury Citizen and 
Resident Account-associated e-Dollar? 
As it happens, things are not nearly as complicated as at first they 
might seem. The system of Citizen Finance I am advocating largely 
determines the form that a Democratic Digital Dollar should take. It will be 
easiest to see why by proceeding sequentially through three contextualizing 
observations that bring policy-relevant order to the present-day chaos that is 
the digital currency literature—including the CBDC literature—now on 
offer. These observations make clear that we can bracket and sidestep, with 
confidence, all the confusion and unnecessary complication that vitiates 
most of the still-burgeoning literature on digital monies and payment 
platforms now on offer. Indeed we can render that thicket all but otiose.  
The first contextualizing observation is that there is always a danger 
of internal tension, if not incoherence, within any discussion of money and 
payments, especially when conducted against the backdrop of our current, 
hybrid public-private franchise-finance system.487 We must take special 
care both to recognize and to avoid falling into these confusions.  
There are two underlying sources of the confusion-potential to 
which I allude, which interact in a manner that gums-up much current 
“money-talk.” One is that money is partly distinguishable from payment 
systems and thus independently addressable, up to a point, as a conceptual 
matter,488 even while also in all cases being deeply embedded in and indeed 
                                                
484 See TOBIAS ADRIAN & TOMMASO MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE 
RISE OF DIGITAL MONEY 4 (2019) (commenting that “The key distinguishing feature of 
[bank] money is that its redemption guarantee is backstopped by the government.”). 
485 See id. (distinguishing electronic money from bank money in that the former’s 
“redemption guarantees are not backstopped by governments. They merely rest on prudent 
management and legal protection of assets available for redemption.”). 
486 See id. at 3 (providing a diagram of various types of digital currency). 
487 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1147–49 (observing that “[p]ursuant to 
[their franchise] arrangement, the sovereign public, as franchisor, effectively licenses 
private financial institutions, as franchisees, to dispense a vital and indefinitely extensible 
public resource: the sovereign's full faith and credit”). 
488 We can talk for some purposes, for example, about money’s functions as a ‘unit of 
account,’ ‘medium of exchange,’ and ‘store of value,’ as economists do, in abstraction 
from the mechanical details of any particular payments system, leaving ‘exchange’ as it 
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constituted by payment systems as a practical matter.489 The other source of 
confusion-potential is the fact that hybrid public-private financial systems 
like ours tend to produce multiple layers of money and near-money within 
single hierarchies, each built on one publicly issued monetary base.490 
These two facts tend to combine in a manner that breeds much confusion 
about money and payment systems that we must avoid—and that a 
Democratic Digital Dollar and associated payment platform will render 
entirely superfluous.491 
On the first point, money is always “that which pays” within a given 
practice of paying or payments regime.492 Payment is like a move in a 
game, we might say, and money is the score-keeping modality within any 
such game.493 It is “that which counts” for purposes of accounting in any 
system involving reciprocal exchange, credits, debits and associated 
“accountability.”494 On the second point, moneys that operate within 
different layers of a money hierarchy tend to count as payment-settling 
devices within different transactional settings, hence within different 
payment subsystems of the overall payments system, in confusion-causing 
ways I shall presently show and clear up.495  
Against this backdrop, it can be tempting to think of distinct layers 
of a single monetary hierarchy as distinct moneys or forms of money, and 
                                                                                                                       
figures into the second of those features un-elaborated. This can then lead us to assume, 
mistakenly, that the mechanics of particular payments systems do not matter for purposes 
of theoretical discussions of money, even though such systems are always essential 
backdrops to and even constitutive of moneys. See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 
44–46 (stating that while it has been argued that coins once held value outside of debt and 
obligations, they were in fact always intertwined); Robert C. Hockett, Money’s Constitutive 
Contexts (2018) (working paper, on file with the authors) [hereinafter, Money’s 
Constitutive Contexts].    
489 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 39 (“You temporarily transform 
narrowly accepted notes into widely accepted note, horizontal money into vertical money, 
private money into public money.”). 
490 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1149 (“Our re-conceptualization of modern 
finance as a hybrid public-private franchise system. . . .”) 
491 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 37–38 (stating that there has been much 
confusion about private and public capital). 
492 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 14 (“[O]ur money is just the general 
form of our shared mode of organizing distributive and hence productive activity in any 
‘decentralized exchange economy’ such as our own.”). 
493 See id. at 17 (“[M]oney’s rootedness in normativity, obligation, accountability and 
associated accounting, but also its elaboration into the notions of credit, asset, and liability 
that populate the familiar legal and financial ‘universe’—or, if you prefer, ‘environment’ or 
‘game reserve.”). 
494 See id. (explaining that the system of accounting-credits and debits, depends on 
reciprocal arrangements). 
495 Id. at 37-38 (illustrating how financial institutions can be used to give credit in the 
same way that private individuals can give credit to other individuals). 
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then to explain the distinctions among them by reference to putatively 
distinct natural kinds such as, for example, tokens, claims, accounts, “b-
moneys,” or e-moneys, all treated as radically different phenomena.496 How 
this gives rise to incoherence and confusion in the digital currency literature 
will become clear as I move through the next two contextualizing 
observations.   
My second contextualizing observation is that the aforementioned 
danger of tension or incoherence rises as payment system complexity rises, 
with “complexity” here understood as the number of discrete nodes or steps, 
and associated institutions interposed between payors and payees, in any 
payment process.497 Indeed, in many cases these distinct steps and 
associated institutions actually constitute the hierarchy of money layers just 
noted.498 The more elements in a payment “value chain,”499 in short, and 
hence the greater the degree of complexity that must enter into any 
comprehensive assessment of particular monetary and payment system 
possibilities, the more unavoidable it becomes to address multiple policy 
decision points and thus to draw distinctions like those just alluded to.  
My third contextualizing observation is that, the moment we bite the 
proverbial bullet and decide that all parties shall have central bank or public 
fisc digital wallets and be able to make payments to one another through 
them, we also eliminate all the layers and associated complexities that 
occasion all of the confusions that presently vitiate monetary and payment 
                                                
496 See generally, David S. Bieri, Chapter 16: Regulatory Space and the Flow of Funds 
Across the Hierarchy of Money, in HANDBOOK OF THE GEOGRAPHIES OF MONEY AND 
FINANCE 377, 382 (Ron Martin & Jane Pollard eds., 2017) (“[T]he Löschian system as a 
spatial monetary order where money and credit are created by different financial 
institutions at separate levels of the hierarchy.”). 
497 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1177-78 (illustrating through a figure the 
immense complexity of the securities markets). 
498 See Jamie Toplin, The Payments Industry Ecosystem: The trend towards digital 
payments and key players moving markets, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2018 11:44 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/payments-ecosystem-report (illustrating the corporate 
players in a digital payment value chain, as well as the hierarchy and layering effects 
present in the chain). 
499 This is a term of art in the literature. See, e.g., Exploring the Payments System 
Value Chain, FIRST DATA 1, 2-3 (2009), https://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-
leadership/fd_insight_payments-value-chain_wp.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HR6-W224] 
(explaining the changes to the payments value chain post financial crisis); Payments Value 
Chain, METASECTION (last visited Apr. 2018), https://www.metasection.com/payments-
value-chain/ [https://perma.cc/BV42-9XA5] (introducing what a payments value chain is 
and breaking down the hierarchy of said chain); Toplin, supra note 431 (illustrates the 
corporate players in a digital payment value chain, as well as the hierarchy and layering 
effects present in the chain). 
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system discussion.500 For the latter, again, all stem entirely from the 
presence of multiple steps and associated institutional interfaces in the 
processes of payment—steps and institutional roles that produce the 
aforementioned hierarchy of distinct moneys and near moneys in the first 
place.501 Put all accounts on liability side of the Fed or Treasury balance 
sheet, then—the accounting sheet whose unit of account, whose money, is 
the sovereign issuance of the account-keeper itself—and you at once 
collapse money “hierarchies” into just money, then sidestep the bewildering 
and altogether unnecessary Ptolmeic distinctions pervading the literature 
that stem from those hierarchies.502  
The upshot of these observations is that the Democratic Digital 
Dollar that I propose will effectively moot most discussions of digital 
currencies and their associated technologies, including CBDC, that are now 
underway.503 There simply will not be a “there” there anymore. In retiring 
this discourse my proposal will also, in consequence, dissipate that head-
spinning and anxiety-prompting air of “embarrass de choix” that now hangs 
over most digital currency and digital fiat currency discussion.504 There 
really are not all that many choices or options once money goes fully 
republican, for there are no longer multiple hierarchy layers to deal with.505 
                                                
500 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that once central banks start to 
upgrade their payment systems and the Fed moves towards a crypto currency, banking will 
become centralized monetary policy will become simplified). 
501 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1 at 1170, 1180 (describing how ‘near monies’ 
play a role in the current monetary payment system). 
502 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that once the distinctions between 
public and private distinctions are discarded, then money can be centralized and digitalized 
in the modern age). 
503 See Ben S.C. Fung & Hanna Halaburda, Central Bank Digital Currencies: A 
Framework for Assessing Why and How, BANK OF CANADA, 1, 12 (Nov., 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2994052 (discussing the positives and negatives in implementing 
a central  bank digital currency); Dong He, Monetary Policy in the Digital Age: Crypto 
assets may one day reduce demand for central bank money, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 13, 15 
(June, 2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/06/pdf/fd0618.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49NP-2JAK] (exploring the ramifications of not issuing a central bank 
digital currency). 
504 Dan Lohrmann, “Could a New Wave of Cryptocurrencies Be on the Horizon?”, 
GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY (May 26, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-
on-cybersecurity/is-a-new-wave-of-cryptocurrencies-coming-soon.html 
[https://perma.cc/5QJY-F35V] (showing the wide number of cryptocurrencies already in 
existence, as well as the many more that are planned and will be coming). 
505 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that once central banks start to 
upgrade their payment systems and the Fed moves towards a crypto currency, banking will 
become centralized monetary policy will become simplified from the complex hierarchical 
layers that came before). 
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My proposal will accordingly simplify monetary conversations in the same 
degree that it simplifies monetary and payment arrangements themselves.  
It is easiest to show this by singling out two particularly oft-
encountered, and putatively fundamental, distinctions that nearly all 
discussions of digital money now seem to assume as immutable background 
conditions.506 My proposal, it will be seen, simply sidesteps both 
distinctions—and with them, therefore, most modern digital money 
proposals and associated discussions as well. It renders the laundry list of 
options that I rattled off in opening this Part instantly obsolete—something 
we need no longer waste valuable time on attempting to make sense of, let 
alone disentangle. 
The first putatively fundamental distinction is the one often cited 
between so-called “account-based” and “token-based”—alternatively, 
“claim-based” and “object-based”—forms of money and payment.507 
Pursuant to this distinction, a payor can pay a payee either by directly 
remitting tokens or objects that are recognized as legal tender in all relevant 
settings—that is, cash—or can convey a claim to the payee that indirectly 
entitles her to some portion of cash or its equivalent in effect held by the 
payor in—or owed to the payer in the form of—some sort of account.508 
This distinction is important, we are told, because (a) payors or their 
account-administrators can prove to be insolvent before payments are 
settled, and (b) cash, unlike accounts, allows for anonymity among 
transacting parties.509    
In our current payments system, this distinction does have some—
dare one say it?—purchase, for it does highlight actual dangers that can 
                                                
506 See Adrian & Mancini-Griffoli, supra note 417, at 2 (“The first attribute that 
defines a means of payment is type-either a claim or an object.”); Open Loop Card, supra 
note 241(“An open loop card is a general-purpose charge card that can be used anywhere 
that brand of card is accepted.”). 
507 See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MKT. 
INFRASTRUCTURES & MKTS. COMM., CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCIES 4 (Mar. 2018) 
(“Money is typically based on one of two basic technologies: tokens of stored value or 
accounts . . . Cash and many digital currencies are token-based, whereas balances in 
reserve accounts and most forms of commercial bank money are account-based.”); see 
also, e.g., ADRIAN & MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, supra 417, at 2 (“The first attribute that defines a 
means of payment is type—either a claim or an object.”). Other work employs similar 
terminology in drawing what appears to be the same attempted distinction.  
508 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 230, at 6 (discussing the direct and 
indirect nature of transfer mechanisms where “[t]he transfer of cash is conducted on a peer-
to-peer basis, while central bank deposits are transferred through the central bank, which 
acts as an intermediary”). 
509 See ADRIAN & MANCINI-GRIFFOLI, supra note 417, at 3 (discussing that central 
bank digital currency “could protect users’ data from third parties” but unlike cash, it 
“would likely not be anonymous”). 
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afflict payment transactions over the course of the value chain—dangers the 
law must then mitigate.510 Checks used to bounce, for example, and 
depository institutions could fail amidst multipart payment transactions 
such as those, for example, that letters of credit involve.511 Much of 
commercial law, negotiable instruments law, and banking law accordingly 
prescribes to this day who has what rights to which things under what 
circumstances.512  
Much current discussion of crypto-currency and associated payment 
infrastructure options, be they central-bank-administered or otherwise, 
highlights and addresses these same sorts of dangers.513 Likewise, many 
participants in current fintech discussions tout the preferability of “token” 
or “object” money over “account” or “claim” money owing to its cash-
reminiscent anonymity properties.514 These people accordingly speak of 
                                                
510 See generally BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 441, at 9 (discussing legal 
considerations where some countries may not “have the authority to issue digital 
currencies” and “issuance may require legislative changes”). 
511 See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. vs. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 
(1986) (involving a failed bank in the midst of a standby letter of credit transaction).  
512 See generally, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (stating pertinent law relating to the Durbin 
Amendment on debit card issuers); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and 
Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (establishing “fair and 
transparent practices relating to the extension of credit under an open end consumer credit 
plan”); Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1178; 
12 C.F.R. § 210 (2017) (“Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks 
and Funds Transfers Through Fedwire (Regulation J).”); 12 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) 
(“Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks (Regulation CC).”); 12 C.F.R. § 235 
(2012) (“Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing (Regulation II).”); 12 C.F.R. § 1005 
(2017) (“Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E).”); U.C.C. §§ 3-101–3-605 (NAT’L 
CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2009-2010) (stating pertinent law on 
negotiable instruments); U.C.C. §§ 4-101–4-504 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM 
STATE LAWS 2009-2010) (stating pertinent law on bank deposits and collections); U.C.C. 
§§ 4A-101–4A-507 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 2009-2010) 
(stating pertinent law on funds transfers). At the time of this writing, members of Congress 
recently proposed another piece of payment system legislation that would be rendered 
unnecessary by my proposal. See H.R. 3951, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Payments 
Modernization Act of 2019.”); see also S. 2243, 116th Cong. (2019) (“Payments 
Modernization Act of 2019.”).  
513 See, e.g., Systemically Significant Prices, supra note 339, at 2 (“[Systemically 
important prices and indices] render financial markets vulnerable to many of the same 
systemic dangers as do [systemically important financial institutions] . . . .”). 
514 See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 230, at 17 (demonstrating the 
preferability of cash-like properties by arguing that “the more anonymous the instrument 
and the more decentralized the transfer mechanism was, the greater the opportunity for 
cross-border activity . . . .”).  
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“digital cash” and “digital wallets” as things radically distinct from and 
preferable to “digital currency” and “digital accounts.”515 
It requires little acuity or imagination, however, to see that these 
distinctions and the dangers they highlight are entirely artifacts of a hybrid 
public-private payments system in which multiple steps and associated 
entities, nearly all of the latter being private sector institutions, stand 
between payors and payees in the payments process.516 This means a move 
to a system of Fed- or Treasury-administered Citizen and Resident Wallets 
and an associated Democratic Digital Dollar like what I propose will, in 
collapsing the money hierarchy and removing its layers, immediately 
collapse the mentioned distinctions themselves and thus render discussions 
predicated upon them no longer interesting.  
Physical currency tokens such as dollar bills and coins, for example, 
are claims upon—liabilities of—federal instrumentalities just as demand 
deposits and associated transaction accounts are claims upon—liabilities 
of—the private sector banks and other financial institutions that offer and 
administer them.517 The aforementioned popular distinction between 
“token” and “account”—or “object” and “claim”—is thus less a distinction 
between kinds or types of money, in any natural kind sense of those words, 
than it is between layers in the same money hierarchy associated with 
public and private obligees—that is, between privately owned financial 
intermediaries and publicly run sovereign instrumentalities.518  
Since the system I am proposing simply dispenses with privately 
owned intermediary institutions where both banking and payments are 
concerned, these distinctions and the systemic vulnerabilities that render 
them salient simply collapse. “Token” and “account,” “object” and “claim,” 
become one and the same thing, just as they would be in a system in which 
all payments were made in sovereign issued coin and currency, and all bank 
accounts were publicly provided and guaranteed bailment services into 
which additional, lent money or “helicopter” money could be dropped.519 In 
effect, what I propose is simply a digitized version of just that—a version 
that was technically unavailable in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
                                                
515 See id. at 4–6 (highlighting the key distinctions between token-based money and 
account-based money where token-based benefits from anonymity and peer-to-peer 
transfers while account-based does not). 
516 See, e.g., Toplin, supra note 432 (listing the various private institutions that play a 
variety of roles including issuers, card networks, and processors in the "payments 
ecosystem"). 
517 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1152 n.22 (noting that demand deposits are 
to be thought of liabilities of the bank). 
518 Id. 
519 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing generally what “sovereign-issued 
currency looks like . . . when paid out” by banks). 
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but now can afford literally instantaneous clearing and settling in digital fiat 
currency between any two or more parties.     
The one caveat to this observation is that physical cash does afford 
some privacy potentials that some systems of digital currency might not.520 
But this is a matter of system design that confronts any electronic issuance 
of anything, public or private, since electronic networks are, well, physical 
networks.521 They are material infrastructures over which flows of electrons 
can in principle always be tracked or retraced.522 This means that cash-
simulating safeguards must be cryptographically built in—again, whether 
the system in question be publicly or privately administered.523 I will come 
back to this shortly in describing the Democratic Digital Dollar that is the 
monetary counterpart of the payment system that our Fed or Treasury 
balance sheet will constitute in a system of Citizen Finance. 
The second putatively fundamental distinction that is salient only 
under our current hybrid payments system arrangements is the difference 
between so-called “open loop” and “closed loop”—a.k.a. “peer to peer” or 
“P2P”—systems, a distinction that partly prompts interest in blockchain and 
other distributed ledger technologies among many enthusiasts in the first 
place.524  Broadly speaking, in contemporary parlance, an open loop 
payments system is one in which intermediaries—typically, but not always, 
financial institutions—stand between transacting parties and whatever party 
manages the relevant payments platform or infrastructure.525 In a closed 
loop system, by contrast, only a single payment platform and system 
                                                
520 See generally, Mauro Conti et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of 
Bitcoin, 20 IEEE COMM. SURV. & TUTORIALS 3416 (2018) (discussing Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrency security risks and possible solutions). 
521 See Daniel DiMase et al., Systems Engineering Framework for Cyber Physical 
Security and Resilience, 35 ENV'T SYS. AND DECISIONS 291 (2015) (discussing cyber 
physical systems security and risk management). 
522 See id. at 295 (stating that track and trace mechanisms provide “the internal and 
network-based process and tools for determining the current and past locations and 
logistics security controls” to perform their required duties). 
523 See, e.g., id. at 298-298 (demonstrating that safeguards such as “resilience” must be 
“built into the framework”). 
524 See, e.g., Troy Segal, Open Loop Card, INVESTOPEDIA, (Jul. 16, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/open-loop-card.asp [https://perma.cc/RQT5-QDFL] 
(defining open loop systems); Julia Kagan, Closed Loop Card, INVESTOPEDIA, (Apr. 11, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/closed-loop-card-definition-4683996 
[https://perma.cc/UN76-HGS6] (defining closed loop systems); Finance Franchise, supra 
note 1, at Part V (discussing institutional integration of banking and capital markets). 
525 Segal, supra note 457 (describing how “open loop” systems are for general use; 
cards may be used at a wide variety of places—credit cards and debits are good examples 
of “open loop”). 
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administrator stand between payors and payees.526 The coexistence of open 
and closed loop systems is of course one case of that layering and 
complexifying via intermediating institutions that I noted above to be a 
confusion-sowing aspect of our present arrangements.527 That is particularly 
true insofar as closed systems tend to integrate into and become subsystems 
of broader open loop systems over time.528  
A stylized case of an open loop system would be one in which Jack 
pays Jill by in effect instructing his bank to pay Jill for him, whereupon his 
bank debits his account and pays the payment system administrator, which 
then pays Jill’s bank, which then credits Jill’s account. Most payment 
service providers with which most of us are familiar operate on some 
version of this model.529 Credit and debit card payment systems, wire 
transfer systems, and even check image transfer systems are cases in 
point.530 So is ACH—the Automated Clearing House Network—that has 
managed billions of payments for decades now.531    
In a closed loop or P2P system, by contrast, payment takes the form 
of a payor instruction to the system administrator to credit the payee’s 
account in the same system, which then occurs more or less simultaneously 
to the payor’s account’s being correspondingly debited within the system.532 
PayPal, Venmo, and Western Union are among the better-known payment 
service providers operating on this model in the United States.533  
                                                
526 Kagan, supra note 457 (describing “closed loop” systems, such as store-specific gift 
cards). 
527 Money’s Constitutive Contexts, supra note 421. 
528 As discussed immediately below. See generally Systemically Significant Prices, 
supra note 339 (developing a general account of systemically important prices and indices, 
and the market vulnerabilities to which they can give rise); National Investment Authority, 
supra note 4 (offering an account of “collective goods” as solutions to collection action 
problems in decentralized markets). 
529 Segal, supra, note 457 (describing commonly-used open loop cards from payment 
service providers like credit card companies, banks, and credit card unions). 
530 Segal, supra note 457 (“Open loop cards can take a variety of forms… credit cards, 
debit cards….”); FED. RES. BD., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF THE ACH 
SYSTEM AND OTHER PAYMENT MECHANISMS FOR REMITTANCE TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN 
COUNTRIES (Mar. 2013) (“Less commonly, consumers… use ‘open-loop’ payment systems 
such as wire-transfer systems, correspondent banking channels, and ACH networks.”). 
531 FED. RES. BD., supra note 463 (clarifying that ACH networks are a type of open 
loop system). 
532 Kagan, supra note 457 (describing how closed loop systems allow cardholders (the 
payor) to purchase from one specific vendor (the payee)). 
533 Brett King, USA - World’s Largest Closed Loop Payment Systems? BANK 
INNOVATION (Oct. 1, 2013) https://bankinnovation.net/allposts/biz-lines/payments/usa-
worlds-largest-closed-loop-payments-system/ [https://perma.cc/BZ8W-DPZJ] (discussing 
the presence of large closed loop payment systems, including Venmo and PayPal, in the 
United States.). 
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While these systems are, by definition, “closed” relative to their 
immediate users, it is noteworthy that they typically also participate in 
wider “open” payments infrastructures in order to fund the interparty 
payments that they conduct.534 Something like this happens, for example, 
when one uses a bank card to make her PayPal payment to a payee.535 The 
open system/closed system distinction is thus a fuzzy or relative one even 
under present arrangements, and becomes ever more fuzzy as closed 
systems integrate themselves into, and thus become subsystems of, broader 
open loop systems. This in turn tends to produce further payment system 
layering and associated money hierarchies of the kinds noted above—the 
kinds that then force a baroque system of distinct bodies of creditor/debtor, 
negotiable instrument, commercial, and banking law.536  
The open/closed distinction can be salient in some circumstances 
under current arrangements notwithstanding its porousness, however, 
inasmuch as each sometimes offers distinct advantages and 
disadvantages.537 For these apparent advantages and disadvantages 
positively and negatively motivate, respectively, much that now goes by the 
name of “innovation” in payment technologies.  
One advantage of an open loop system, for example, is said to be 
that it can quickly be made to operate on a large scale because the 
intermediaries that act on behalf of payors and payees—typically 
commercial banks—already have large customer bases.538 Even a small 
number of such institutions’ joining a network accordingly brings millions 
of exploitable payor/payees into the payment system “value chain.”539  
The corresponding disadvantage of the open system is that operating 
rules must be established and then maintained across multiple layers of 
interfacing institutions, which then represent multiple “near-moneys” and 
associated sites of potential error and associated legal liability in the event 
                                                
534 Kagan, supra note 457 (providing a brief overview of closed loop system payment 
infrastructures). 
535 Id. (discussing card processing in closed loop systems). 
536 See generally Open Labor, supra note 29 (offering a case for institutionalizing 
continuous public operations in labor markets analogous to continuous Fed operations in 
money markets); How to Make QE More Helpful, supra note 329 (suggesting innovations 
to monetary policy). 
537 See Dan Kosir, Open vs. Closed Loop Mobile Payments, Clearbridge Mobile (May 
21, 2014), https://clearbridgemobile.com/open-vs-closed-loop-mobile-payments/ 
[https://perma.cc/V842-MEHB] (laying out the advantages and disadvantages of closed and 
open loop systems as well as some emerging hybrid systems). 
538 Segal, supra note 457 (listing several large financial institutions, including banks 
and credit card companies that utilize open loop systems). 
539 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., 2018 ANNUAL REPORT i (2018) (“As our 2018 results 
show, we . . . added 12 million new Card Members”). 
1-June-18] The Capital Commons - DRAFT  
 
117
something goes wrong.540 Such error can of course pose systemic dangers 
and even occasion temporary payment system shut down—which, thanks to 
money’s always being constituted by a payment system, can be the 
functional equivalent of a liquidity crisis that morphs into a depression-or 
recession-causing “credit crunch” in the financial system.541   
Closed loop systems, by contrast to open systems, are comparatively 
simpler and present flatter money hierarchies and fewer sites of potential 
glitch and associated system-wide crash and liability.542 Their 
corresponding disadvantage is that they ordinarily take more time and effort 
to scale-up than do open systems, because, unlike the latter, they do not 
always build upon already-large, ready-made client bases.543  
This is one of the putative advantages that Facebook and other large 
firms and social media platforms tout in connection with proposals like 
Facebook’s Libra. With nearly two and a half billion users worldwide, 
Facebook, in theory, could offer a closed loop system that boasts all the 
simplicity advantages of a closed loop while also enjoying the scaling 
advantages of an open loop system.544 The same goes for WeChat Pay and 
AliPay in China, which are preparing to do there—save in collaboration 
with China’s central bank— what Facebook proposes to do here.545  
This in turn invites a thought: what better payments system could 
there possibly be than one that is both maximally open and maximally 
closed—i.e., one that cuts out all intermediating layers while also including 
all possible payors and payees, all citizens, residents, and businesses? The 
answer, as I will next show, is that no system could be better. And so that is 
                                                
540 See generally, Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at Part II (discussing banking 
institutions’ interactions with the public and banking liabilities). 
541 Probably still the most infamous case in point is the brief global scare brought on 
by Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974—a scare which both occasioned the establishment of the 
Basel Committee so beloved by finance regulators and provided a name to a specific form 
of systemic risk routinely now noted to afflict financial markets: ‘Herstatt Risk.’ Opinion, 
The Long Dark Shadow of Herstatt, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 70–71 (discussing a 
new financial institution aimed at reducing the risk of a crisis in foreign-exchange 
payments post-Herstatt); Julia Kagan, Settlement Risk, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 9 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/settlementrisk.asp [https://perma.cc/9CZV-J9QX] 
(describing settlement risk, also called “Herstatt Risk”). 
542 See Kagan, supra note 457; see also Segal, supra note 457 (juxtaposing the closed 
loop system with the open loop system). 
543 Id. (discussing a specific disadvantage of a closed loop system that an open loop 
system does not have). 
544 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (arguing that because of Facebook’s 
large user base they can offer a closed loop system, therefore precluding an issue of 
scaling). 
545 Id. (stating that similarly to Facebook, WeChat and Alipay can offer a closed loop 
system because of their large user base). 
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what I will propose for the Fed’s or Treasury’s liability ledger and 
associated Democratic Digital Dollar. 
As suggested above, the same capacities to bridge open and closed 
loops that render a Libra or AliPay attractive to some people also account 
for some of the attraction of blockchain and other distributed ledger 
technologies, along with associated crypto-currencies to the same people. In 
effect, these technologies can be seen as offering the prospect of a payments 
infrastructure bearing both the intimacy, quasi-anonymity, clearing-
simultaneity, and middleman-minimization advantages of a closed loop 
system, and the scale advantages of an open loop system.546 These reasons 
drive many of the more reasonable, less silly, contributions we sometimes 
find in the literature on crypto, blockchain, and other distributed ledger 
technologies.547 This too, then, invites a thought: what need would there be 
for these technologies were our payments system already both maximally 
open and maximally closed? The answer, as again I shall indicate below, is 
“undeniably some, but not as much as cryptopians claim.”  
As in the case of the token/account or object/claim distinction 
discussed above, then, here too the salience of a popular distinction and a 
whole literature still growing around it is entirely an artifact of the roles 
played by multiple private sector entities in constituting multiple “near 
money” layers in our current hybrid, public-private payments infrastructure. 
Were literally everybody to hold Citizen or Resident Wallets with the Fed 
or Treasury in a form that employs Democratic Digital Dollars as a unit of 
account, as I propose, there would be no need to develop hub and spoke 
structures linking up various accounts already held at various institutions, as 
privately offered open loop payment infrastructures do.548 Nor would there 
be any need painstakingly to build user bases—or to piggyback upon 
private sector social media user bases—as privately-run closed systems 
must do.549 We would already have the whole possible user base—
ourselves, in our shared capacity as citizens of a democratic commercial 
republic—available for inclusion.550 
In such case everyone would immediately be on one ledger—a sort 
of Consolidated Citizens’ & Residents’ Ledger—and payments would 
                                                
546 See Kosir, supra note 470 (laying out the advantages and disadvantages of closed 
and open loop systems as well as some emerging hybrid systems). 
547 See id. (discussing benefits of hybrid systems). 
548 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that a Citizen Account will 
centralize banking and make it more efficient). 
549 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (juxtaposing the Citizen Account 
approach with the approach of social media giants like Facebook who rely on their user 
bases). 
550 Id. (arguing that a user base would already be pre-built if a Citizen Account 
proposal was created because everyone would be on a “Citizens’ Ledger”). 
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simply be simultaneous creditings and debitings on that single ledger.551 
There would be little need to distribute, even if some advantage in 
distributing, a ledger as a means of indelibly mimicking centralized clearing 
among disparate peers.552 For there simply would be traceable centralized 
clearing among all paying and paid citizens and approved residents, via a 
democratically owned and operated digital payments system and associated 
Democratic Digital Dollar platform.553 Blockchain’s sole use then would be 
less as a money-platform than as a useful “smart contract” and linked-
transaction file folder, as I will explain presently.554 
In effect, then, many putative benefits—at any rate, non-criminal 
benefits—said to be offered by new crypto-currencies and associated tech 
architectures will be immediately rendered superfluous under my 
proposal.555 They will have no more use in the future than have nineteenth 
century bank-issued “wildcat” currencies now.556  We will have moved on 
from fintech to what might be called “Ourtech”—or perhaps even better, 
just plain old “tech.”557 
The same goes for all options mentioned in the opening paragraph of 
this Part. The only salient benefits that these technologies will offer will be 
(a) the privacy-maintenance prospects they promise, and (b) certain book-
keeping virtues they afford in connection with contracting apart from 
payment-consummation. The latter benefits are of some relevance for 
present purposes—indeed I am developing uses for them in other contexts 
such as mortgage registration and chain-of-title tracking558—but not as 
much as cryptopians claim. The former, or privacy, benefits, for their part, 
                                                
551 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (predicting that the Fed will begin 
administering a Distributed Ledger Technology to more efficiently track transactions). 
552 Id. (describing the benefits of a centralized distributed ledger). 
553 Id. (describing the benefits of a centralized distributed ledger). 
554 Id. (implying that blockchain technology’s primary use would be to track 
transactions). 
555 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (stating that if Facebook makes the 
Libra “regulatorily tolerable” then it will result in the Libra being monetarily superfluous). 
556  See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (arguing that if the Fed adopts a digital 
dollar, the current cryptocurrencies would have no use). 
557 Id. at 12 (arguing that even though technology is changing the way we use money, 
it will always be “our money” (the sovereign public’s money) that is allowing these new 
technological changes; hence “ourtech”). 
558 See, e.g., Robert C. Hockett & William Fry, The Simplified Mortgage and Recorded 
Title (SMART) Act of 2019 19-04 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 19-04, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3298870 (providing an 
example of some of these uses in another context). 
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are easy to bake in to a Democratic Digital Dollar and associated payments 
architecture with cryptography.559 I turn, then, to doing just that. 
B. From Payments to Moneys: Technical Options for the Democratic 
Digital Dollar—and Its Counterparts Abroad 
What, then, should a Democratic Digital Dollar look like? How 
should payments be made and transactions clear? The answer might initially 
look surprisingly simple. But the surprise should not be long-lasting in light 
of the foregoing observations. For those observations lead directly to the 
conclusion that most decision points commonly said to be implicated by 
digital currency proposals need not actually be decided upon at all. They 
can be mooted the moment we opt for Fed- or Treasury-administered 
Citizen and Resident Wallets, for they rest on distinctions that are mere 
artifacts of our not having yet instituted such a system of public accounts.  
My answer to the “what will a Digital Dollar look like” question, 
then, is that all can proceed much as it appears on the surface—or, in 
industry parlance, at “the back end”—already, save without intermediating 
payment processors, banks, or other financial institutions calling shots 
under the surface—that is, at “the front end.” The Fed or Treasury will 
simply debit and credit transacting parties’ Citizen or Resident Wallets, just 
as the Fed now does with bank Reserve Accounts.560 Payment instructions 
for their part can be made to the Fed or Treasury much as they are presently 
made to banks or to closed loop payment service firms like PayPal—
namely, via phones, laptops, chip cards, strip cards, wire, etc.— in short, all 
of the above and all that might emerge in the future.561 
In this connection the Fed or Treasury can supply payment cards to 
those who prefer plastic with strips or with chips to smart phones or other 
devices, and will post freely downloadable “Wallet apps” for use on 
electronic devices. We should also, I think, continue to make cash and coin 
available, at either or both ATMs and teller windows as noted above, at 
least for the time being. And these forms should be freely interchangeable 
with all digital forms just as they are now via check-cashing and ATM 
withdrawals. Perhaps one day paper currency, coin, and other old money-
                                                
559 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (analyzing privacy benefits of 
Facebook’s Libra). 
560 Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1147-48 (explaining how reserve accounts 
work at the Federal Reserve). 
561 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, Payment Instructions, (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) 
https://www.morganstanley.com/spc/amazon/docs/en/Payment_Instructions_Amazon.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J65V-WR7J] (providing an example of payment instructions at Morgan 
Stanley). 
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media will die out, but I see no need publicly to force the issue, and see 
compelling reasons not to do so.562  
How about privacy? Well, as noted above it is easy to bake this in to 
any digital system in a manner that replicates or simulates what we do now 
with cash and bank-administered transaction accounts.563 Under this regime, 
transactions in cash or by transfer, when for values below certain threshold 
amounts, enjoy specific privacy protections. Transactions in amounts 
exceeding those threshold amounts, by contrast, must be reported.564  
There is no reason we cannot import this regime into the system of 
Citizen and Resident Wallets, either with (a) cryptographic protections 
provided to transactions valued at amounts lower than the same thresholds, 
(b) prepaid value cards whose amounts can be withdrawn at will, or (c) both 
(a) and (b). Digital Dollars can thereby be made to constitute cryptographic 
currency or coin up to stipulated threshold amounts in connection with 
specific transactions, and something more like presently traceable bank 
money beyond those thresholds.565  
Violations of such protections by public instrumentalities including 
the Fed or Treasury itself, in turn, would of course constitute actionable 
violations of Fourth Amendment rights.566 And the regime will at all events 
always be, as it is now and as the Fed system more generally is, 
democratically determined—by federal statute.567 This is far better for 
privacy than would be any system driven by the profit- or rent-seeking 
motives that could move privately owned banks and other financial 
                                                
562 I say this notwithstanding the warnings of Kenneth Rogoff, whose concerns are 
readily addressable by means that do not throw elderly people off of the payment 
technologies to which they are accustomed. See generally KENNETH ROGOFF, THE CURSE 
OF CASH (2017). For more reasons not to dispense with contemporary cash forms too 
quickly, see, e.g., Satyajit Das, Think Twice about Going Cashless, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-05-21/world-should-think-twice-
before-abolishing-cash.  
563 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (stating that digital currency utilizing 
distributive ledger technology affords consumers increased privacy). 
564  Filing Obligations for Reports of Transactions in Currency, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 
(2011) (requiring reporting of transactions over $10,000). 
565 Are Cryptocurrencies Anonymous?, COINBASE (last visited Oct. 16, 2019), 
https://www.coinbase.com/learn/are-cryptocurrencies-anonymous [https://perma.cc/NQU3-
T3X9] (stating that cryptocurrencies are generally traceable). 
566 See, e.g., Protection of Nonpublic Personal Information, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012) 
(creating an obligation on financial institutions to protect the privacy and confidentiality of 
its customers). 
567 See, e.g., id. (providing an example of a federal statute protecting against Fourth 
Amendment violations). 
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institutions, not to mention Facebook and other social media firms whose 
business model just is data-“harvest” and -sale, to violate user privacy.568 
As for blockchain and other distributed ledger technologies, these 
will be contingently useful even though not strictly necessary in a Fed- or 
Treasury-administered Digital Dollar payments system. One virtue of 
blockchain technology, for example, is the ease with which it enables 
associated transaction records to be in effect “stapled” together for purposes 
of tracking complex sets of transactions as clusters or wholes.569 Letter of 
credit transactions are obvious cases in point, as would be mortgage-lending 
and -transfer transactions and other species of negotiable instrument 
transaction.570 In essence, any transaction type involving multiple 
component actions with documents associated with each component—e.g., 
the multiple documents used in documentary letter of credit transactions, or 
the documents linked in a chain of title—will of course lend themselves to 
tracking by suggestively named blockchain technology.571  
Insofar as payments within such transaction-clusters are made across 
Fed or Treasury Citizen or Resident Wallets, it would presumably become 
convenient at some point for the Fed or Treasury to make use of blockchain 
technology in effecting the relevant transactions.572 It would be of obvious 
benefit to the parties, and probably also to the Fed or Treasury itself. Hence 
one can deem it desirable. It would not be essential, however, hence the 
decision whether to do it will amount to a garden-variety cost-benefit 
                                                
568 See More Pisces Than Libra, supra note 377 (describing major data breaches of 
personal data like that of Cambridge Analytica). 
569 See Finance Franchise, supra note 1, at 1209 (explaining that blockchain 
technology uses a distributed ledger to record and verify each transaction and is not stored 
at a single host which eliminates the risk of alteration). 
570 See, e.g., Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 45 (providing an example of such 
mortgage-lending transactions). 
571 See Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends 
[https://perma.cc/RRB7-8AAC] (“Blockchain is a type of distributed ledger where each 
transaction is verified using encryption keys and digital wallets; the numbers of the 
transactions are recorded on a new electronic distributed ledger, which is then connected 
through a chain (using hash functions) to previous, proven distributed ledgers using the 
proof-of-work process.”). 
572 As noted below, central bank experiments with DLT-based CBDCs thus far suggest 
that the technology is promising but not yet cost-effective. See Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank 
Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX, (Mar. 6, 2019) 
https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends 
[https://perma.cc/RRB7-8AAC] (“Most of the central banks concluded that their 
experiments successfully transferred digital tokens on a distributed ledger in real time and 
in reasonable volumes.”). 
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decision we can leave to the Fed or Treasury or to Congress.573 Similar 
remarks hold of all forms of distributed ledger technology.574 On the one 
hand it will not be necessary to my proposal insofar as the tracking benefits 
that typically recommend it are already had on a centralized ledger such as 
the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet will be.575 On the other hand, it 
offers other benefits that the Fed, Treasury or Congress might deem worth 
offering when upgrading our payments system with the new features I am 
here proposing, particularly as they become less costly. At the very least, 
their replicability and associated indelibility properties lend them good 
back-up or potential that can afford payment system resilience once the new 
Democratic Digital Dollar regime is in place.  
And that is essentially it. There need be no further complication or 
layering. Nor, therefore, need there be any more “hierarchy” of moneys and 
“near moneys” associated with discrete privately managed subsystems of 
the full public payments system. There will simply be one payment system, 
run on the liability side of the Fed’s or the Treasury’s balance sheet, and 
one associated digital payments platform and associated currency. And both 
will be democratically sovereign and citizen-owned.  
Diagrammatically, then, the system I envisage is as depicted in 
Figure 2 above or Figure 5 immediately below. Payment from any A to any 
B will take the form of a card or mobile device or other such instruction to 
the Fed or Treasury Master Account administrator, which will then 
simultaneously debit A’s and credit B’s Citizen or Resident Wallet. Any 
person C, moreover, will be able to convert dollars she holds in some form 
X—e.g., digital cash—into dollars she wishes to hold in some other form 






                                                
573 Id. (“[N]o central banks have found strong advantages to issuing their own digital 
coins due to technical constraints.”). 
574 Id. (“The board of directors shall perform the duties usually appertaining to the 
office of directors of designated financial market utilities (as defined in 12 USC § 5462(4)) 
and all such duties as are prescribed by law.”); see also Simon Scorer, Central Bank 
Digital Currency: DLT, or Not DLT? That is the Question, BANK UNDERGROUND (June 5, 
2017), https://bankunderground.co.uk/2017/06/05/central-bank-digital-currency-dlt-or-not-
dlt-that-is-the-question/ [https://perma.cc/49EX-2NAR] (“It’s important for central banks 
to determine exactly what might motivate them to ever issue CBDC . . . .”).   
575 See supra Part III (“As early as the 1920s, foreign central bankers were noting how 
U.S. Fed open market operations had become the primary determinants, not only of the 
U.S., but also of the global money supply.”). 
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How does this compare to what other jurisdictions are doing? As 
noted earlier, many central banks and monetary authorities worldwide—
nearly twenty at this point—are now considering the adoption of some form 
of digital fiat currency.576 News of Facebook’s Libra proposal, moreover, 
appears to have instigated some acceleration along these lines.577 Some 
central banks at present are merely studying the prospect of issuing digital 
currencies, others are actively conducting limited experiments with a view 
to determining in advance what opportunities to exploit and what pitfalls to 
avoid before actually instituting anything, and a few are now actively doing 
such instituting.578 The farthest along at this point is Sweden’s Riksbank, 
                                                
576 See, e.g., Mike Orcutt, At Least 15 Central Banks Are Serious About Getting into 
Digital Currency, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 15, 2018),  
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612573/at-least-15-central-banks-are-serious-about-
getting-into-digital-currency/ (“In fact, no fewer than 15 such central banks around the 
world are taking the idea seriously, and many others are at least exploring it, according to a 
recent report from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).”). 
577 See, e.g., Ana Alexandre, China’s Central Bank Developing Own Digital Currency 
in Response to Libra, COIN TELEGRAPH (July 8, 2019), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinas-central-bank-developing-own-digital-currency-in-
response-to-libra [https://perma.cc/QEU2-KLCV] (“China’s central bank is reportedly 
developing its own digital currency in response to Facebook’s Libra . . . ”); Claire Jones, 
Central Bank Plans to Create Digital Currencies Receive Backing, FIN. TIMES (June 30, 
2019),  https://www.ft.com/content/428a0b20-99b0-11e9-9573-ee5cbb98ed36 (“Global 
central banks may have to issue their own digital currencies sooner than expected . . . ”); 
Nicholas Megaw, BIS Warns on Facebook Risk to Finance After Libra Plan Unveiled, FIN. 
TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/db37a29e-95a8-11e9-8cfb-
30c211dcd229 (“The BIS, the central bank for central banks, said regulators worldwide 
may need to ‘revamp’ rules to deal with the structural changes being brought about by 
entrants that control ‘key digital platforms’ such as ecommerce sites and social 
networks.”).  
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and I think it no accident that the Swedish plan also is the one that most 
closely resembles my own.579  
Plans now being actively considered or vetted fall into two broad 
categories, which I will call “citizen-benefitting” (or “retail”) and “bank-
benefitting” (or “wholesale”).580 The idea behind proposals being made and 
studies being conducted under the latter category is in essence simply to 
make improvements to existing payments infrastructures, not to upend or 
replace them.581 The focus is on wholesale central bank to private bank 
transfers and wholesale intra-bank transfers among private sector banking 
institutions themselves.582 And the thought is that cryptographic distributed 
ledger technology might make safer, faster, and more cost-efficient real 
time gross settlement of large batches of payments possible.583  
Central banks exploring this model are accordingly thinking simply 
in terms of incremental “system-upgrading” rather than far-reaching 
systemic transformation.584 Prominent among central banks going this route 
thus far are those of Brazil, Canada, the Eurozone, India, Japan, Singapore, 
                                                
579 See Gabriel Söderberg, What is Money and What Type of Money Would an e-Krona 
Be?, SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. (2018) (discussing Sweden’s central bank issued 
digital currencies and the e-krona).  
580 A number of jurisdictions are still very much in “study and deliberation mode.” 
These include the Bahamas, Curcao, the Czech Republic, the Eastern Caribbean Central 
Bank, Malaysia, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, the UK, and the US, among 
others. See infra nn. 514, 518, 524 (summarizing the various states of different central 
banks concerning the institution of digital currency). 
581 See, e.g., Sayuri Shirai, Central Bank Digital Currency: Concepts and Trends, VOX 
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/central-bank-digital-currency-concepts-and-trends 
[https://perma.cc/B79M-DS5Z] (“This proposal is the most popular among central banks 
because of the potential to make existing wholesale financial systems faster, less expensive, 
and safer.”); see also Michael Kumhof & Clare Noone, Central Bank Digital Currencies—
Design Principles and Balance Sheet Implications 23 (Bank of England, Staff Working 
Paper No. 725, 2018) (“CBDC is therefore a substitute for bank deposits, with 
substitutability determined by relative functionality and convenience, and actual 
substitution determined by these in conjunction with relative returns.”).  
582 See Shirai, supra note 514 (“In contrast, reserve deposits are available only to 
designated financial institutions such as commercial banks (and are thus called ‘wholesale 
central bank money’), and are used for managing the real-time interbank payments and 
settlements system. Wholesale central bank money is not necessarily available 24 hours a 
day or 365 days a year, although central banks have been making efforts to improve 
systems to enable faster and more efficient transactions.”). 
583 Id. (“This proposal is the most popular among central banks because of the 
potential to make existing wholesale financial systems faster, less expensive, and safer.”). 
584 See Ashley Lannquist, Central Banks and Distributed Ledger Technology: How are 
Central Banks Exploring Blockchain Today?, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Mar. 2019) 
(discussing central banks use of blockchain). 
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South Africa, and Thailand.585 The consensus concerning the results of 
CBDC experiments conducted to date in these jurisdictions seems to be that 
distributed ledger technology does offer promise along the desired lines just 
enumerated, but that it is not quite ready for prime time yet.586 Presumably 
the technology will grow more cost-effective in time, and thus we might 
well see wholesale CBDCs being adopted in some of the enumerated 
jurisdictions before long.587 This prospect is not altogether interesting in 
connection with what prompts my proposal, however—apart, perhaps, from 
the system interoperability benefits it might ultimately afford people with 
Fed or Treasury Citizen or Resident Wallets who wish to transact abroad. 
More interesting are plans and proposals of the first category I 
mentioned—citizen-benefitting CBDC. These plans and proposals fall into 
two sub-categories, one of them well suited to countries that already have 
well-developed payments infrastructures, the other well-suited to countries 
with less well-developed such infrastructures. The idea in the latter case is 
for the central bank or monetary authority simply to issue digital tokens on 
a distributed ledger platform instead of paper currencies and metallic 
coins.588 These then could be held in and paid out of digital wallets. The 
central bank would not necessarily hand out or manage the wallets, but it 
                                                
585 Id. (“Since 2016, experiments have been conducted or examined by the central 
banks of countries including Canada, Singapore, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand, 
as well as the euro area.”); see also Yves Mersch, Executive Board Member, European 
Central Bank, Fairwell Ceremony for Pentti Hakkarainen, Deputy Governor of Suomen 
Pankki – Finlands Bank (Jan. 16, 2017) (“In some European countries, for instance in 
Sweden and Denmark, electronic payments have started crowding out the use of cash.”); 
Laura Shin, Canada Has Been Experimenting with a Digital Fiat Currency Called CAD-
COIN, FORBES (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/06/16/canada-has-been-experimenting-with-
a-digital-fiat-currency-called-cad-coin/#7f84279046a4 [https://perma.cc/9LPX-R6QF] (“A 
momentous development in digital currency was announced in a low-key way on 
Wednesday, at a Canadian payments conference.”); Ministry of Finance, Government of 
India, Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen the Digital Payments Ecosystem 
(2017),  http://finance.du.ac.in/du-finance/uploads/pdf/Reports/watal_report271216.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H4TV-2XQC] (“[Digital payments] offers an unprecedented opportunity 
to our people, most of whom live in rural India or are migrants in big cities.”). 
586  See Exploring the Payments System Value Chain, supra note 432, at 4 (“SEPA 
and other market pressures have opened the box on European payments with the result that 
the industry’s value chain is being fundamentally changed.”). 
587 See Shirai, supra note 514 (discussing the CBDC trend). 
588 See Toplin, supra note 432 (“As noncash payment volume accelerates, the power 
dynamics of the payments industry are shifting further in favor of digital and omnichannel 
providers, . . . .”). 
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would replace physical cash with digital cash that can interface with such 
wallets.589  
The prompting considerations behind these plans and proposals 
seem to be to avoid having (a) to build extensive payments infrastructures 
from scratch, (b) to incur the printing and minting expenses that non-digital 
cash issuance occasions, and (c) to deal with the untraceable illicit financial 
flows that non-digital cash can enable.590 Countries whose central banks are 
either implementing, experimenting with, or considering this model include 
China, Ecuador, Lithuania, the Marshall Islands, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela.591    
The other subcategory of citizen-benefitting CBDC now being 
implemented or considered makes use of already well-developed payments 
system capacity, but has the central bank opening and administering 
accounts like Citizen and Resident Wallets in which a digital rendition of 
the existing currency serves as the unit of account.592 This is Phase 2 of the 
e-Krona project, now under study by the Riksbank of Sweden and its 
counterparts in Denmark and Norway.593 Phase 1, which is further along, is 
                                                
589 See Payments Value Chain, supra note 432 (“The payments value chain has 
become increasingly industrialised, with back office processes increasingly automated and 
centralised.”). 
590 Toplin, supra note 432 (“This is helping payments become seamless, allowing 
firms to boost adoption, build and strengthen relationships, offer more services, and 
increase usage. But payment ubiquity and invisibility also comes with challenges.”). 
591 Shirai, supra note 514 (explaining that this model benefits emerging economies 
“desire to take the lead in the . . . fintech industry, to promote financial inclusion by 
accelerating the shift to a cashless society, and to reduce cash printing and handling 
costs”); see also El BCU presentó un plan piloto para la emisión de billetes digitales, 
BANCO CENT. DEL URU. (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Comunicaciones/Paginas/Billete_Digital_Piloto.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PT6B-HWWL]; Uruguayan Central Bank to Test Digital Currency, 
AGENCIA EEE, (Sept. 20, 2017) https://www.efe.com/efe/english/business/uruguayan-
central-bank-to-test-digital-currency/50000265-3385232 (quoting the president of the 
Central Bank that digital currency “will be implemented in Uruguay”). 
592 See, e.g., Cecilia Skingsley, Speech at FinTech Stockholm 2016, Should the 
Riksbank Issue e-Krona?, at 10 (Nov. 16, 2016) (“[T]he Riksbank is not intending to 
abolish banknotes and coins, but is considering supplementing them with another service to 
the general public.”). 
593 See, e.g., id. at 9 (stating that the Riksbank plans to investigate the feasibility of 
digital currency in Sweden); Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Riksbank, Do We Need an E-
Krona?, at 3 (Dec. 8, 2017) (explaining that “Sweden and the other Nordic countries” are 
ahead of the trend toward technological solutions to the decline of cash use); Jon 
Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor, Speech at Nor. Acad. of Sci. and Letters, What Should the 
Future Form of Our Money Be?, at 11 (Apr. 25, 2017) (addressing Norges Bank’s future 
will involve electronic central bank money).  
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more limited, resembling the pilot plans mentioned above underway in 
China, Ecuador, Lithuania, and several other jurisdictions.594 
The prompting considerations behind e-Krona are essentially two.595 
The first is that Sweden has gone largely cashless by now, with many 
payees no longer accepting paper notes or metal coins.596 The Riksbank is 
accordingly worried that system failure on the part of privately-run e-
payment services could bring down the Swedish financial system and 
broader economy.597 A digital form of sovereign banknote is accordingly 
needed.598 This is what prompts e-Krona Phase 1.599  
The considerations prompting e-Krona Phase 2 are in sync with my 
own, though the Riksbank is less un-ambivalently committed to acting upon 
them than I am.600 They include interest in a more inclusive electronic 
payments infrastructure that will facilitate much more effective monetary 
policy transmission.601 Sweden plans also to enable at least some degree of 
anonymity as I have recommended above, by issuing e-Krona in the form of 
prepaid cards limited in value even after opening Riksbank accounts to the 
citizenry if such they do.602 Phase 2 of the e-Krona has just moved, as of the 
start of 2020, into a pilot program now operational “on the ground.”603 
                                                
594 See Skingsley, supra note 525; see also SVERIGES RISKBANK, THE RIKSBANK’S E-
KRONA PROJECT: REPORT 2 38  ( 2018) [hereinafter Riksbank Report 2] (“[T]he initial 
focus will be on an e-krona that constitutes a prepaid value (electronic money) without 
interest and with traceable transactions”); Sveriges Riksbank, Special Issue on the e-Krona, 
SVERIGES RIKSBANK ECON. REV. at 25 (2018) [hereinafter Special Issue on the e-Krona] 
(acknowledging that the Riksbank has “begun to investigate the possibility of introducing a 
digital form of the Krona”). 
595 See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 2 (stating that the decline of cash and the 
Riksbank’s need to promote safety are two important issues behind the investigation into e-
Krona). 
596 Id. at 5 (“According to the Riksbank’s survey from 2018, only 14 percent paid for 
their most recent purchase in cash. The corresponding figure for 2010 was 39 percent”). 
597 Id. at 29 (discussing e-Krona’s effect on financial stability in times of ease and 
distress). 
598 Id. at 2–3 (explaining the ways e-Krona can contribute to the public welfare). 
599 Id. (discussing the conditions that gave rise to the e-Krona). 
600 Id. at 35 (stating that “technology need[s] to be further examined before the 
Riksbank can decide how a development project could be designed”). 
601 See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 3 (describing how a completely neutral 
digital infrastructure could affect efficiency and inclusiveness by increasing competition, 
reducing fees, and reaching those without access to payment instruments other than cash). 
602 Id. at 16–17 (explaining that all e-Krona transactions will be traceable “with the 
exception of a prepaid e-krona card used as cash and handed over from one user to 
another,” so long as the card is no more than EUR 250); see also Shirai, supra note 276 
(describing the two proposed models for Riksbank’s digital currency as “non-anonymous” 
and “traceable”).  
603 See Riksbank Announcement, “Riksbank to Test Technical Solution for the e-
Krona,” February 20, 2020, available at https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/press-and-
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At present, the e-Krona project eschews reliance on DLT, 
presumably because (a) the technology underlying the Swedish payments 
infrastructure is already apparently safe, fast, and cost-efficient, and (b) 
DLT is itself still developing along those lines, as noted above in 
connection with the first category of CBDC experiments that I noted.604 
Presumably the time will come when DLT proves itself worthy of 
deployment in a comprehensive payments system upgrade.605 Fortunately in 
light of present purposes, however, Sweden and possibly Norway might 
have in place something like what I am proposing even before that, thereby 
affording a live experiment from which to learn by the time my proposal 
draws sufficient attention to invite movement.606 Even before that, the State 
of New York, in which legislation I’ve drafted to institute what I call an 
“Inclusive Value Ledger” is now before the State Assembly and Senate, 
might offer our republic a live pilot in our largest metropolitan area and 
indeed the world’s very financial center.607            
VII. CITIZEN FINANCE & THE DIGITAL DOLLAR: CAVILS AND COMPETITORS 
I noted in introducing this article that many proposals have been 
made in the wake of our hybrid finance franchise’s failings in the lead-up to 
2008 and thereafter.608 I noted also that I expect some to object to or quibble 
with what I propose.609 Here, I will briefly consider some of those other 
proposals along with anticipated objections to mine. I treat them roughly in 
the order in which I first referenced them in the Introduction. 
One objection that I expect is that I have misidentified the culprit in 
our nation’s no longer tenable finance franchise arrangement—that it is the 
public franchisor, not the private franchisees, whose role should be newly 
                                                                                                                       
published/notices-and-press-releases/notices/2020/the-riksbank-to-test-technical-solution-
for-the-e-krona/ (last visited March 10, 2020).  
604 See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 34 (explaining that e-Krona must be 
designed flexibly so that it may be “integrated with other systems in the financial 
infrastructure” of Sweden); see also Shiari, supra note 276. 
605 See Shiari, supra note 514 (“[Central banks] have not taken further steps towards 
implementation because the current technology is seen as not yet sufficiently advanced to 
cope with privacy protection issues.”). 
606 See Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 8 (“The Riksbank and Nordic central 
banks have mainly been interested in a version [of CBDC] that is broadly available to the 
general public . . .”). 
607 See, e.g., Jordana Rosenfeld, “New York is Proposing the Creation of a ‘Public 
Venmo,” Vice, January 7, 2020, available at 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/pked9v/new-york-is-proposing-the-creation-of-a-
public-venmo (last visited March 7, 2020).  
608 See supra nn. 5–8 (describing events that prompt a reconsideration of our current 
economic system). 
609 See supra p. 9 (suggesting the existence of objections or alternatives to the 
proposed new system). 
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curtailed or eliminated. Some will follow Ron Paul in crying “end the 
Fed!”610 Some will follow Murray Rothbard in crying “back to free 
banking!”611 Others will follow Peter Schiff in crying “back to gold!,” 
investing in the same while so crying.612 And still others will follow John 
Taylor in crying “tie their hands!” —“rules, not discretion!”’613  
These would amount less to objections to my proposal than to 
counterproposals, and the discussion above in Part I, along with earlier 
work which that Part reprises and references, makes clear why they are very 
bad ideas. A usable currency must be a stable currency—one that retains 
more or less constant value across jurisdictional, temporal, and geographical 
spans.614 That in turn requires managed currency “elasticity,” which in turn 
requires daily fine-tuning by a central bank or other monetary authority—a 
publicly instituted collective agent able to address that system-wide 
collective action challenge with which all financial and money markets 
involving exchange, not just those in a democratic commercial republic like 
ours, are continually confronted.615  
As Parts II and III above indicated, it took us quite literally over a 
century to learn this, during which time we successively rejected, first, 
wildcat banknotes; second, “gold-backed” Greenbacks; and finally, “rules-
based” monetary policy.616 Advocates of Fed-ending or Fed-binding 
proposals of this sort might never have learned this history, but our 
                                                
610 See Paul, supra note 7, at 5 (suggesting ending the Federal Reserve “would be the 
single greatest step we could take to restoring American prosperity and freedom . . .”). 
611 See, e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE MYSTERY OF BANKING 11 (1st ed. 1983) 
(popularizing a ‘right wing libertarian’ read of the ‘Austrian’ tradition of monetary 
economics). 
612 See, e.g., PETER D. SCHIFF, CRASH PROOF: HOW TO PROFIT FROM THE COMING 
ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 210 (2007) (describing the Federal Reserves’ abandonment of the 
international gold standard in 1971 as bringing the United States dollar “to the brink of 
collapse”). 
613 See generally, e.g.,JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT 
ACTIONS AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2009) (popularizing a view developed in the academic literature over the 1970s). 
614 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 51 (describing how currency is not 
money, rather “represents money” in jurisdictions that recognize such representation); 
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9 (“Nothing whose value is unstable can function for long as 
bona fide ‘money’”). 
615 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 9 (“A money whose supply can be ‘modulated’ . 
. . is essential if we’re to avoid needlessly disrupting either transaction activity, investment 
activity, or currency value”).  
616 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 3 (“Money figures as something that 
‘doesn’t grow on trees,’ must be ‘backed up’ by gold . . . and is ‘debased’ by ‘the 
government’ itself when the latter resorts to ‘mere printing’ of ‘mere fiat’ money.”);  
Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining how Greenbacks eventually brought an end to 
‘wildcat’ banknotes).  
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commercial republic is, happily, unlikely to forget it.617 The problem with 
our Fed is its incomplete citizen-ownership, not its citizen-ownership. 
Hence the advocacy here of what I am calling Citizen Finance and a 
Democratic Digital Dollar.618      
A second objection I expect works from the other side of the 
public/private divide, in effect crying, not “end [or limit] the Fed,” but “end 
[or limit] banking.” The idea here is that “ending” banking a la McMillan, 
“narrow banking” a la Cochrane, “limited purpose banking” a la Kotlikoff, 
“100% money”” a la Fisher, or perhaps what I call “40% money” after 
Admati and Hellwig, would be preferable to the system of Citizen Finance 
that I here propose.619  
This line of thinking, like “end the Fed” thinking, agrees that the 
fault in our nation’s finance franchise arrangement stems from its hybridity, 
but in effect faults the franchisee side of the public/private divide more than 
the franchisor side.620 It is the height of moral hazard, the argument in effect 
                                                
617 See Rousseauvian Money, supra note 67, at 9 (explaining our polity is our “joint 
emanation . . . our ‘internal’ means of selecting our shared destinations, not an ‘outward’ 
imposition of radically separate destinies”). 
618 See supra Parts IV–VI. 
619 The ‘100% Money’ plan originates with the remarkably fertile mind of Irving 
Fisher. See IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY AND THE PUBLIC DEBT, 8–9 (2009) (arguing for a 
“plan to put and keep a 100% cash Reserve behind all Demand Deposits.”). Variants were 
subsequently advocated by several Chicago economists, whereupon it began to be called 
‘The Chicago Plan.’ Since the 2008 crash, revivals have been attempted by Cochrane, 
Kotlikoff, and several others, including my friends Jonathan McMillan. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD, 157 (2010) (advocating a system that 
would require depository institutions to “transfer all their checking accounts into cash 
mutual funds and use their reserves to provide cash to back these shares”); McMillan, 
supra note 21, at 145–46 (advocating an expansion of the definition of solvency to include 
only “real assets” to prevent “a daisy chain of balance sheets” where “the solvency of one 
balance sheet . . . depends on the solvency of balance sheets further up the chain”); John H. 
Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL Crisis 197, 198 (Martin N. Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 
2014) (“In this vision, demand deposits, fixed-value money-market funds, or overnight 
debt must be backed entirely by short-term Treasuries.”). By ‘40% Money,’ I refer, tongue-
in-cheek fashion, to my friends Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s recently proposed 40% 
capital requirement. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW 
CLOTHES 181–82 (2013) (postulating that there is no reason “why banks should not have 
equity levels between 20 and 30 percent of their total assets”). 
620 See, e.g., McMillan, supra note 21, at 8 (“The banking system turned into a 
dysfunctional public-private project.”); KOTLIKOFF, supra note 550, at 52 (“[T]he critical 
takeaways . . . are that power is extremely concentrated at the very top in modern American 
financial companies, that decisions are being made as much on emotion and ego as careful 
business planning, that the folks at the top are so rich as to face no real financial loss for 
themselves or their families if they role [sic] the wrong dice for their companies, that board 
after board of directors did nothing to oversee the decisions of their ultimate paymasters, 
and that the correlation between performance and compensation was negative.”). 
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runs, to entrust profit-seeking private sector entities with the management of 
a public resource that is as systemically important as the monetized full 
faith and credit of the United States.621 Advocates accordingly hold that 
simply removing the credit-generation authority from banks—or at least, 
say, some 40% of that authority—is the appropriate policy response.622  
Banks would continue to manage accounts and offer payment 
services to depositors under these proposals, but would no longer operate as 
disseminators of monetized public full faith and credit by lending in excess 
of what has been antecedently deposited with them.623 They would 
effectively become mutual funds, and regulation would accordingly make 
true the intermediated scarce private capital story that I have long argued, as 
noted above in Part I, is not true.624   
It should be clear from what I have argued both here and elsewhere 
that I do not think it necessary or desirable that private sector banks and 
other financial institutions continue to operate as the primary allocators of 
our nation’s monetized full faith and credit. Both the Citizen and Resident 
Wallet plan and the Democratic Digital Dollar plans elaborated above, and 
the NIC and PSF proposals reprised above and detailed elsewhere, make 
plain what I think about that.625 But simply ending private bank credit-
generation, without simultaneously replacing it thoughtfully and 
pervasively with public credit-generation, would be as profoundly 
deflationary as “returning to gold” would be.626 Before ending credit-
generative private sector banking, then, we must put in place explicitly 
credit-generative public institutions and procedures. That is precisely what 
the Citizen Finance and its Democratic Digital Dollar as elaborated above 
do. 
                                                
621 See, e.g., MCMILLAN, supra note 21, at 43 (“[W]ith government guarantees in 
place, depositors now that their money is safe no matter what. They have no incentive to 
step in if their bank takes excessive risks. Knowing this, banks indeed take excessive 
risks.”). 
622 See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 550, at 181–82 (arguing banks should be 
subject to somewhere between 20-30% capital requirements); FISHER, supra note 550, at 
8–9 (“[P]ut and keep a 100% cash Reserve behind all Demand Deposits.”). 
623See, e.g., KOTLIKOFF, supra note 550, at 156–58 (describing the functioning of 
banks under his scheme). 
624 Further elaboration on this point see Finance Franchise, supra note 14, at 1151 
(characterizing financial institutions in this scheme as “effectively variations on the mutual 
fund form”). 
625 See generally Finance without Financiers, supra note 1; Finance Franchise, supra 
note 1; Money’s Past, supra note 3; supra, Part IV (expressing skepticism about the current 
banking system’s stewardship of the people’s full faith and credit). 
626 This is precisely why Keynes politely declined to sign on to the first-ever proposal 
along these lines, when invited by Fisher to do so in 1934. See KEYNES, supra note 246, at 
125 (critiquing the Fisher conception of appreciation and interest). 
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The next set of proposals I referenced in introducing this paper 
involve various forms of small-scale “public banking,” understood as 
embracing either or both (a) deposit-taking and transaction-account-
managing, and (b) retail credit-extending and -allocating.627 As my remarks 
on “narrow banking” immediately above should make plain, I sympathize 
with many such proposals. Indeed, I am explicitly associated with and 
working on several of them.628  
I do not, therefore, regard these as being in any fundamental tension 
with my proposals. I see them, rather, as proposed local or smaller scale 
complements to my more comprehensive and nationally applicable 
proposals—micro or half-complete counterparts, as it were, to my macro 
Wallet, Digital Dollar, NIC and PSF plans. The “central banking for all” 
proposals of McMillan and Gruen in 2014, of Andolfatto and Niepelt in 
2015, and of The Economist and Ricks, Crawford and Menand in 2018, for 
example, overlap with what I propose at least for one piece of the liability 
sides of central bank balance sheets.629  So does the Swedish Riksbank’s 
already well-underway e-Krona project discussed above.630 The many 
“public bank,” revived “postal bank,” and “microfinance” proposals made 
over the last thirty years also aim to do something akin to what I would do 
with the Fed’s or the Treasury’s liability book, not to mention my earlier 
“Shoeboc Bank” started for homeless friends and “Occupy Bank” founded 
during the Wall Street “Occupation” of 2011, prompted as these all are by 
the value of greater financial inclusion.631   
What these earlier proposals do not do, however, is engage seriously 
with the asset side counterparts of their particular liability side 
                                                
627 See, e.g., BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 92–94, 113 
(discussing the new paradigm of commercial banks entering the microfinance space); 
PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 10, at 78-85 (discussing the deposit and credit services 
that banks should provide under her system). 
628 Cf. Pre-Liberal Autonomy, supra note 10 (citing and critiquing the small-scale 
models). 
629 See Ricks, Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 1 (“We propose giving the 
general public—individuals, businesses, and institutions—the option to hold accounts at 
the central bank, which we call FedAccounts.”); Andolfatto, supra note 21 (describing a 
system of digital federal currency); Niepelt, supra note 21 (“Letting the general public hold 
reserves at the central bank and use them for electronic payments would lower the risk of 
bank runs and strengthen financial stability.”); MCMILLAN, supra note 21, at 10, 164–65 
(describing the effects of a system without banking: “[t]o spend more money than it earns, 
the government will have to gain trust from potential lenders, that is, from its citizens”). 
630 Riksbank Report 2, supra note 527, at 8 (discussing an electronic digital money 
widely available to the public). 
631 See, e.g., BUILDING INCLUSIVE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 10, at 178–81 
(“Financial development could contribute directly to poverty alleviation by easing credit 
constraints on the poor and indirectly by fostering economic growth that benefits the 
poor.”). 
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recommendations.632 Nor do most of them concern themselves with how to 
make use of, or even more generally what to do about, the rapidly unfolding 
revolution now underway in the realms of financial, commercial, and 
payments technology.633 And that is because each of them seems to concern 
itself with but one or two perceived problems instead of the broader array of 
mutually reinforcing problems that afflict contemporary financial and 
macroeconomic policy thanks to our system of hybrid, public/private 
finance.634  
That narrowness of focus need not be a bad thing—there is much to 
be said for addressing discrete challenges in discrete ways. I do not think it 
possible to deal optimally with any one of the problems discussed in this 
paper, however, without dealing with all of them. For they are all in this 
case, as argued above, mutually reinforcing. And whatever one thinks of the 
comparative merits of piecemeal and comprehensive structural reform 
strategies, the important point for present purposes is that these proposals 
need not in any event be at crossed-purposes to mine. We can go “both/and” 
here instead of “either/or,” and in consequence let a thousand flowers 
bloom.635    
Another objection that I anticipate would stem from a claim that 
there is something “Orwellian” or otherwise “dangerous” about what I 
propose here—that putting us all on one Consolidated Ledger denominated 
in Democratic Digital Dollars will render us vulnerable to system-wide tech 
failure or subject us to centralized scrutiny and thereby imperil our 
“freedom.” Those who issue these warnings might also argue that the 
blemishes presently marring our finance franchise arrangements are better 
rectified simply through better regulation.636 Cautious “incrementalists,” 
wild-eyed crypto-anarchists, and any number of starry-eyed cryptopians 
                                                
632 See PUBLIC BANKS SOLUTION, supra note 10, at 352–360 (discussing the various 
different proposals). 
633 See, e.g., PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 10; FISHER, supra note 550 (though 
perhaps this is merely the result of technology outpacing scholarship). 
634 See, e.g., Ricks, Crawford, & Menand, supra note 21, at 2 (proposing a 
FedAccounts system for financial stability, smooth monetary policy communications, and 
regulatory simplicity); Niepelt, supra note 21 (focusing on eliminating both “the zero lower 
bound on nominal interest rates” and “anonymous transaction[s] that may obstruct the fight 
against crime, money laundering, tax evasion, and the like”). 
635 Professor Omarova and I argue similarly in National Investment Authority and 
Public Actors. National Investment Authority, supra note 4, at 438–39 (addressing the 
challenge of “ensuring structurally balanced, sustainable, and socially inclusive long-term 
economic development” via a “National Investment Authority”); Public Actors, supra note 
4, at 122 (outlining a range of modality extensions forming the buds of the enlightened 
financial flower).  
636 See When is “Social Credit” Orwellian?, supra note 393 (discussing the perils of a 
widespread social credit system that extends beyond the purely financial). 
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will likely approve this response to my proposal, as will some older school 
self-styled libertarians, money-launderers, drug-dealers, terrorists, and other 
criminals.  
The problem with the response, at least in its good faith guise, is that 
it is ill-informed both as to the present sources of systemic and Orwellian 
danger and, therefore, as to how that same danger is best addressed.637 As 
for the source of the danger, the discussion above should make plain that 
our present patchwork payments system, which has developed ad hoc 
through the actions of profit-seeking private sector institutions, is itself 
vulnerable to glitches and associated panics at each node and connecting 
line segment in the “value chain.”638 Indeed it is more vulnerable than any 
unitary system without multiple layers and connecting nodes ever can be.  
Moreover, as also noted above, it is easy to build indelibility into 
transaction records on the Fed or Treasury balance sheet not only with 
backup computing power as is done now, but also with the new payments 
technologies I have just discussed.639 And lest anyone doubt that the Fed 
and Treasury have this capacity, they need only look at the comprehensive 
flow-of-funds data the Fed and Treasury compile, process, and publicly 
report every quarter.640 Or, they can look at how each of the six mega-banks 
that now dominate our hybrid financial system handle clearing and 
settlement of transactions among the literal scores of millions of citizens 
and counterparties who transact on their books every hour.641  
As for Orwellian danger, the discussion above also makes plain that 
Orwellian intrusion and invasion of privacy—indeed, even illicit mining, 
“harvesting,” and selling of private financial and other data—right now 
does not emanate from our citizen-owned, public sector, republican  
                                                
637 Id. (drawing attention to the distinction between an algorithmic valuation of purely 
financial metrics and one of social ilk). 
638 See MetaSection, supra note 432 (diagraming the complicated flow of payments 
systems); First Data, supra note 432 (highlighting the rapid change in the industry and 
proclivity for the industry players themselves to drive that change). 
639 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 10 (praising the “superior tracking ability 
afforded by [distributed ledger technology]”). 
640 At the time of this writing, the most recent is FED. RESERVE SYS., Financial 
Accounts of the Unites States, Quarter 1 (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20190606/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6YT-
6K7S]. 
641 See Steve Schaefer, Five Biggest U.S. Banks Control Nearly Half Industry's $15 
Trillion In Assets, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2014/12/03/five-biggest-banks-trillion-
jpmorgan-citi-bankamerica/#459c8976b539 [https://perma.cc/MG9F-WKMY] (reporting 
that the five biggest banks control nearly half of the assets held by banks in the United 
States). 
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institutions.642 It emanates from gargantuan elite-owned private sector 
monopoles and oligopolies.643 The threat comes, that is, from the huge 
platform and social media firms—Amazon, Facebook, Google, and so on—
that now harvest individual data they both use and sell on in an ever-greater 
commoditizing of our general public for private gain.644 Moreover, as noted 
above, large private sector banking and other financial institutions are now 
actively partnering with these same platform and social media firms, 
precisely in order to circumvent banking and finance-regulatory privacy 
laws and extract further value from all of us.645  
Reclaiming commercial and financial access and public investment 
as republican citizen functions, as my plan aims to do, is accordingly to be 
understood as a measure aimed at recovering and safeguarding citizens’ 
access, privacy, and critical public infrastructures, not undermining or 
ending them. We cannot take away what we have already given away. We 
can only reclaim it. This is, again, precisely what the project of Citizen 
Finance laid out here is meant to do. 
These same observations carry over to the suggestion that 
“regulation’s enough.” Obviously, regulation is not enough. That was the 
thrust of Parts I through III and my prior work cited there. Financial privacy 
regulation is precisely what banks entering fintech right now are attempting 
to arbitrage out of.646 And public money-modulatory and credit-allocative 
regulation is precisely what banks that successfully rolled back Glass-
Steagall regulation, derivatives regulation, mortgage loan regulation, 
consumer financial protection regulation, and now even Dodd-Frank 
macroprudential regulation are always and everywhere seeking to evade—
and paying legislators to help them evade.647 
Of course, they will try likewise to roll back a system of Citizen 
Finance too once it is in place. But two things should be remembered here. 
                                                
642 See Omarova Testimony, supra note 394, at 7 (emphasizing the danger that tech 
companies pose due to their unimpeded access to consumers’ financial data). 
643 Id. (highlighting large tech platforms’ unauthorized use of personal data). 
644Id. at 7 (describing how tech companies can gain access to private financial, 
information and use it to influence consumers into buying what they want to sell). 
645 See, e.g., Kristina Russo, Regulatory Oversight Uncertain Amid Growing Fintech 
Partnerships with Banks, American Express (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), 
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/foreign-exchange/articles/bank-fintech-partnership-
regulatory-void/ [https://perma.cc/42P9-LVG3] (discussing the lack of regulation 
surrounding fintech and the partnering of banks with fintech to take advantage of this). 
646 See Money’s Past, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how fintech and cryptocurrencies 
create privacy “paradises”). 
647 Katy Milani, Latest assault on Dodd-Frank has bank lobbyists beaming, THE HILL 
(Mar. 5, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/376749-latest-assault-on-dodd-frank-
has-bank-lobbyists-beaming [https://perma.cc/8VAE-Q44U] (describing lobbying efforts 
by banks to weaken and remove Dodd Frank regulations). 
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First, that it is much harder to take away popular public institutions than it is 
to roll back regulations, as the popularity and longevity of Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, public education, the National Parks and National 
Monuments and a host of other civic institutions attests.648 And second, my 
proposal amounts also, especially in the long run, to a massive downsizing 
of precisely those industries whose enormous rent revenues and gigantic, 
“too big to fail,” self-hostage-holding capacity have enabled them to strong-
arm our legislators and other public officials in the first place. They will not 
be able to do that next time, for the plan here is precisely to shrink and 
disarm them, in addition to rendering us no longer dependent upon them.  
CONCLUSION: FROM FINTECH TO OURTECH—AND OUR FINANCE 
I have covered a fair bit of ground in this paper, from characterizing 
our present public-private franchise system of payment and finance, through 
explaining how it came to be and why it was destined never to be more than 
a way-station en route to full citizen-managed money and finance, to 
describing in detail that better and final destination. Along the way I have 
clarified the nature of money, credit, payment, and finance themselves—in 
particular, their continuing and yet still hidden character as public-private 
franchise operations.  
The hidden character of our system’s hybridity, I believe, is 
responsible for many delusions and misapprehensions, which manifest 
themselves in the persistence of dysfunctional monetary and financial 
arrangements that prevent our all being as productive and prosperous as we 
could be, all while subjecting us to exploitative privately-owned mega-firms 
that extract from us without giving back to us. These drive a bipolar 
financial treadmill that by turns trips us by rushing more quickly than we 
can run, and then holds us back by not moving at all. This ceaseless, manic-
depressive oscillation between unstoppable bubble and unforgiving bust is 
the inevitable upshot of a franchise arrangement in which the franchisor 
routinely forgets its role, standing by idly as rogue franchisees dispense low 
quality knockoffs of its product—effectively “counterfeiting” it—with 
                                                
648 See Matthew Sherman, A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United 
States, CENTER FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH (2009), 
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FYR6-V8G7] (describing the history of financial deregulation over the 
last three decades); Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html 
[https://perma.cc/QDT4-SJF3] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (detailing the long history of 
Social Security since its establishment in the 1930s and its history of perseverance since 
then). 
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abandon.649 That is where regular over-emission and misallocation of our 
monetized public full faith and credit originates.650 
The solution is to bring to the surface what has been there all along, 
and then to correct it. Our mutual credit and debit relations effectively 
constitute one citizens’ ledger. Our monetized public full faith and credit—
our money—just is the set of relations that constitute that ledger. It is 
accordingly both our prerogative and our responsibility both to put and to 
keep this ledger—our ledger—to rights. The trajectory of American 
commercial and financial development, I maintain, is such as to recommend 
doing that reclamation in one simple stroke. That is the stroke of making 
our central bank and public fisc our central bank and public fisc, our public 
investment our public investment, and our money our money. That, in this 
country, will be a Citizens’ Fed or Treasury, a Fed- or Treasury-
administered public savings and payments platform, and an associated 
Democratic Digital Dollar. That, in our democratically productive 
commercial republic, will be Citizens’ Finance.  
                                                
649 See Finance without Financiers, supra note 14, at 3 (asserting that lack of quality 
control over franchisee performance leads to a failure to create effective modulation and 
allocation of credit resulting in less utilization of production capacity). 
650 Id. at 2 (describing public faith and full credit as prone to over-generation and 
misallocation). 
